diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'spectre-meltdown-checker.sh')
| -rwxr-xr-x | spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | 3110 |
1 files changed, 1556 insertions, 1554 deletions
diff --git a/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh b/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh index fe46c45..67fcd09 100755 --- a/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh +++ b/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh @@ -14,83 +14,84 @@ trap 'exit_cleanup' EXIT trap '_warn "interrupted, cleaning up..."; exit_cleanup; exit 1' INT exit_cleanup() { - # cleanup the temp decompressed config & kernel image - [ -n "$dumped_config" ] && [ -f "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config" - [ -n "$vmlinuxtmp" ] && [ -f "$vmlinuxtmp" ] && rm -f "$vmlinuxtmp" - [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ] && umount /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null - [ "$insmod_cpuid" = 1 ] && rmmod cpuid 2>/dev/null - [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ] && rmmod msr 2>/dev/null + # cleanup the temp decompressed config & kernel image + [ -n "$dumped_config" ] && [ -f "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config" + [ -n "$vmlinuxtmp" ] && [ -f "$vmlinuxtmp" ] && rm -f "$vmlinuxtmp" + [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ] && umount /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null + [ "$insmod_cpuid" = 1 ] && rmmod cpuid 2>/dev/null + [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ] && rmmod msr 2>/dev/null } show_usage() { - # shellcheck disable=SC2086 - cat <<EOF - Usage: - Live mode: $(basename $0) [options] [--live] - Offline mode: $(basename $0) [options] [--kernel <vmlinux_file>] [--config <kernel_config>] [--map <kernel_map_file>] - - Modes: - Two modes are available. - - First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel. - To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitly) - - Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel. - You'll need to specify the location of the vmlinux file, config and System.map files: - - --kernel vmlinux_file Specify a (possibly compressed) vmlinux file - --config kernel_config Specify a kernel config file - --map kernel_map_file Specify a kernel System.map file - - Options: - --no-color Don't use color codes - --verbose, -v Increase verbosity level - --no-sysfs Don't use the /sys interface even if present - --sysfs-only Only use the /sys interface, don't run our own checks - --coreos Special mode for CoreOS (use an ephemeral toolbox to inspect kernel) - --batch text Produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone - --batch json Produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef... - --batch nrpe Produce machine readable output formatted for NRPE - --variant [1,2,3] Specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked - Can be specified multiple times (e.g. --variant 2 --variant 3) - - Return codes: - 0 (not vulnerable), 2 (vulnerable), 3 (unknown), 255 (error) - - IMPORTANT: - A false sense of security is worse than no security at all. - Please use the --disclaimer option to understand exactly what this script does. + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + cat << EOF + Usage: + Live mode: $(basename $0) [options] [--live] + Offline mode: $(basename $0) [options] [--kernel <vmlinux_file>] [--config <kernel_config>] [--map <kernel_map_file>] + + Modes: + Two modes are available. + + First mode is the "live" mode (default), it does its best to find information about the currently running kernel. + To run under this mode, just start the script without any option (you can also use --live explicitly) + + Second mode is the "offline" mode, where you can inspect a non-running kernel. + You'll need to specify the location of the vmlinux file, config and System.map files: + + --kernel vmlinux_file Specify a (possibly compressed) vmlinux file + --config kernel_config Specify a kernel config file + --map kernel_map_file Specify a kernel System.map file + + Options: + --no-color Don't use color codes + --verbose, -v Increase verbosity level + --no-sysfs Don't use the /sys interface even if present + --sysfs-only Only use the /sys interface, don't run our own checks + --coreos Special mode for CoreOS (use an ephemeral toolbox to inspect kernel) + --batch text Produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone + --batch json Produce JSON output formatted for Puppet, Ansible, Chef... + --batch nrpe Produce machine readable output formatted for NRPE + --variant [1,2,3] Specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked + Can be specified multiple times (e.g. --variant 2 --variant 3) + + Return codes: + 0 (not vulnerable), 2 (vulnerable), 3 (unknown), 255 (error) + + IMPORTANT: + A false sense of security is worse than no security at all. + Please use the --disclaimer option to understand exactly what this script does. EOF } show_disclaimer() { - cat <<EOF -Disclaimer: + cat <<EOF -This tool does its best to determine whether your system is immune (or has proper mitigations in place) for the -collectively named "speculative execution" vulnerabilities. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee -that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying whether your system has the known correct mitigations in place. -However, some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might -falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels). + Disclaimer: -Your system exposure also depends on your CPU. As of now, AMD and ARM processors are marked as immune to some or all of these -vulnerabilities (except some specific ARM models). All Intel processors manufactured since circa 1995 are thought to be vulnerable, -except some specific/old models, such as some early Atoms. Whatever processor one uses, one might seek more information -from the manufacturer of that processor and/or of the device in which it runs. + This tool does its best to determine whether your system is immune (or has proper mitigations in place) for the + collectively named "speculative execution" vulnerabilities. It doesn't attempt to run any kind of exploit, and can't guarantee + that your system is secure, but rather helps you verifying whether your system has the known correct mitigations in place. + However, some mitigations could also exist in your kernel that this script doesn't know (yet) how to detect, or it might + falsely detect mitigations that in the end don't work as expected (for example, on backported or modified kernels). -The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected -to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer -explicitly stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement. + Your system exposure also depends on your CPU. As of now, AMD and ARM processors are marked as immune to some or all of these + vulnerabilities (except some specific ARM models). All Intel processors manufactured since circa 1995 are thought to be vulnerable, + except some specific/old models, such as some early Atoms. Whatever processor one uses, one might seek more information + from the manufacturer of that processor and/or of the device in which it runs. -Please also note that for Spectre vulnerabilities, all software can possibly be exploited, this tool only verifies that the -kernel (which is the core of the system) you're using has the proper protections in place. Verifying all the other software -is out of the scope of this tool. As a general measure, ensure you always have the most up to date stable versions of all -the softwares you use, especially for those who are exposed to the world, such as network daemons and browsers. + The nature of the discovered vulnerabilities being quite new, the landscape of vulnerable processors can be expected + to change over time, which is why this script makes the assumption that all CPUs are vulnerable, except if the manufacturer + explicitly stated otherwise in a verifiable public announcement. -This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security. + Please also note that for Spectre vulnerabilities, all software can possibly be exploited, this tool only verifies that the + kernel (which is the core of the system) you're using has the proper protections in place. Verifying all the other software + is out of the scope of this tool. As a general measure, ensure you always have the most up to date stable versions of all + the softwares you use, especially for those who are exposed to the world, such as network daemons and browsers. + + This tool has been released in the hope that it'll be useful, but don't use it to jump to conclusions about your security. EOF } @@ -122,411 +123,411 @@ nrpe_vuln="" if which echo >/dev/null 2>&1; then echo_cmd=$(which echo) else - [ -x /bin/echo ] && echo_cmd=/bin/echo - [ -x /system/bin/echo ] && echo_cmd=/system/bin/echo + [ -x /bin/echo ] && echo_cmd=/bin/echo + [ -x /system/bin/echo ] && echo_cmd=/system/bin/echo fi # still empty ? fallback to builtin [ -z "$echo_cmd" ] && echo_cmd=echo __echo() { - opt="$1" - shift - _msg="$*" - - if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ] ; then - # strip ANSI color codes - # some sed versions (i.e. toybox) can't seem to handle - # \033 aka \x1B correctly, so do it for them. - _ctrlchar=$($echo_cmd -e "\033") - _msg=$($echo_cmd -e "$_msg" | sed -r "s/$_ctrlchar\[([0-9][0-9]?(;[0-9][0-9]?)?)?m//g") - fi - # shellcheck disable=SC2086 - $echo_cmd $opt -e "$_msg" + opt="$1" + shift + _msg="$*" + + if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ] ; then + # strip ANSI color codes + # some sed versions (i.e. toybox) can't seem to handle + # \033 aka \x1B correctly, so do it for them. + _ctrlchar=$($echo_cmd -e "\033") + _msg=$($echo_cmd -e "$_msg" | sed -r "s/$_ctrlchar\[([0-9][0-9]?(;[0-9][0-9]?)?)?m//g") + fi + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + $echo_cmd $opt -e "$_msg" } _echo() { - if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge "$1" ]; then - shift - __echo '' "$*" - fi + if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge "$1" ]; then + shift + __echo '' "$*" + fi } _echo_nol() { - if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge "$1" ]; then - shift - __echo -n "$*" - fi + if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge "$1" ]; then + shift + __echo -n "$*" + fi } _warn() { - _echo 0 "\033[31m$*\033[0m" >&2 + _echo 0 "\033[31m$*\033[0m" >&2 } _info() { - _echo 1 "$*" + _echo 1 "$*" } _info_nol() { - _echo_nol 1 "$*" + _echo_nol 1 "$*" } _verbose() { - _echo 2 "$*" + _echo 2 "$*" } _verbose_nol() { - _echo_nol 2 "$*" + _echo_nol 2 "$*" } _debug() { - _echo 3 "\033[34m(debug) $*\033[0m" + _echo 3 "\033[34m(debug) $*\033[0m" } is_cpu_vulnerable_cached=0 _is_cpu_vulnerable_cached() { - # shellcheck disable=SC2086 - [ "$1" = 1 ] && return $variant1 - # shellcheck disable=SC2086 - [ "$1" = 2 ] && return $variant2 - # shellcheck disable=SC2086 - [ "$1" = 3 ] && return $variant3 - echo "$0: error: invalid variant '$1' passed to is_cpu_vulnerable()" >&2 - exit 255 + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + [ "$1" = 1 ] && return $variant1 + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + [ "$1" = 2 ] && return $variant2 + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + [ "$1" = 3 ] && return $variant3 + echo "$0: error: invalid variant '$1' passed to is_cpu_vulnerable()" >&2 + exit 255 } is_cpu_vulnerable() { - # param: 1, 2 or 3 (variant) - # returns 0 if vulnerable, 1 if not vulnerable - # (note that in shell, a return of 0 is success) - # by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here. - # usage: is_cpu_vulnerable 2 && do something if vulnerable - if [ "$is_cpu_vulnerable_cached" = 1 ]; then - _is_cpu_vulnerable_cached "$1" - return $? - fi - - variant1='' - variant2='' - variant3='' - - if is_cpu_specex_free; then - variant1=immune - variant2=immune - variant3=immune - elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ]; then - # Intel - # https://github.com/crozone/SpectrePoC/issues/1 ^F E5200 => spectre 2 not vulnerable - # https://github.com/paboldin/meltdown-exploit/issues/19 ^F E5200 => meltdown vulnerable - # model name : Pentium(R) Dual-Core CPU E5200 @ 2.50GHz - if grep -qE '^model name.+ Pentium\(R\) Dual-Core[[:space:]]+CPU[[:space:]]+E[0-9]{4}K? ' /proc/cpuinfo; then - variant1=vuln - [ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune - variant3=vuln - fi - if [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = 1 ]; then - # capability bit for future Intel processor that will explicitly state - # that they're not vulnerable to Meltdown - # this var is set in check_cpu() - variant3=immune - _debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: RDCL_NO is set so not vuln to meltdown" - fi - elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = AuthenticAMD ]; then - # AMD revised their statement about variant2 => vulnerable - # https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/speculative-execution - variant1=vuln - variant2=vuln - [ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune - elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = ARM ]; then - # ARM - # reference: https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update - # some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers, - # an example is "bigLITTLE". we shouldn't rely on the first CPU only, so we check the whole list - i=0 - for cpupart in $cpu_part_list - do - i=$(( i + 1 )) - # do NOT quote $cpu_arch_list below - # shellcheck disable=SC2086 - cpuarch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $'$i' }') - _debug "checking cpu$i: <$cpupart> <$cpuarch>" - # some kernels report AArch64 instead of 8 - [ "$cpuarch" = "AArch64" ] && cpuarch=8 - if [ -n "$cpupart" ] && [ -n "$cpuarch" ]; then - # Cortex-R7 and Cortex-R8 are real-time and only used in medical devices or such - # I can't find their CPU part number, but it's probably not that useful anyway - # model R7 R8 A9 A15 A17 A57 A72 A73 A75 - # part ? ? 0xc09 0xc0f 0xc0e 0xd07 0xd08 0xd09 0xd0a - # arch 7? 7? 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 - # - # variant 1 & variant 2 - if [ "$cpuarch" = 7 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(c09|c0f|c0e)$'; then - # armv7 vulnerable chips - _debug "checking cpu$i: this armv7 vulnerable to spectre 1 & 2" - variant1=vuln - variant2=vuln - elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(d07|d08|d09|d0a)$'; then - # armv8 vulnerable chips - _debug "checking cpu$i: this armv8 vulnerable to spectre 1 & 2" - variant1=vuln - variant2=vuln - else - _debug "checking cpu$i: this arm non vulnerable to 1 & 2" - # others are not vulnerable - [ -z "$variant1" ] && variant1=immune - [ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune - fi - - # for variant3, only A75 is vulnerable - if [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && [ "$cpupart" = 0xd0a ]; then - _debug "checking cpu$i: arm A75 vulnerable to meltdown" - variant3=vuln - else - _debug "checking cpu$i: this arm non vulnerable to meltdown" - [ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune - fi - fi - _debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: for cpu$i and so far, we have <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3>" - done - fi - _debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: temp results are <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3>" - # if at least one of the cpu is vulnerable, then the system is vulnerable - [ "$variant1" = "immune" ] && variant1=1 || variant1=0 - [ "$variant2" = "immune" ] && variant2=1 || variant2=0 - [ "$variant3" = "immune" ] && variant3=1 || variant3=0 - _debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: final results are <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3>" - is_cpu_vulnerable_cached=1 - _is_cpu_vulnerable_cached "$1" - return $? + # param: 1, 2 or 3 (variant) + # returns 0 if vulnerable, 1 if not vulnerable + # (note that in shell, a return of 0 is success) + # by default, everything is vulnerable, we work in a "whitelist" logic here. + # usage: is_cpu_vulnerable 2 && do something if vulnerable + if [ "$is_cpu_vulnerable_cached" = 1 ]; then + _is_cpu_vulnerable_cached "$1" + return $? + fi + + variant1='' + variant2='' + variant3='' + + if is_cpu_specex_free; then + variant1=immune + variant2=immune + variant3=immune + elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ]; then + # Intel + # https://github.com/crozone/SpectrePoC/issues/1 ^F E5200 => spectre 2 not vulnerable + # https://github.com/paboldin/meltdown-exploit/issues/19 ^F E5200 => meltdown vulnerable + # model name : Pentium(R) Dual-Core CPU E5200 @ 2.50GHz + if grep -qE '^model name.+ Pentium\(R\) Dual-Core[[:space:]]+CPU[[:space:]]+E[0-9]{4}K? ' /proc/cpuinfo; then + variant1=vuln + [ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune + variant3=vuln + fi + if [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = 1 ]; then + # capability bit for future Intel processor that will explicitly state + # that they're not vulnerable to Meltdown + # this var is set in check_cpu() + variant3=immune + _debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: RDCL_NO is set so not vuln to meltdown" + fi + elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = AuthenticAMD ]; then + # AMD revised their statement about variant2 => vulnerable + # https://www.amd.com/en/corporate/speculative-execution + variant1=vuln + variant2=vuln + [ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune + elif [ "$cpu_vendor" = ARM ]; then + # ARM + # reference: https://developer.arm.com/support/security-update + # some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers, + # an example is "bigLITTLE". we shouldn't rely on the first CPU only, so we check the whole list + i=0 + for cpupart in $cpu_part_list + do + i=$(( i + 1 )) + # do NOT quote $cpu_arch_list below + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + cpuarch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $'$i' }') + _debug "checking cpu$i: <$cpupart> <$cpuarch>" + # some kernels report AArch64 instead of 8 + [ "$cpuarch" = "AArch64" ] && cpuarch=8 + if [ -n "$cpupart" ] && [ -n "$cpuarch" ]; then + # Cortex-R7 and Cortex-R8 are real-time and only used in medical devices or such + # I can't find their CPU part number, but it's probably not that useful anyway + # model R7 R8 A9 A15 A17 A57 A72 A73 A75 + # part ? ? 0xc09 0xc0f 0xc0e 0xd07 0xd08 0xd09 0xd0a + # arch 7? 7? 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 + # + # variant 1 & variant 2 + if [ "$cpuarch" = 7 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(c09|c0f|c0e)$'; then + # armv7 vulnerable chips + _debug "checking cpu$i: this armv7 vulnerable to spectre 1 & 2" + variant1=vuln + variant2=vuln + elif [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && echo "$cpupart" | grep -Eq '^0x(d07|d08|d09|d0a)$'; then + # armv8 vulnerable chips + _debug "checking cpu$i: this armv8 vulnerable to spectre 1 & 2" + variant1=vuln + variant2=vuln + else + _debug "checking cpu$i: this arm non vulnerable to 1 & 2" + # others are not vulnerable + [ -z "$variant1" ] && variant1=immune + [ -z "$variant2" ] && variant2=immune + fi + + # for variant3, only A75 is vulnerable + if [ "$cpuarch" = 8 ] && [ "$cpupart" = 0xd0a ]; then + _debug "checking cpu$i: arm A75 vulnerable to meltdown" + variant3=vuln + else + _debug "checking cpu$i: this arm non vulnerable to meltdown" + [ -z "$variant3" ] && variant3=immune + fi + fi + _debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: for cpu$i and so far, we have <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3>" + done + fi + _debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: temp results are <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3>" + # if at least one of the cpu is vulnerable, then the system is vulnerable + [ "$variant1" = "immune" ] && variant1=1 || variant1=0 + [ "$variant2" = "immune" ] && variant2=1 || variant2=0 + [ "$variant3" = "immune" ] && variant3=1 || variant3=0 + _debug "is_cpu_vulnerable: final results are <$variant1> <$variant2> <$variant3>" + is_cpu_vulnerable_cached=1 + _is_cpu_vulnerable_cached "$1" + return $? } is_cpu_specex_free() { - # return true (0) if the CPU doesn't do speculative execution, false (1) if it does. - # if it's not in the list we know, return false (1). - # source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c#n882 - # { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, - # { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, - # { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, - # { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, - # { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, - # { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5 }, - # { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5 }, - # { X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5 }, - # { X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4 }, - parse_cpu_details - if [ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ]; then - if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then - if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW" ] || \ - [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW" ] || \ - [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT" ] || \ - [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL" ] || \ - [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW" ]; then - return 0 - fi - elif [ "$cpu_family" = 5 ]; then - return 0 - fi - fi - [ "$cpu_family" -eq 4 ] && return 0 - return 1 + # return true (0) if the CPU doesn't do speculative execution, false (1) if it does. + # if it's not in the list we know, return false (1). + # source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/common.c#n882 + # { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + # { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + # { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + # { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + # { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 6, INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW, X86_FEATURE_ANY }, + # { X86_VENDOR_CENTAUR, 5 }, + # { X86_VENDOR_INTEL, 5 }, + # { X86_VENDOR_NSC, 5 }, + # { X86_VENDOR_ANY, 4 }, + parse_cpu_details + if [ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ]; then + if [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ]; then + if [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW" ] || \ + [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW" ] || \ + [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT" ] || \ + [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL" ] || \ + [ "$cpu_model" = "$INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW" ]; then + return 0 + fi + elif [ "$cpu_family" = 5 ]; then + return 0 + fi + fi + [ "$cpu_family" -eq 4 ] && return 0 + return 1 } show_header() { - _info "\033[1;34mSpectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION\033[0m" - _info + _info "\033[1;34mSpectre and Meltdown mitigation detection tool v$VERSION\033[0m" + _info } parse_opt_file() { - # parse_opt_file option_name option_value - option_name="$1" - option_value="$2" - if [ -z "$option_value" ]; then - show_header - show_usage - echo "$0: error: --$option_name expects one parameter (a file)" >&2 - exit 1 - elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then - show_header - echo "$0: error: couldn't find file $option_value" >&2 - exit 1 - elif [ ! -f "$option_value" ]; then - show_header - echo "$0: error: $option_value is not a file" >&2 - exit 1 - elif [ ! -r "$option_value" ]; then - show_header - echo "$0: error: couldn't read $option_value (are you root?)" >&2 - exit 1 - fi - echo "$option_value" - exit 0 + # parse_opt_file option_name option_value + option_name="$1" + option_value="$2" + if [ -z "$option_value" ]; then + show_header + show_usage + echo "$0: error: --$option_name expects one parameter (a file)" >&2 + exit 1 + elif [ ! -e "$option_value" ]; then + show_header + echo "$0: error: couldn't find file $option_value" >&2 + exit 1 + elif [ ! -f "$option_value" ]; then + show_header + echo "$0: error: $option_value is not a file" >&2 + exit 1 + elif [ ! -r "$option_value" ]; then + show_header + echo "$0: error: couldn't read $option_value (are you root?)" >&2 + exit 1 + fi + echo "$option_value" + exit 0 } while [ -n "$1" ]; do - if [ "$1" = "--kernel" ]; then - opt_kernel=$(parse_opt_file kernel "$2"); ret=$? - [ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255 - shift 2 - opt_live=0 - elif [ "$1" = "--config" ]; then - opt_config=$(parse_opt_file config "$2"); ret=$? - [ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255 - shift 2 - opt_live=0 - elif [ "$1" = "--map" ]; then - opt_map=$(parse_opt_file map "$2"); ret=$? - [ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255 - shift 2 - opt_live=0 - elif [ "$1" = "--live" ]; then - opt_live_explicit=1 - shift - elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then - opt_no_color=1 - shift - elif [ "$1" = "--no-sysfs" ]; then - opt_no_sysfs=1 - shift - elif [ "$1" = "--sysfs-only" ]; then - opt_sysfs_only=1 - shift - elif [ "$1" = "--coreos" ]; then - opt_coreos=1 - shift - elif [ "$1" = "--coreos-within-toolbox" ]; then - # don't use directly: used internally by --coreos - opt_coreos=0 - shift - elif [ "$1" = "--batch" ]; then - opt_batch=1 - opt_verbose=0 - shift - case "$1" in - text|nrpe|json) opt_batch_format="$1"; shift;; - --*) ;; # allow subsequent flags - '') ;; # allow nothing at all - *) - echo "$0: error: unknown batch format '$1'" >&2 - echo "$0: error: --batch expects a format from: text, nrpe, json" >&2 - exit 255 - ;; - esac - elif [ "$1" = "-v" ] || [ "$1" = "--verbose" ]; then - opt_verbose=$(( opt_verbose + 1 )) - shift - elif [ "$1" = "--variant" ]; then - if [ -z "$2" ]; then - echo "$0: error: option --variant expects a parameter (1, 2 or 3)" >&2 - exit 255 - fi - case "$2" in - 1) opt_variant1=1; opt_allvariants=0;; - 2) opt_variant2=1; opt_allvariants=0;; - 3) opt_variant3=1; opt_allvariants=0;; - *) - echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, expected either 1, 2 or 3" >&2; - exit 255 - ;; - esac - shift 2 - elif [ "$1" = "-h" ] || [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then - show_header - show_usage - exit 0 - elif [ "$1" = "--version" ]; then - opt_no_color=1 - show_header - exit 0 - elif [ "$1" = "--disclaimer" ]; then - show_header - show_disclaimer - exit 0 - else - show_header - show_usage - echo "$0: error: unknown option '$1'" - exit 255 - fi + if [ "$1" = "--kernel" ]; then + opt_kernel=$(parse_opt_file kernel "$2"); ret=$? + [ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255 + shift 2 + opt_live=0 + elif [ "$1" = "--config" ]; then + opt_config=$(parse_opt_file config "$2"); ret=$? + [ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255 + shift 2 + opt_live=0 + elif [ "$1" = "--map" ]; then + opt_map=$(parse_opt_file map "$2"); ret=$? + [ $ret -ne 0 ] && exit 255 + shift 2 + opt_live=0 + elif [ "$1" = "--live" ]; then + opt_live_explicit=1 + shift + elif [ "$1" = "--no-color" ]; then + opt_no_color=1 + shift + elif [ "$1" = "--no-sysfs" ]; then + opt_no_sysfs=1 + shift + elif [ "$1" = "--sysfs-only" ]; then + opt_sysfs_only=1 + shift + elif [ "$1" = "--coreos" ]; then + opt_coreos=1 + shift + elif [ "$1" = "--coreos-within-toolbox" ]; then + # don't use directly: used internally by --coreos + opt_coreos=0 + shift + elif [ "$1" = "--batch" ]; then + opt_batch=1 + opt_verbose=0 + shift + case "$1" in + text|nrpe|json) opt_batch_format="$1"; shift;; + --*) ;; # allow subsequent flags + '') ;; # allow nothing at all + *) + echo "$0: error: unknown batch format '$1'" >&2 + echo "$0: error: --batch expects a format from: text, nrpe, json" >&2 + exit 255 + ;; + esac + elif [ "$1" = "-v" ] || [ "$1" = "--verbose" ]; then + opt_verbose=$(( opt_verbose + 1 )) + shift + elif [ "$1" = "--variant" ]; then + if [ -z "$2" ]; then + echo "$0: error: option --variant expects a parameter (1, 2 or 3)" >&2 + exit 255 + fi + case "$2" in + 1) opt_variant1=1; opt_allvariants=0;; + 2) opt_variant2=1; opt_allvariants=0;; + 3) opt_variant3=1; opt_allvariants=0;; + *) + echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, expected either 1, 2 or 3" >&2; + exit 255 + ;; + esac + shift 2 + elif [ "$1" = "-h" ] || [ "$1" = "--help" ]; then + show_header + show_usage + exit 0 + elif [ "$1" = "--version" ]; then + opt_no_color=1 + show_header + exit 0 + elif [ "$1" = "--disclaimer" ]; then + show_header + show_disclaimer + exit 0 + else + show_header + show_usage + echo "$0: error: unknown option '$1'" + exit 255 + fi done show_header if [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then - _warn "Incompatible options specified (--no-sysfs and --sysfs-only), aborting" - exit 255 + _warn "Incompatible options specified (--no-sysfs and --sysfs-only), aborting" + exit 255 fi # print status function pstatus() { - if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ]; then - _info_nol "$2" - else - case "$1" in - red) col="\033[41m\033[30m";; - green) col="\033[42m\033[30m";; - yellow) col="\033[43m\033[30m";; - blue) col="\033[44m\033[30m";; - *) col="";; - esac - _info_nol "$col $2 \033[0m" - fi - [ -n "$3" ] && _info_nol " ($3)" - _info + if [ "$opt_no_color" = 1 ]; then + _info_nol "$2" + else + case "$1" in + red) col="\033[41m\033[30m";; + green) col="\033[42m\033[30m";; + yellow) col="\033[43m\033[30m";; + blue) col="\033[44m\033[30m";; + *) col="";; + esac + _info_nol "$col $2 \033[0m" + fi + [ -n "$3" ] && _info_nol " ($3)" + _info } # Print the final status of a vulnerability (incl. batch mode) # Arguments are: CVE UNK/OK/VULN description pvulnstatus() { - if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ]; then - case "$opt_batch_format" in - text) _echo 0 "$1: $2 ($3)";; - json) - case "$1" in - CVE-2017-5753) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 1";; - CVE-2017-5715) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 2";; - CVE-2017-5754) aka="MELTDOWN";; - esac - case "$2" in - UNK) is_vuln="null";; - VULN) is_vuln="true";; - OK) is_vuln="false";; - esac - json_output="${json_output:-[}{\"NAME\":\"$aka\",\"CVE\":\"$1\",\"VULNERABLE\":$is_vuln,\"INFOS\":\"$3\"}," - ;; - - nrpe) [ "$2" = VULN ] && nrpe_vuln="$nrpe_vuln $1";; - esac - fi - - # always fill global_* vars because we use that do decide the program exit code - case "$2" in - UNK) global_unknown="1";; - VULN) global_critical="1";; - esac - - # display info if we're not in quiet/batch mode - vulnstatus="$2" - shift 2 - _info_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m " - case "$vulnstatus" in - UNK) pstatus yellow 'UNKNOWN' "$@";; - VULN) pstatus red 'VULNERABLE' "$@";; - OK) pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' "$@";; - esac + if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ]; then + case "$opt_batch_format" in + text) _echo 0 "$1: $2 ($3)";; + json) + case "$1" in + CVE-2017-5753) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 1";; + CVE-2017-5715) aka="SPECTRE VARIANT 2";; + CVE-2017-5754) aka="MELTDOWN";; + esac + case "$2" in + UNK) is_vuln="null";; + VULN) is_vuln="true";; + OK) is_vuln="false";; + esac + json_output="${json_output:-[}{\"NAME\":\"$aka\",\"CVE\":\"$1\",\"VULNERABLE\":$is_vuln,\"INFOS\":\"$3\"}," + ;; + + nrpe) [ "$2" = VULN ] && nrpe_vuln="$nrpe_vuln $1";; + esac + fi + + # always fill global_* vars because we use that do decide the program exit code + case "$2" in + UNK) global_unknown="1";; + VULN) global_critical="1";; + esac + + # display info if we're not in quiet/batch mode + vulnstatus="$2" + shift 2 + _info_nol "> \033[46m\033[30mSTATUS:\033[0m " + case "$vulnstatus" in + UNK) pstatus yellow 'UNKNOWN' "$@";; + VULN) pstatus red 'VULNERABLE' "$@";; + OK) pstatus green 'NOT VULNERABLE' "$@";; + esac } @@ -550,466 +551,466 @@ vmlinux='' vmlinux_err='' check_vmlinux() { - readelf -h "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0 - return 1 + readelf -h "$1" >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0 + return 1 } try_decompress() { - # The obscure use of the "tr" filter is to work around older versions of - # "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern. - - # Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here - for pos in $(tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$6" | grep -abo "^$2") - do - _debug "try_decompress: magic for $3 found at offset $pos" - if ! which "$3" >/dev/null 2>&1; then - vmlinux_err="missing '$3' tool, please install it, usually it's in the '$5' package" - return 0 - fi - pos=${pos%%:*} - # shellcheck disable=SC2086 - tail -c+$pos "$6" 2>/dev/null | $3 $4 > "$vmlinuxtmp" 2>/dev/null - if check_vmlinux "$vmlinuxtmp"; then - vmlinux="$vmlinuxtmp" - _debug "try_decompress: decompressed with $3 successfully!" - return 0 - else - _debug "try_decompress: decompression with $3 did not work" - fi - done - return 1 + # The obscure use of the "tr" filter is to work around older versions of + # "grep" that report the byte offset of the line instead of the pattern. + + # Try to find the header ($1) and decompress from here + for pos in $(tr "$1\n$2" "\n$2=" < "$6" | grep -abo "^$2") + do + _debug "try_decompress: magic for $3 found at offset $pos" + if ! which "$3" >/dev/null 2>&1; then + vmlinux_err="missing '$3' tool, please install it, usually it's in the '$5' package" + return 0 + fi + pos=${pos%%:*} + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + tail -c+$pos "$6" 2>/dev/null | $3 $4 > "$vmlinuxtmp" 2>/dev/null + if check_vmlinux "$vmlinuxtmp"; then + vmlinux="$vmlinuxtmp" + _debug "try_decompress: decompressed with $3 successfully!" + return 0 + else + _debug "try_decompress: decompression with $3 did not work" + fi + done + return 1 } extract_vmlinux() { - [ -n "$1" ] || return 1 - # Prepare temp files: - vmlinuxtmp="$(mktemp /tmp/vmlinux-XXXXXX)" - - # Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects: - if check_vmlinux "$1"; then - cat "$1" > "$vmlinuxtmp" - vmlinux=$vmlinuxtmp - return 0 - fi - - # That didn't work, so retry after decompression. - try_decompress '\037\213\010' xy gunzip '' gunzip "$1" && return 0 - try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz '' xz-utils "$1" && return 0 - try_decompress 'BZh' xy bunzip2 '' bzip2 "$1" && return 0 - try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma '' xz-utils "$1" && return 0 - try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy 'lzop' '-d' lzop "$1" && return 0 - try_decompress '\002\041\114\030' xyy 'lz4' '-d -l' liblz4-tool "$1" && return 0 - return 1 + [ -n "$1" ] || return 1 + # Prepare temp files: + vmlinuxtmp="$(mktemp /tmp/vmlinux-XXXXXX)" + + # Initial attempt for uncompressed images or objects: + if check_vmlinux "$1"; then + cat "$1" > "$vmlinuxtmp" + vmlinux=$vmlinuxtmp + return 0 + fi + + # That didn't work, so retry after decompression. + try_decompress '\037\213\010' xy gunzip '' gunzip "$1" && return 0 + try_decompress '\3757zXZ\000' abcde unxz '' xz-utils "$1" && return 0 + try_decompress 'BZh' xy bunzip2 '' bzip2 "$1" && return 0 + try_decompress '\135\0\0\0' xxx unlzma '' xz-utils "$1" && return 0 + try_decompress '\211\114\132' xy 'lzop' '-d' lzop "$1" && return 0 + try_decompress '\002\041\114\030' xyy 'lz4' '-d -l' liblz4-tool "$1" && return 0 + return 1 } # end of extract-vmlinux functions mount_debugfs() { - if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then - # try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards - mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1 - fi + if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then + # try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards + mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1 + fi } load_msr() { - modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1 - _debug "attempted to load module msr, insmod_msr=$insmod_msr" + modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1 + _debug "attempted to load module msr, insmod_msr=$insmod_msr" } load_cpuid() { - modprobe cpuid 2>/dev/null && insmod_cpuid=1 - _debug "attempted to load module cpuid, insmod_cpuid=$insmod_cpuid" + modprobe cpuid 2>/dev/null && insmod_cpuid=1 + _debug "attempted to load module cpuid, insmod_cpuid=$insmod_cpuid" } read_cpuid() { - _leaf="$1" - _bytenum="$2" - _and_operand="$3" - - if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ]; then - # try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards) - load_cpuid - fi - if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ]; then - return 2 - fi - - if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 3 ]; then - dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 >/dev/null 2>/dev/null - _debug "cpuid: reading leaf$_leaf of cpuid on cpu0, ret=$?" - _debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf eax-ebx-ecx-edx: $( dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 2>/dev/null | od -x -A n)" - _debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf edx higher byte is: $(dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 2>/dev/null | dd bs=1 skip="$_bytenum" count=1 2>/dev/null | od -x -A n)" - fi - # getting proper byte of edx on leaf$_leaf of cpuinfo in decimal - _reg_byte=$(dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 2>/dev/null | dd bs=1 skip="$_bytenum" count=1 2>/dev/null | od -t u1 -A n | awk '{print $1}') - _debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf byte $_bytenum: $_reg_byte (decimal)" - _reg_bit=$(( _reg_byte & _and_operand )) - _debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf byte $_bytenum & $_and_operand = $_reg_bit" - [ "$_reg_bit" -eq 0 ] && return 1 - # $_reg_bit is > 0, so the bit was found: return true (aka 0) - return 0 + _leaf="$1" + _bytenum="$2" + _and_operand="$3" + + if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ]; then + # try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards) + load_cpuid + fi + if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/cpuid ]; then + return 2 + fi + + if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 3 ]; then + dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 >/dev/null 2>/dev/null + _debug "cpuid: reading leaf$_leaf of cpuid on cpu0, ret=$?" + _debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf eax-ebx-ecx-edx: $( dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 2>/dev/null | od -x -A n)" + _debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf edx higher byte is: $(dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 2>/dev/null | dd bs=1 skip="$_bytenum" count=1 2>/dev/null | od -x -A n)" + fi + # getting proper byte of edx on leaf$_leaf of cpuinfo in decimal + _reg_byte=$(dd if=/dev/cpu/0/cpuid bs=16 skip="$_leaf" iflag=skip_bytes count=1 2>/dev/null | dd bs=1 skip="$_bytenum" count=1 2>/dev/null | od -t u1 -A n | awk '{print $1}') + _debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf byte $_bytenum: $_reg_byte (decimal)" + _reg_bit=$(( _reg_byte & _and_operand )) + _debug "cpuid: leaf$_leaf byte $_bytenum & $_and_operand = $_reg_bit" + [ "$_reg_bit" -eq 0 ] && return 1 + # $_reg_bit is > 0, so the bit was found: return true (aka 0) + return 0 } dmesg_grep() { - # grep for something in dmesg, ensuring that the dmesg buffer - # has not been truncated - dmesg_grepped='' - if ! dmesg | grep -qE '(^|\] )Linux version [0-9]'; then - # dmesg truncated - return 2 - fi - dmesg_grepped=$(dmesg | grep -E "$1" | head -1) - # not found: - [ -z "$dmesg_grepped" ] && return 1 - # found, output is in $dmesg_grepped - return 0 + # grep for something in dmesg, ensuring that the dmesg buffer + # has not been truncated + dmesg_grepped='' + if ! dmesg | grep -qE '(^|\] )Linux version [0-9]'; then + # dmesg truncated + return 2 + fi + dmesg_grepped=$(dmesg | grep -E "$1" | head -1) + # not found: + [ -z "$dmesg_grepped" ] && return 1 + # found, output is in $dmesg_grepped + return 0 } is_coreos() { - which coreos-install >/dev/null 2>&1 && which toolbox >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0 - return 1 + which coreos-install >/dev/null 2>&1 && which toolbox >/dev/null 2>&1 && return 0 + return 1 } parse_cpu_details() { - [ "$parse_cpu_details_done" = 1 ] && return 0 - cpu_vendor=$( grep '^vendor_id' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | head -1) - cpu_friendly_name=$(grep '^model name' /proc/cpuinfo | cut -d: -f2- | head -1 | sed -e 's/^ *//') - # special case for ARM follows - if grep -qi 'CPU implementer[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*0x41' /proc/cpuinfo; then - cpu_vendor='ARM' - # some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers, - # an example is "bigLITTLE", so we need to store the whole list, this is needed for is_cpu_vulnerable - cpu_part_list=$(awk '/CPU part/ {print $4}' /proc/cpuinfo) - cpu_arch_list=$(awk '/CPU architecture/ {print $3}' /proc/cpuinfo) - # take the first one to fill the friendly name, do NOT quote the vars below - # shellcheck disable=SC2086 - cpu_arch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $1 }') - # shellcheck disable=SC2086 - cpu_part=$(echo $cpu_part_list | awk '{ print $1 }') - [ "$cpu_arch" = "AArch64" ] && cpu_arch=8 - cpu_friendly_name="ARM" - [ -n "$cpu_arch" ] && cpu_friendly_name="$cpu_friendly_name v$cpu_arch" - [ -n "$cpu_part" ] && cpu_friendly_name="$cpu_friendly_name model $cpu_part" - fi - - cpu_family=$( grep '^cpu family' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $4}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1) - cpu_model=$( grep '^model' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1) - cpu_stepping=$(grep '^stepping' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1) - cpu_ucode=$( grep '^microcode' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | head -1) - - # also define those that we will need in other funcs - # taken from ttps://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h - # shellcheck disable=SC2034 - { - INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH=$(( 0x0E )) - - INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM=$(( 0x0F )) - INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L=$(( 0x16 )) - INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN=$(( 0x17 )) - INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_DUNNINGTON=$(( 0x1D )) - - INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM=$(( 0x1E )) - INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G=$(( 0x1F )) - INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP=$(( 0x1A )) - INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX=$(( 0x2E )) - - INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE=$(( 0x25 )) - INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP=$(( 0x2C )) - INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EX=$(( 0x2F )) - - INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE=$(( 0x2A )) - INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X=$(( 0x2D )) - INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE=$(( 0x3A )) - INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X=$(( 0x3E )) - - INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE=$(( 0x3C )) - INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X=$(( 0x3F )) - INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT=$(( 0x45 )) - INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E=$(( 0x46 )) - - INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE=$(( 0x3D )) - INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E=$(( 0x47 )) - INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X=$(( 0x4F )) - INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D=$(( 0x56 )) - - INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE=$(( 0x4E )) - INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP=$(( 0x5E )) - INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X=$(( 0x55 )) - INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE=$(( 0x8E )) - INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP=$(( 0x9E )) - - # /* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */ - - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW=$(( 0x1C )) - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT=$(( 0x26 )) - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL=$(( 0x27 )) - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW=$(( 0x35 )) - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW=$(( 0x36 )) - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1=$(( 0x37 )) - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2=$(( 0x4D )) - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT=$(( 0x4C )) - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD=$(( 0x4A )) - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD=$(( 0x5A )) - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT=$(( 0x5C )) - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON=$(( 0x5F )) - INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE=$(( 0x7A )) - - # /* Xeon Phi */ - - INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL=$(( 0x57 )) - INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM=$(( 0x85 )) - } - parse_cpu_details_done=1 + [ "$parse_cpu_details_done" = 1 ] && return 0 + cpu_vendor=$( grep '^vendor_id' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | head -1) + cpu_friendly_name=$(grep '^model name' /proc/cpuinfo | cut -d: -f2- | head -1 | sed -e 's/^ *//') + # special case for ARM follows + if grep -qi 'CPU implementer[[:space:]]*:[[:space:]]*0x41' /proc/cpuinfo; then + cpu_vendor='ARM' + # some devices (phones or other) have several ARMs and as such different part numbers, + # an example is "bigLITTLE", so we need to store the whole list, this is needed for is_cpu_vulnerable + cpu_part_list=$(awk '/CPU part/ {print $4}' /proc/cpuinfo) + cpu_arch_list=$(awk '/CPU architecture/ {print $3}' /proc/cpuinfo) + # take the first one to fill the friendly name, do NOT quote the vars below + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + cpu_arch=$(echo $cpu_arch_list | awk '{ print $1 }') + # shellcheck disable=SC2086 + cpu_part=$(echo $cpu_part_list | awk '{ print $1 }') + [ "$cpu_arch" = "AArch64" ] && cpu_arch=8 + cpu_friendly_name="ARM" + [ -n "$cpu_arch" ] && cpu_friendly_name="$cpu_friendly_name v$cpu_arch" + [ -n "$cpu_part" ] && cpu_friendly_name="$cpu_friendly_name model $cpu_part" + fi + + cpu_family=$( grep '^cpu family' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $4}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1) + cpu_model=$( grep '^model' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1) + cpu_stepping=$(grep '^stepping' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | grep -E '^[0-9]+$' | head -1) + cpu_ucode=$( grep '^microcode' /proc/cpuinfo | awk '{print $3}' | head -1) + + # also define those that we will need in other funcs + # taken from ttps://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/include/asm/intel-family.h + # shellcheck disable=SC2034 + { + INTEL_FAM6_CORE_YONAH=$(( 0x0E )) + + INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM=$(( 0x0F )) + INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_MEROM_L=$(( 0x16 )) + INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_PENRYN=$(( 0x17 )) + INTEL_FAM6_CORE2_DUNNINGTON=$(( 0x1D )) + + INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM=$(( 0x1E )) + INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_G=$(( 0x1F )) + INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EP=$(( 0x1A )) + INTEL_FAM6_NEHALEM_EX=$(( 0x2E )) + + INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE=$(( 0x25 )) + INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EP=$(( 0x2C )) + INTEL_FAM6_WESTMERE_EX=$(( 0x2F )) + + INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE=$(( 0x2A )) + INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X=$(( 0x2D )) + INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE=$(( 0x3A )) + INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X=$(( 0x3E )) + + INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE=$(( 0x3C )) + INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X=$(( 0x3F )) + INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT=$(( 0x45 )) + INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E=$(( 0x46 )) + + INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE=$(( 0x3D )) + INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E=$(( 0x47 )) + INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X=$(( 0x4F )) + INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D=$(( 0x56 )) + + INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE=$(( 0x4E )) + INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP=$(( 0x5E )) + INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X=$(( 0x55 )) + INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE=$(( 0x8E )) + INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP=$(( 0x9E )) + + # /* "Small Core" Processors (Atom) */ + + INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PINEVIEW=$(( 0x1C )) + INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_LINCROFT=$(( 0x26 )) + INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_PENWELL=$(( 0x27 )) + INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CLOVERVIEW=$(( 0x35 )) + INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_CEDARVIEW=$(( 0x36 )) + INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT1=$(( 0x37 )) + INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_SILVERMONT2=$(( 0x4D )) + INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_AIRMONT=$(( 0x4C )) + INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MERRIFIELD=$(( 0x4A )) + INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_MOOREFIELD=$(( 0x5A )) + INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GOLDMONT=$(( 0x5C )) + INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_DENVERTON=$(( 0x5F )) + INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE=$(( 0x7A )) + + # /* Xeon Phi */ + + INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNL=$(( 0x57 )) + INTEL_FAM6_XEON_PHI_KNM=$(( 0x85 )) + } + parse_cpu_details_done=1 } is_ucode_blacklisted() { - parse_cpu_details - # if it's not an Intel, don't bother: it's not blacklisted - [ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ] || return 1 - # it also needs to be family=6 - [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ] || return 1 - # now, check each known bad microcode - # source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c#n105 - # 2018-02-08 update: https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/02/microcode-update-guidance.pdf - # model,stepping,microcode - ucode_found="model $cpu_model stepping $cpu_stepping ucode $cpu_ucode" - for tuple in \ - $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x0B,0x84 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x0A,0x84 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x09,0x84 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE,0x0A,0x84 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE,0x09,0x84 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x03,0x0100013e \ - $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x0200003a \ - $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x0200003c \ - $INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE,0x04,0x28 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E,0x01,0x1b \ - $INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D,0x02,0x14 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D,0x03,0x07000011 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,0x01,0x0b000023 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,0x01,0x0b000025 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT,0x01,0x21 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E,0x01,0x18 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE,0x03,0x23 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,0x02,0x3b \ - $INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,0x04,0x10 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X,0x04,0x42a \ - $INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE,0x01,0x22 \ - $INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,0x06,0x61b \ - $INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,0x07,0x712 - do - model=$(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f1) - stepping=$(( $(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f2) )) - ucode=$(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f3) - if [ "$cpu_model" = "$model" ] && [ "$cpu_stepping" = "$stepping" ] && echo "$cpu_ucode" | grep -qi "^$ucode$"; then - _debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: we have a match! ($cpu_model/$cpu_stepping/$cpu_ucode)" - return 0 - fi - done - _debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: no ($cpu_model/$cpu_stepping/$cpu_ucode)" - return 1 + parse_cpu_details + # if it's not an Intel, don't bother: it's not blacklisted + [ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ] || return 1 + # it also needs to be family=6 + [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ] || return 1 + # now, check each known bad microcode + # source: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/tree/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/intel.c#n105 + # 2018-02-08 update: https://newsroom.intel.com/wp-content/uploads/sites/11/2018/02/microcode-update-guidance.pdf + # model,stepping,microcode + ucode_found="model $cpu_model stepping $cpu_stepping ucode $cpu_ucode" + for tuple in \ + $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x0B,0x84 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x0A,0x84 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP,0x09,0x84 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE,0x0A,0x84 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE,0x09,0x84 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x03,0x0100013e \ + $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x0200003a \ + $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X,0x04,0x0200003c \ + $INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_CORE,0x04,0x28 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_GT3E,0x01,0x1b \ + $INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D,0x02,0x14 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_XEON_D,0x03,0x07000011 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,0x01,0x0b000023 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_BROADWELL_X,0x01,0x0b000025 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_ULT,0x01,0x21 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_GT3E,0x01,0x18 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_CORE,0x03,0x23 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,0x02,0x3b \ + $INTEL_FAM6_HASWELL_X,0x04,0x10 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_IVYBRIDGE_X,0x04,0x42a \ + $INTEL_FAM6_ATOM_GEMINI_LAKE,0x01,0x22 \ + $INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,0x06,0x61b \ + $INTEL_FAM6_SANDYBRIDGE_X,0x07,0x712 + do + model=$(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f1) + stepping=$(( $(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f2) )) + ucode=$(echo $tuple | cut -d, -f3) + if [ "$cpu_model" = "$model" ] && [ "$cpu_stepping" = "$stepping" ] && echo "$cpu_ucode" | grep -qi "^$ucode$"; then + _debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: we have a match! ($cpu_model/$cpu_stepping/$cpu_ucode)" + return 0 + fi + done + _debug "is_ucode_blacklisted: no ($cpu_model/$cpu_stepping/$cpu_ucode)" + return 1 } is_skylake_cpu() { - # is this a skylake cpu? + # is this a skylake cpu? # return 0 if yes, 1 otherwise #if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_INTEL && - # boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) { - # switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) { - # case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE: - # case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP: - # case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X: - # case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE: - # case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP: - # return true; - parse_cpu_details - [ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ] || return 1 - [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ] || return 1 - if [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE ] || \ - [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP ] || \ - [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X ] || \ - [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE ] || \ - [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP ]; then - return 0 - fi - return 1 + # boot_cpu_data.x86 == 6) { + # switch (boot_cpu_data.x86_model) { + # case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE: + # case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP: + # case INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X: + # case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE: + # case INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP: + # return true; + parse_cpu_details + [ "$cpu_vendor" = GenuineIntel ] || return 1 + [ "$cpu_family" = 6 ] || return 1 + if [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_MOBILE ] || \ + [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_DESKTOP ] || \ + [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_SKYLAKE_X ] || \ + [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_MOBILE ] || \ + [ "$cpu_model" = $INTEL_FAM6_KABYLAKE_DESKTOP ]; then + return 0 + fi + return 1 } # check for mode selection inconsistency if [ "$opt_live_explicit" = 1 ]; then - if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ] || [ -n "$opt_config" ] || [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then - show_usage - echo "$0: error: incompatible modes specified, use either --live or --kernel/--config/--map" >&2 - exit 255 - fi + if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ] || [ -n "$opt_config" ] || [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then + show_usage + echo "$0: error: incompatible modes specified, use either --live or --kernel/--config/--map" >&2 + exit 255 + fi fi # coreos mode if [ "$opt_coreos" = 1 ]; then - if ! is_coreos; then - _warn "CoreOS mode asked, but we're not under CoreOS!" - exit 255 - fi - _warn "CoreOS mode, starting an ephemeral toolbox to launch the script" - load_msr - load_cpuid - mount_debugfs - toolbox --ephemeral --bind-ro /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu -- sh -c "dnf install -y binutils which && /media/root$PWD/$0 $* --coreos-within-toolbox" - exitcode=$? - exit $exitcode + if ! is_coreos; then + _warn "CoreOS mode asked, but we're not under CoreOS!" + exit 255 + fi + _warn "CoreOS mode, starting an ephemeral toolbox to launch the script" + load_msr + load_cpuid + mount_debugfs + toolbox --ephemeral --bind-ro /dev/cpu:/dev/cpu -- sh -c "dnf install -y binutils which && /media/root$PWD/$0 $* --coreos-within-toolbox" + exitcode=$? + exit $exitcode else - if is_coreos; then - _warn "You seem to be running CoreOS, you might want to use the --coreos option for better results" - _warn - fi + if is_coreos; then + _warn "You seem to be running CoreOS, you might want to use the --coreos option for better results" + _warn + fi fi parse_cpu_details if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - # root check (only for live mode, for offline mode, we already checked if we could read the files) - if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then - _warn "Note that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information." - _warn "We'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors." - _warn "To run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0" - _warn - fi - _info "Checking for vulnerabilities on current system" - _info "Kernel is \033[35m$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)\033[0m" - _info "CPU is \033[35m$cpu_friendly_name\033[0m" - - # try to find the image of the current running kernel - # first, look for the BOOT_IMAGE hint in the kernel cmdline - if [ -r /proc/cmdline ] && grep -q 'BOOT_IMAGE=' /proc/cmdline; then - opt_kernel=$(grep -Eo 'BOOT_IMAGE=[^ ]+' /proc/cmdline | cut -d= -f2) - _debug "found opt_kernel=$opt_kernel in /proc/cmdline" - # if we have a dedicated /boot partition, our bootloader might have just called it / - # so try to prepend /boot and see if we find anything - [ -e "/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$opt_kernel" - # special case for CoreOS if we're inside the toolbox - [ -e "/media/root/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/media/root/boot/$opt_kernel" - _debug "opt_kernel is now $opt_kernel" - # else, the full path is already there (most probably /boot/something) - fi - # if we didn't find a kernel, default to guessing - if [ ! -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then - # Fedora: - [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vmlinuz" ] && opt_kernel="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vmlinuz" - # Slackare: - [ -e "/boot/vmlinuz" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz" - # Arch: - [ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-linux" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-linux" - # Linux-Libre: - [ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre" - # generic: - [ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)" - [ -e "/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)" - [ -e "/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)" - # Gentoo: - [ -e "/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)" - # NixOS: - [ -e "/run/booted-system/kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/run/booted-system/kernel" - # systemd kernel-install: - [ -e "/etc/machine-id" ] && [ -e "/boot/$(cat /etc/machine-id)/$(uname -r)/linux" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$(cat /etc/machine-id)/$(uname -r)/linux" - fi - - # system.map - if [ -e /proc/kallsyms ] ; then - opt_map=/proc/kallsyms - elif [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/System.map" ] ; then - opt_map="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/System.map" - elif [ -e "/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)" ] ; then - opt_map="/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)" - fi - - # config - if [ -e /proc/config.gz ] ; then - dumped_config="$(mktemp /tmp/config-XXXXXX)" - gunzip -c /proc/config.gz > "$dumped_config" - # dumped_config will be deleted at the end of the script - opt_config="$dumped_config" - elif [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/config" ]; then - opt_config="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/config" - elif [ -e "/boot/config-$(uname -r)" ]; then - opt_config="/boot/config-$(uname -r)" - fi + # root check (only for live mode, for offline mode, we already checked if we could read the files) + if [ "$(id -u)" -ne 0 ]; then + _warn "Note that you should launch this script with root privileges to get accurate information." + _warn "We'll proceed but you might see permission denied errors." + _warn "To run it as root, you can try the following command: sudo $0" + _warn + fi + _info "Checking for vulnerabilities on current system" + _info "Kernel is \033[35m$(uname -s) $(uname -r) $(uname -v) $(uname -m)\033[0m" + _info "CPU is \033[35m$cpu_friendly_name\033[0m" + + # try to find the image of the current running kernel + # first, look for the BOOT_IMAGE hint in the kernel cmdline + if [ -r /proc/cmdline ] && grep -q 'BOOT_IMAGE=' /proc/cmdline; then + opt_kernel=$(grep -Eo 'BOOT_IMAGE=[^ ]+' /proc/cmdline | cut -d= -f2) + _debug "found opt_kernel=$opt_kernel in /proc/cmdline" + # if we have a dedicated /boot partition, our bootloader might have just called it / + # so try to prepend /boot and see if we find anything + [ -e "/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$opt_kernel" + # special case for CoreOS if we're inside the toolbox + [ -e "/media/root/boot/$opt_kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/media/root/boot/$opt_kernel" + _debug "opt_kernel is now $opt_kernel" + # else, the full path is already there (most probably /boot/something) + fi + # if we didn't find a kernel, default to guessing + if [ ! -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then + # Fedora: + [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vmlinuz" ] && opt_kernel="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/vmlinuz" + # Slackare: + [ -e "/boot/vmlinuz" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz" + # Arch: + [ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-linux" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-linux" + # Linux-Libre: + [ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-linux-libre" + # generic: + [ -e "/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/vmlinuz-$(uname -r)" + [ -e "/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel-$( uname -r)" + [ -e "/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/bzImage-$(uname -r)" + # Gentoo: + [ -e "/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/kernel-genkernel-$(uname -m)-$(uname -r)" + # NixOS: + [ -e "/run/booted-system/kernel" ] && opt_kernel="/run/booted-system/kernel" + # systemd kernel-install: + [ -e "/etc/machine-id" ] && [ -e "/boot/$(cat /etc/machine-id)/$(uname -r)/linux" ] && opt_kernel="/boot/$(cat /etc/machine-id)/$(uname -r)/linux" + fi + + # system.map + if [ -e /proc/kallsyms ] ; then + opt_map=/proc/kallsyms + elif [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/System.map" ] ; then + opt_map="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/System.map" + elif [ -e "/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)" ] ; then + opt_map="/boot/System.map-$(uname -r)" + fi + + # config + if [ -e /proc/config.gz ] ; then + dumped_config="$(mktemp /tmp/config-XXXXXX)" + gunzip -c /proc/config.gz > "$dumped_config" + # dumped_config will be deleted at the end of the script + opt_config="$dumped_config" + elif [ -e "/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/config" ]; then + opt_config="/lib/modules/$(uname -r)/config" + elif [ -e "/boot/config-$(uname -r)" ]; then + opt_config="/boot/config-$(uname -r)" + fi else - _info "Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel" - _info "CPU is \033[35m$cpu_friendly_name\033[0m" + _info "Checking for vulnerabilities against specified kernel" + _info "CPU is \033[35m$cpu_friendly_name\033[0m" fi if [ -n "$opt_kernel" ]; then - _verbose "Will use vmlinux image \033[35m$opt_kernel\033[0m" + _verbose "Will use vmlinux image \033[35m$opt_kernel\033[0m" else - _verbose "Will use no vmlinux image (accuracy might be reduced)" - bad_accuracy=1 + _verbose "Will use no vmlinux image (accuracy might be reduced)" + bad_accuracy=1 fi if [ -n "$opt_config" ] && ! grep -q '^CONFIG_' "$opt_config"; then - # given file is invalid! - _warn "The kernel config file seems invalid, was expecting a plain-text file, ignoring it!" - opt_config='' + # given file is invalid! + _warn "The kernel config file seems invalid, was expecting a plain-text file, ignoring it!" + opt_config='' fi if [ -n "$dumped_config" ] && [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then - _verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m/proc/config.gz (decompressed)\033[0m" + _verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m/proc/config.gz (decompressed)\033[0m" elif [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then - _verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m$opt_config\033[0m" + _verbose "Will use kconfig \033[35m$opt_config\033[0m" else - _verbose "Will use no kconfig (accuracy might be reduced)" - bad_accuracy=1 + _verbose "Will use no kconfig (accuracy might be reduced)" + bad_accuracy=1 fi if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then - _verbose "Will use System.map file \033[35m$opt_map\033[0m" + _verbose "Will use System.map file \033[35m$opt_map\033[0m" else - _verbose "Will use no System.map file (accuracy might be reduced)" - bad_accuracy=1 + _verbose "Will use no System.map file (accuracy might be reduced)" + bad_accuracy=1 fi if [ "$bad_accuracy" = 1 ]; then - _info "We're missing some kernel info (see -v), accuracy might be reduced" + _info "We're missing some kernel info (see -v), accuracy might be reduced" fi if [ -e "$opt_kernel" ]; then - if ! which readelf >/dev/null 2>&1; then - _debug "readelf not found" - vmlinux_err="missing 'readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the 'binutils' package" - elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then - vmlinux_err='kernel image decompression skipped' - else - extract_vmlinux "$opt_kernel" - fi + if ! which readelf >/dev/null 2>&1; then + _debug "readelf not found" + vmlinux_err="missing 'readelf' tool, please install it, usually it's in the 'binutils' package" + elif [ "$opt_sysfs_only" = 1 ]; then + vmlinux_err='kernel image decompression skipped' + else + extract_vmlinux "$opt_kernel" + fi else - _debug "no opt_kernel defined" - vmlinux_err="couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used netboot, this is normal" + _debug "no opt_kernel defined" + vmlinux_err="couldn't find your kernel image in /boot, if you used netboot, this is normal" fi if [ -z "$vmlinux" ] || [ ! -r "$vmlinux" ]; then - [ -z "$vmlinux_err" ] && vmlinux_err="couldn't extract your kernel from $opt_kernel" + [ -z "$vmlinux_err" ] && vmlinux_err="couldn't extract your kernel from $opt_kernel" else - vmlinux_version=$(strings "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep '^Linux version ' | head -1) - if [ -n "$vmlinux_version" ]; then - # in live mode, check if the img we found is the correct one - if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - _verbose "Kernel image is \033[35m$vmlinux_version" - if ! echo "$vmlinux_version" | grep -qF "$(uname -r)" || \ - ! echo "$vmlinux_version" | grep -qF "$(uname -v)"; then - _warn "Possible disrepancy between your running kernel and the image we found ($opt_kernel), results might be incorrect" - fi - else - _info "Kernel image is \033[35m$vmlinux_version" - fi - fi + vmlinux_version=$(strings "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep '^Linux version ' | head -1) + if [ -n "$vmlinux_version" ]; then + # in live mode, check if the img we found is the correct one + if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + _verbose "Kernel image is \033[35m$vmlinux_version" + if ! echo "$vmlinux_version" | grep -qF "$(uname -r)" || \ + ! echo "$vmlinux_version" | grep -qF "$(uname -v)"; then + _warn "Possible disrepancy between your running kernel and the image we found ($opt_kernel), results might be incorrect" + fi + else + _info "Kernel image is \033[35m$vmlinux_version" + fi + fi fi _info @@ -1021,839 +1022,840 @@ _info sys_interface_check() { - [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 0 ] && [ -r "$1" ] || return 1 - _info_nol "* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: " - if grep -qi '^not affected' "$1"; then - # Not affected - status=OK - pstatus green YES "kernel confirms that your CPU is unaffected" - elif grep -qi '^mitigation' "$1"; then - # Mitigation: PTI - status=OK - pstatus green YES "kernel confirms that the mitigation is active" - elif grep -qi '^vulnerable' "$1"; then - # Vulnerable - status=VULN - pstatus red NO "kernel confirms your system is vulnerable" - else - status=UNK - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unknown value reported by kernel" - fi - msg=$(cat "$1") - _debug "sys_interface_check: $1=$msg" - return 0 + [ "$opt_live" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_no_sysfs" = 0 ] && [ -r "$1" ] || return 1 + _info_nol "* Mitigated according to the /sys interface: " + if grep -qi '^not affected' "$1"; then + # Not affected + status=OK + pstatus green YES "kernel confirms that your CPU is unaffected" + elif grep -qi '^mitigation' "$1"; then + # Mitigation: PTI + status=OK + pstatus green YES "kernel confirms that the mitigation is active" + elif grep -qi '^vulnerable' "$1"; then + # Vulnerable + status=VULN + pstatus red NO "kernel confirms your system is vulnerable" + else + status=UNK + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "unknown value reported by kernel" + fi + msg=$(cat "$1") + _debug "sys_interface_check: $1=$msg" + return 0 } check_cpu() { - _info "\033[1;34mHardware check\033[0m" - - _info "* Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques" - _info " * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)" - _info_nol " * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: " - if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then - # try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards) - load_msr - fi - if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then - spec_ctrl_msr=-1 - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?" - else - # the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48 - # here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool - # if we get a read error, the MSR is not there. bs has to be 8 for msr - # skip=9 because 8*9=72=0x48 - dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip=9 2>/dev/null; ret=$? - if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then - spec_ctrl_msr=1 - pstatus green YES - else - spec_ctrl_msr=0 - pstatus red NO - fi - fi - - _info_nol " * CPU indicates IBRS capability: " - # from kernel src: { X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL, CPUID_EDX,26, 0x00000007, 0 }, - read_cpuid 7 15 4; ret=$? - if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then - pstatus green YES "SPEC_CTRL feature bit" - cpuid_spec_ctrl=1 - elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?" - else - pstatus red NO - fi - - # hardware support according to kernel - if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then - # the spec_ctrl flag in cpuinfo is set if and only if the kernel sees - # that the spec_ctrl cpuinfo bit set. we already check that ourselves above - # but let's check it anyway (in verbose mode only) - _verbose_nol " * Kernel has set the spec_ctrl flag in cpuinfo: " - if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw spec_ctrl; then - pstatus green YES - else - pstatus blue NO - fi - else - pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" - fi - fi - - # IBPB - _info " * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)" - _info_nol " * PRED_CMD MSR is available: " - if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?" - else - # the new MSR 'PRED_CTRL' is at offset 0x49, write-only - # here we use dd, it's the same as using 'wrmsr 0x49 0' but without needing the wrmsr tool - # if we get a write error, the MSR is not there - $echo_cmd -ne "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0" | dd of=/dev/cpu/0/msr bs=8 count=1 seek=73 oflag=seek_bytes 2>/dev/null; ret=$? - if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then - pstatus green YES - else - pstatus red NO - fi - fi - - - _info_nol " * CPU indicates IBPB capability: " - # CPUID EAX=0x80000008, ECX=0x00 return EBX[12] indicates support for just IBPB. - read_cpuid 2147483656 5 16; ret=$? - if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then - pstatus green YES "IBPB_SUPPORT feature bit" - elif [ "$cpuid_spec_ctrl" = 1 ]; then - pstatus green YES "SPEC_CTRL feature bit" - elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?" - else - pstatus red NO - fi - - # STIBP - _info " * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)" - _info_nol " * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: " - if [ "$spec_ctrl_msr" = 1 ]; then - pstatus green YES - elif [ "$spec_ctrl_msr" = 0 ]; then - pstatus red NO - else - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?" - fi - - _info_nol " * CPU indicates STIBP capability: " - # A processor supports STIBP if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[27] as 1 - read_cpuid 7 15 8; ret=$? - if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then - pstatus green YES - elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?" - else - pstatus red NO - fi - - _info " * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)" - _info_nol " * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: " - cpuid_arch_capabilities=-1 - # A processor supports STIBP if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[27] as 1 - read_cpuid 7 15 32; ret=$? - if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then - pstatus green YES - cpuid_arch_capabilities=1 - elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?" - else - pstatus red NO - cpuid_arch_capabilities=0 - fi - - _info_nol " * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: " - capabilities_rdcl_no=-1 - capabilities_ibrs_all=-1 - if [ "$cpuid_arch_capabilities" = -1 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN - elif [ "$cpuid_arch_capabilities" != 1 ]; then - capabilities_rdcl_no=0 - capabilities_ibrs_all=0 - pstatus red NO - elif [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then - spec_ctrl_msr=-1 - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?" - else - # the new MSR 'ARCH_CAPABILITIES' is at offset 0x10a - # here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x10a' but without needing the rdmsr tool - # if we get a read error, the MSR is not there. bs has to be 8 for msr - capabilities=$(dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr bs=8 count=1 skip=266 iflag=skip_bytes 2>/dev/null | od -t u1 -A n | awk '{print $8}'); ret=$? - capabilities_rdcl_no=0 - capabilities_ibrs_all=0 - if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then - _debug "capabilities MSR lower byte is $capabilities (decimal)" - [ $(( capabilities & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_rdcl_no=1 - [ $(( capabilities & 2 )) -eq 2 ] && capabilities_ibrs_all=1 - _debug "capabilities says rdcl_no=$capabilities_rdcl_no ibrs_all=$capabilities_ibrs_all" - if [ "$capabilities_ibrs_all" = 1 ]; then - pstatus green YES - else - pstatus red NO - fi - else - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN - fi - fi - - _info_nol " * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown (RDCL_NO): " - if [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = -1 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN - elif [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = 1 ]; then - pstatus green YES - else - pstatus blue NO - fi - - _info_nol " * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: " - if is_ucode_blacklisted; then - pstatus red YES "$ucode_found" - _warn - _warn "The microcode your CPU is running on is known to cause instability problems," - _warn "such as intempestive reboots or random crashes." - _warn "You are advised to either revert to a previous microcode version (that might not have" - _warn "the mitigations for Spectre), or upgrade to a newer one if available." - _warn - else - pstatus green NO "$ucode_found" + _info "\033[1;34mHardware check\033[0m" + + _info "* Hardware support (CPU microcode) for mitigation techniques" + _info " * Indirect Branch Restricted Speculation (IBRS)" + _info_nol " * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: " + if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then + # try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards) + load_msr + fi + if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then + spec_ctrl_msr=-1 + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?" + else + # the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48 + # here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool + # if we get a read error, the MSR is not there. bs has to be 8 for msr + # skip=9 because 8*9=72=0x48 + dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip=9 2>/dev/null; ret=$? + if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then + spec_ctrl_msr=1 + pstatus green YES + else + spec_ctrl_msr=0 + pstatus red NO + fi + fi + + + _info_nol " * CPU indicates IBRS capability: " + # from kernel src: { X86_FEATURE_SPEC_CTRL, CPUID_EDX,26, 0x00000007, 0 }, + read_cpuid 7 15 4; ret=$? + if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then + pstatus green YES "SPEC_CTRL feature bit" + cpuid_spec_ctrl=1 + elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?" + else + pstatus red NO + fi + + # hardware support according to kernel + if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then + # the spec_ctrl flag in cpuinfo is set if and only if the kernel sees + # that the spec_ctrl cpuinfo bit set. we already check that ourselves above + # but let's check it anyway (in verbose mode only) + _verbose_nol " * Kernel has set the spec_ctrl flag in cpuinfo: " + if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw spec_ctrl; then + pstatus green YES + else + pstatus blue NO + fi + else + pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" + fi + fi + + # IBPB + _info " * Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier (IBPB)" + _info_nol " * PRED_CMD MSR is available: " + if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?" + else + # the new MSR 'PRED_CTRL' is at offset 0x49, write-only + # here we use dd, it's the same as using 'wrmsr 0x49 0' but without needing the wrmsr tool + # if we get a write error, the MSR is not there + $echo_cmd -ne "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0" | dd of=/dev/cpu/0/msr bs=8 count=1 seek=73 oflag=seek_bytes 2>/dev/null; ret=$? + if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then + pstatus green YES + else + pstatus red NO + fi + fi + + _info_nol " * CPU indicates IBPB capability: " + # CPUID EAX=0x80000008, ECX=0x00 return EBX[12] indicates support for just IBPB. + read_cpuid 2147483656 5 16; ret=$? + if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then + pstatus green YES "IBPB_SUPPORT feature bit" + elif [ "$cpuid_spec_ctrl" = 1 ]; then + pstatus green YES "SPEC_CTRL feature bit" + elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?" + else + pstatus red NO + fi + + # STIBP + _info " * Single Thread Indirect Branch Predictors (STIBP)" + _info_nol " * SPEC_CTRL MSR is available: " + if [ "$spec_ctrl_msr" = 1 ]; then + pstatus green YES + elif [ "$spec_ctrl_msr" = 0 ]; then + pstatus red NO + else + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?" fi - _info "* CPU vulnerability to the three speculative execution attacks variants" - for v in 1 2 3; do - _info_nol " * Vulnerable to Variant $v: " - if is_cpu_vulnerable $v; then - pstatus red YES - else - pstatus green NO - fi - done - - _info + _info_nol " * CPU indicates STIBP capability: " + # A processor supports STIBP if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[27] as 1 + read_cpuid 7 15 8; ret=$? + if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then + pstatus green YES + elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?" + else + pstatus red NO + fi + + + _info " * Enhanced IBRS (IBRS_ALL)" + _info_nol " * CPU indicates ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR availability: " + cpuid_arch_capabilities=-1 + # A processor supports STIBP if it enumerates CPUID (EAX=7H,ECX=0):EDX[27] as 1 + read_cpuid 7 15 32; ret=$? + if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then + pstatus green YES + cpuid_arch_capabilities=1 + elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/cpuid, is cpuid support enabled in your kernel?" + else + pstatus red NO + cpuid_arch_capabilities=0 + fi + + _info_nol " * ARCH_CAPABILITIES MSR advertises IBRS_ALL capability: " + capabilities_rdcl_no=-1 + capabilities_ibrs_all=-1 + if [ "$cpuid_arch_capabilities" = -1 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN + elif [ "$cpuid_arch_capabilities" != 1 ]; then + capabilities_rdcl_no=0 + capabilities_ibrs_all=0 + pstatus red NO + elif [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then + spec_ctrl_msr=-1 + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?" + else + # the new MSR 'ARCH_CAPABILITIES' is at offset 0x10a + # here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x10a' but without needing the rdmsr tool + # if we get a read error, the MSR is not there. bs has to be 8 for msr + capabilities=$(dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr bs=8 count=1 skip=266 iflag=skip_bytes 2>/dev/null | od -t u1 -A n | awk '{print $8}'); ret=$? + capabilities_rdcl_no=0 + capabilities_ibrs_all=0 + if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then + _debug "capabilities MSR lower byte is $capabilities (decimal)" + [ $(( capabilities & 1 )) -eq 1 ] && capabilities_rdcl_no=1 + [ $(( capabilities & 2 )) -eq 2 ] && capabilities_ibrs_all=1 + _debug "capabilities says rdcl_no=$capabilities_rdcl_no ibrs_all=$capabilities_ibrs_all" + if [ "$capabilities_ibrs_all" = 1 ]; then + pstatus green YES + else + pstatus red NO + fi + else + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN + fi + fi + + _info_nol " * CPU explicitly indicates not being vulnerable to Meltdown (RDCL_NO): " + if [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = -1 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN + elif [ "$capabilities_rdcl_no" = 1 ]; then + pstatus green YES + else + pstatus blue NO + fi + + _info_nol " * CPU microcode is known to cause stability problems: " + if is_ucode_blacklisted; then + pstatus red YES "$ucode_found" + _warn + _warn "The microcode your CPU is running on is known to cause instability problems," + _warn "such as intempestive reboots or random crashes." + _warn "You are advised to either revert to a previous microcode version (that might not have" + _warn "the mitigations for Spectre), or upgrade to a newer one if available." + _warn + else + pstatus green NO "$ucode_found" + fi + + _info "* CPU vulnerability to the three speculative execution attacks variants" + for v in 1 2 3; do + _info_nol " * Vulnerable to Variant $v: " + if is_cpu_vulnerable $v; then + pstatus red YES + else + pstatus green NO + fi + done + + _info } ################### # SPECTRE VARIANT 1 check_variant1() { - _info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m" - - status=UNK - sys_interface_available=0 - msg='' - if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1"; then - # this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything - # v0.33+: don't. some kernels have backported the array_index_mask_nospec() workaround without - # modifying the vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 file. that's bad. we can't trust it when it says Vulnerable :( - # see "silent backport" detection at the bottom of this func - sys_interface_available=1 - fi - if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then - # no /sys interface (or offline mode), fallback to our own ways - _info_nol "* Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: " - # vanilla: look for the Linus' mask aka array_index_mask_nospec() - # that is inlined at least in raw_copy_from_user (__get_user_X symbols) - #mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX - #cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX - #jae bad_get_user - # /* array_index_mask_nospec() are the 2 opcodes that follow */ - #+sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX - #+and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX - #ASM_STAC - # x86 64bits: jae(0x0f 0x83 0x?? 0x?? 0x?? 0x??) sbb(0x48 0x19 0xd2) and(0x48 0x21 0xd0) - # x86 32bits: cmp(0x3b 0x82 0x?? 0x?? 0x00 0x00) jae(0x73 0x??) sbb(0x19 0xd2) and(0x21 0xd0) - if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)" - elif ! which perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it" - else - perl -ne '/\x0f\x83....\x48\x19\xd2\x48\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$vmlinux"; ret=$? - if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then - pstatus green YES "$ret occurence(s) found of 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec()" - v1_mask_nospec=1 - else - perl -ne '/\x3b\x82..\x00\x00\x73.\x19\xd2\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$vmlinux"; ret=$? - if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then - pstatus green YES "$ret occurence(s) found of 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec()" - v1_mask_nospec=1 - else - pstatus red NO - fi - fi - fi - - if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ] || [ "$v1_mask_nospec" != 1 ]; then - # this is a slow heuristic and we don't need it if we already know the kernel is patched - # but still show it in verbose mode - _info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE instructions following a jump in kernel... " - if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)" - else - if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package" - else - # here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurrences of the LFENCE opcode - # in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50 - # in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+) - # v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches, - # so let's push the threshold to 70. - # v0.33+: now only count lfence opcodes after a jump, way less error-prone - # non patched kernel have between 0 and 20 matches, patched ones have at least 40-45 - nb_lfence=$(objdump -d "$vmlinux" | grep -w -B1 lfence | grep -Ewc 'jmp|jne|je') - if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 30 ]; then - pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence jump-then-lfence instructions found, should be >= 30 (heuristic)" - else - v1_lfence=1 - pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence jump-then-lfence instructions found, which is >= 30 (heuristic)" - fi - fi - fi - fi - - else - # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only! - msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!" - status=UNK - fi - - # report status - cve='CVE-2017-5753' - if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then - # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all - pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" - elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then - # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test - if [ "$v1_mask_nospec" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (array_index_mask_nospec)" - elif [ "$v1_lfence" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has PROBABLY been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (jump-then-lfence instructions heuristic)" - elif [ "$vmlinux_err" ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve UNK "Couldn't find kernel image or tools missing to execute the checks" - else - pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability" - fi - else - if [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && [ "$v1_mask_nospec" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (silent backport of array_index_mask_nospec)" - else - [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && msg="Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability" - pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg" - fi - fi + _info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m" + + status=UNK + sys_interface_available=0 + msg='' + if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v1"; then + # this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything + # v0.33+: don't. some kernels have backported the array_index_mask_nospec() workaround without + # modifying the vulnerabilities/spectre_v1 file. that's bad. we can't trust it when it says Vulnerable :( + # see "silent backport" detection at the bottom of this func + sys_interface_available=1 + fi + if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then + # no /sys interface (or offline mode), fallback to our own ways + _info_nol "* Kernel has array_index_mask_nospec: " + # vanilla: look for the Linus' mask aka array_index_mask_nospec() + # that is inlined at least in raw_copy_from_user (__get_user_X symbols) + #mov PER_CPU_VAR(current_task), %_ASM_DX + #cmp TASK_addr_limit(%_ASM_DX),%_ASM_AX + #jae bad_get_user + # /* array_index_mask_nospec() are the 2 opcodes that follow */ + #+sbb %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_DX + #+and %_ASM_DX, %_ASM_AX + #ASM_STAC + # x86 64bits: jae(0x0f 0x83 0x?? 0x?? 0x?? 0x??) sbb(0x48 0x19 0xd2) and(0x48 0x21 0xd0) + # x86 32bits: cmp(0x3b 0x82 0x?? 0x?? 0x00 0x00) jae(0x73 0x??) sbb(0x19 0xd2) and(0x21 0xd0) + if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)" + elif ! which perl >/dev/null 2>&1; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'perl' binary, please install it" + else + perl -ne '/\x0f\x83....\x48\x19\xd2\x48\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$vmlinux"; ret=$? + if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then + pstatus green YES "$ret occurence(s) found of 64 bits array_index_mask_nospec()" + v1_mask_nospec=1 + else + perl -ne '/\x3b\x82..\x00\x00\x73.\x19\xd2\x21\xd0/ and $found++; END { exit($found) }' "$vmlinux"; ret=$? + if [ $ret -gt 0 ]; then + pstatus green YES "$ret occurence(s) found of 32 bits array_index_mask_nospec()" + v1_mask_nospec=1 + else + pstatus red NO + fi + fi + fi + + if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ] || [ "$v1_mask_nospec" != 1 ]; then + # this is a slow heuristic and we don't need it if we already know the kernel is patched + # but still show it in verbose mode + _info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE instructions following a jump in kernel... " + if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't check ($vmlinux_err)" + else + if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package" + else + # here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurrences of the LFENCE opcode + # in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50 + # in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+) + # v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches, + # so let's push the threshold to 70. + # v0.33+: now only count lfence opcodes after a jump, way less error-prone + # non patched kernel have between 0 and 20 matches, patched ones have at least 40-45 + nb_lfence=$(objdump -d "$vmlinux" | grep -w -B1 lfence | grep -Ewc 'jmp|jne|je') + if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 30 ]; then + pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence jump-then-lfence instructions found, should be >= 30 (heuristic)" + else + v1_lfence=1 + pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence jump-then-lfence instructions found, which is >= 30 (heuristic)" + fi + fi + fi + fi + + else + # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only! + msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!" + status=UNK + fi + + # report status + cve='CVE-2017-5753' + if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then + # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all + pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" + elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then + # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test + if [ "$v1_mask_nospec" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (array_index_mask_nospec)" + elif [ "$v1_lfence" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has PROBABLY been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (jump-then-lfence instructions heuristic)" + elif [ "$vmlinux_err" ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve UNK "Couldn't find kernel image or tools missing to execute the checks" + else + pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability" + fi + else + if [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && [ "$v1_mask_nospec" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve OK "Kernel source has been patched to mitigate the vulnerability (silent backport of array_index_mask_nospec)" + else + [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && msg="Kernel source needs to be patched to mitigate the vulnerability" + pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg" + fi + fi } ################### # SPECTRE VARIANT 2 check_variant2() { - _info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m" - - status=UNK - sys_interface_available=0 - msg='' - if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2"; then - # this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything - sys_interface_available=1 - fi - if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then - _info "* Mitigation 1" - _info_nol " * Kernel is compiled with IBRS/IBPB support: " - ibrs_can_tell=0 - - if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - ibrs_can_tell=1 - mount_debugfs - for dir in \ - /sys/kernel/debug \ - /sys/kernel/debug/x86 \ - /proc/sys/kernel; do - if [ -e "$dir/ibrs_enabled" ]; then - # if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in - # /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled: vanilla - # /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled: RedHat (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301) - # /proc/sys/kernel/ibrs_enabled: OpenSUSE tumbleweed - pstatus green YES - ibrs_knob_dir=$dir - ibrs_supported=1 - ibrs_enabled=$(cat "$dir/ibrs_enabled" 2>/dev/null) - _debug "ibrs: found $dir/ibrs_enabled=$ibrs_enabled" - if [ -e "$dir/ibpb_enabled" ]; then - ibpb_enabled=$(cat "$dir/ibpb_enabled" 2>/dev/null) - _debug "ibpb: found $dir/ibpb_enabled=$ibpb_enabled" - else - ibpb_enabled=-1 - _debug "ibpb: no ibpb_enabled file in $dir" - fi - break - else - _debug "ibrs: $dir/ibrs_enabled file doesn't exist" - fi - done - # on some newer kernels, the spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in /proc/cpuinfo - # is set when ibrs has been administratively enabled (usually from cmdline) - # which in that case means ibrs is supported *and* enabled for kernel & user - # as per the ibrs patch series v3 - if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 0 ]; then - if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw spec_ctrl_ibrs; then - _debug "ibrs: found spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in /proc/cpuinfo" - ibrs_supported=1 - # enabled=2 -> kernel & user - ibrs_enabled=2 - # XXX and what about ibpb ? - fi - fi - fi - if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then - ibrs_can_tell=1 - if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then - pstatus green YES - ibrs_supported=1 - _debug "ibrs: found '*spec_ctrl*' symbol in $opt_map" - fi - fi - if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then - if [ "$ibrs_can_tell" = 1 ]; then - pstatus red NO - else - # if we're in offline mode without System.map, we can't really know - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "in offline mode, we need System.map to be able to tell" - fi - fi - - _info " * Currently enabled features" - _info_nol " * IBRS enabled for Kernel space: " - if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - if [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then - # if ibpb=2, ibrs is forcefully=0 - pstatus blue NO "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints" - else - # 0 means disabled - # 1 is enabled only for kernel space - # 2 is enabled for kernel and user space - case "$ibrs_enabled" in - "") - if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN - else - pstatus red NO - fi - ;; - 0) - pstatus red NO - _verbose " - To enable, \`echo 1 > $ibrs_knob_dir/ibrs_enabled' as root. If you don't have hardware support, you'll get an error." - ;; - 1 | 2) pstatus green YES;; - *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; - esac - fi - else - pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" - fi - - _info_nol " * IBRS enabled for User space: " - if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - if [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then - # if ibpb=2, ibrs is forcefully=0 - pstatus blue NO "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints" - else - case "$ibrs_enabled" in - "") - if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN - else - pstatus red NO - fi - ;; - 0 | 1) - pstatus red NO - _verbose " - To enable, \`echo 2 > $ibrs_knob_dir/ibrs_enabled' as root. If you don't have hardware support, you'll get an error." - ;; - 2) pstatus green YES;; - *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; - esac - fi - else - pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" - fi - - _info_nol " * IBPB enabled: " - if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - case "$ibpb_enabled" in - "") - if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN - else - pstatus red NO - fi - ;; - 0) - pstatus red NO - _verbose " - To enable, \`echo 1 > $ibrs_knob_dir/ibpb_enabled' as root. If you don't have hardware support, you'll get an error." - ;; - 1) pstatus green YES;; - 2) pstatus green YES "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints";; - *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; - esac - else - pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" - fi - - _info "* Mitigation 2" - _info_nol " * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: " - # We check the RETPOLINE kernel options - if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then - if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then - pstatus green YES - retpoline=1 - # shellcheck disable=SC2046 - _debug 'retpoline: found '$(grep '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE' "$opt_config")" in $opt_config" - else - pstatus red NO - fi - else - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration" - fi - - _info_nol " * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: " - # Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm - # For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles) - # See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79 - # In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set - # *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol - if [ -e "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2" ]; then - if grep -qw Minimal /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2; then - pstatus red NO "kernel reports minimal retpoline compilation" - elif grep -qw Full /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2; then - retpoline_compiler=1 - pstatus green YES "kernel reports full retpoline compilation" - else - if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN - else - pstatus red NO - fi - fi - elif [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then - # look for the symbol - if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then - retpoline_compiler=1 - pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map" - else - if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN - else - pstatus red NO - fi - fi - elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then - # look for the symbol - if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then - # the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol - if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then - retpoline_compiler=1 - pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols" - else - if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN - else - pstatus red NO - fi - fi - elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then - # if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have - # any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary - retpoline_compiler=1 - pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux" - else - if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN - else - pstatus red NO - fi - fi - else - if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map" - else - pstatus red NO - fi - fi - elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then - # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only! - msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!" - status=UNK - fi - - cve='CVE-2017-5715' - if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then - # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all - pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" - elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then - # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test - if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve OK "retpoline mitigates the vulnerability" - elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - if ( [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 ] || [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ] ) && [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve OK "IBRS/IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability" - elif ( [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 ] || [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ] ) && [ "$ibpb_enabled" = -1 ]; then - # IBPB doesn't seem here on this kernel - pvulnstatus $cve OK "IBRS is mitigating the vulnerability" - elif [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve OK "Full IBPB is mitigating the vulnerability" - else - pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" - fi - else - if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: IBRS/IBPB will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime" - elif [ "$ibrs_can_tell" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" - else - pvulnstatus $cve UNK "offline mode: not enough information" - fi - fi - else - [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && msg="IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" - pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg" - fi + _info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m" + + status=UNK + sys_interface_available=0 + msg='' + if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2"; then + # this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything + sys_interface_available=1 + fi + if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then + _info "* Mitigation 1" + _info_nol " * Kernel is compiled with IBRS/IBPB support: " + ibrs_can_tell=0 + + if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + ibrs_can_tell=1 + mount_debugfs + for dir in \ + /sys/kernel/debug \ + /sys/kernel/debug/x86 \ + /proc/sys/kernel; do + if [ -e "$dir/ibrs_enabled" ]; then + # if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in + # /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled: vanilla + # /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled: RedHat (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301) + # /proc/sys/kernel/ibrs_enabled: OpenSUSE tumbleweed + pstatus green YES + ibrs_knob_dir=$dir + ibrs_supported=1 + ibrs_enabled=$(cat "$dir/ibrs_enabled" 2>/dev/null) + _debug "ibrs: found $dir/ibrs_enabled=$ibrs_enabled" + if [ -e "$dir/ibpb_enabled" ]; then + ibpb_enabled=$(cat "$dir/ibpb_enabled" 2>/dev/null) + _debug "ibpb: found $dir/ibpb_enabled=$ibpb_enabled" + else + ibpb_enabled=-1 + _debug "ibpb: no ibpb_enabled file in $dir" + fi + break + else + _debug "ibrs: $dir/ibrs_enabled file doesn't exist" + fi + done + # on some newer kernels, the spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in /proc/cpuinfo + # is set when ibrs has been administratively enabled (usually from cmdline) + # which in that case means ibrs is supported *and* enabled for kernel & user + # as per the ibrs patch series v3 + if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 0 ]; then + if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw spec_ctrl_ibrs; then + _debug "ibrs: found spec_ctrl_ibrs flag in /proc/cpuinfo" + ibrs_supported=1 + # enabled=2 -> kernel & user + ibrs_enabled=2 + # XXX and what about ibpb ? + fi + fi + fi + if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then + ibrs_can_tell=1 + if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then + pstatus green YES + ibrs_supported=1 + _debug "ibrs: found '*spec_ctrl*' symbol in $opt_map" + fi + fi + if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then + if [ "$ibrs_can_tell" = 1 ]; then + pstatus red NO + else + # if we're in offline mode without System.map, we can't really know + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "in offline mode, we need System.map to be able to tell" + fi + fi + + _info " * Currently enabled features" + _info_nol " * IBRS enabled for Kernel space: " + if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + if [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then + # if ibpb=2, ibrs is forcefully=0 + pstatus blue NO "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints" + else + # 0 means disabled + # 1 is enabled only for kernel space + # 2 is enabled for kernel and user space + case "$ibrs_enabled" in + "") + if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN + else + pstatus red NO + fi + ;; + 0) + pstatus red NO + _verbose " - To enable, \`echo 1 > $ibrs_knob_dir/ibrs_enabled' as root. If you don't have hardware support, you'll get an error." + ;; + 1 | 2) pstatus green YES;; + *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; + esac + fi + else + pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" + fi + + _info_nol " * IBRS enabled for User space: " + if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + if [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then + # if ibpb=2, ibrs is forcefully=0 + pstatus blue NO "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints" + else + case "$ibrs_enabled" in + "") + if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN + else + pstatus red NO + fi + ;; + 0 | 1) + pstatus red NO + _verbose " - To enable, \`echo 2 > $ibrs_knob_dir/ibrs_enabled' as root. If you don't have hardware support, you'll get an error." + ;; + 2) pstatus green YES;; + *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; + esac + fi + else + pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" + fi + + _info_nol " * IBPB enabled: " + if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + case "$ibpb_enabled" in + "") + if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN + else + pstatus red NO + fi + ;; + 0) + pstatus red NO + _verbose " - To enable, \`echo 1 > $ibrs_knob_dir/ibpb_enabled' as root. If you don't have hardware support, you'll get an error." + ;; + 1) pstatus green YES;; + 2) pstatus green YES "IBPB used instead of IBRS in all kernel entrypoints";; + *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; + esac + else + pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" + fi + + _info "* Mitigation 2" + _info_nol " * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: " + # We check the RETPOLINE kernel options + if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then + if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then + pstatus green YES + retpoline=1 + # shellcheck disable=SC2046 + _debug 'retpoline: found '$(grep '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE' "$opt_config")" in $opt_config" + else + pstatus red NO + fi + else + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration" + fi + + _info_nol " * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: " + # Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm + # For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles) + # See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79 + # In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set + # *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol + if [ -e "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2" ]; then + if grep -qw Minimal /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2; then + pstatus red NO "kernel reports minimal retpoline compilation" + elif grep -qw Full /sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/spectre_v2; then + retpoline_compiler=1 + pstatus green YES "kernel reports full retpoline compilation" + else + if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN + else + pstatus red NO + fi + fi + elif [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then + # look for the symbol + if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then + retpoline_compiler=1 + pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map" + else + if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN + else + pstatus red NO + fi + fi + elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then + # look for the symbol + if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then + # the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol + if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then + retpoline_compiler=1 + pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols" + else + if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN + else + pstatus red NO + fi + fi + elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then + # if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have + # any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary + retpoline_compiler=1 + pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux" + else + if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN + else + pstatus red NO + fi + fi + else + if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map" + else + pstatus red NO + fi + fi + + elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then + # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only! + msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!" + status=UNK + fi + + cve='CVE-2017-5715' + if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then + # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all + pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" + elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then + # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test + if [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && [ "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve OK "retpoline mitigates the vulnerability" + elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + if ( [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 ] || [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ] ) && [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve OK "IBRS/IBPB are mitigating the vulnerability" + elif ( [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 ] || [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ] ) && [ "$ibpb_enabled" = -1 ]; then + # IBPB doesn't seem here on this kernel + pvulnstatus $cve OK "IBRS is mitigating the vulnerability" + elif [ "$ibpb_enabled" = 2 ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve OK "Full IBPB is mitigating the vulnerability" + else + pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" + fi + else + if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: IBRS/IBPB will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime" + elif [ "$ibrs_can_tell" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" + else + pvulnstatus $cve UNK "offline mode: not enough information" + fi + fi + else + [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ] && msg="IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" + pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg" + fi } ######################## # MELTDOWN aka VARIANT 3 check_variant3() { - _info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m" - - status=UNK - sys_interface_available=0 - msg='' - if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown"; then - # this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything - sys_interface_available=1 - fi - if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then - _info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): " - kpti_support=0 - kpti_can_tell=0 - if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then - kpti_can_tell=1 - if grep -Eq '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config"; then - # shellcheck disable=SC2046 - _debug 'kpti_support: found option '$(grep -E '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config")" in $opt_config" - kpti_support=1 - fi - fi - if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then - # it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch - # so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map - kpti_can_tell=1 - if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then - _debug "kpti_support: found kpti_force_enabled in $opt_map" - kpti_support=1 - fi - fi - if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 ] && [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then - # same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the - # nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option) - kpti_can_tell=1 - if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package" - else - if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then - _debug "kpti_support: found nopti string in $vmlinux" - kpti_support=1 - fi - fi - fi - - if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then - pstatus green YES - elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then - pstatus red NO - else - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file" - fi - - mount_debugfs - _info_nol "* PTI enabled and active: " - if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - dmesg_grep="Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled" - dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|Kernel page table isolation enabled" - dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|x86/pti: Unmapping kernel while in userspace" - if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then - # vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo - _debug "kpti_enabled: found 'pti' flag in /proc/cpuinfo" - kpti_enabled=1 - elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then - # kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo - _debug "kpti_enabled: found 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo" - kpti_enabled=1 - elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then - # RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301 - kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null) - _debug "kpti_enabled: file /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled exists and says: $kpti_enabled" - fi - if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then - dmesg_grep "$dmesg_grep"; ret=$? - if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then - _debug "kpti_enabled: found hint in dmesg: $dmesg_grepped" - kpti_enabled=1 - elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then - _debug "kpti_enabled: dmesg truncated" - kpti_enabled=-1 - fi - fi - if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then - _debug "kpti_enabled: couldn't find any hint that PTI is enabled" - kpti_enabled=0 - fi - if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then - pstatus green YES - elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = -1 ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "dmesg truncated, please reboot and relaunch this script" - else - pstatus red NO - fi - else - pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode" - fi - - # no security impact but give a hint to the user in verbose mode - # about PCID/INVPCID cpuid features that must be present to avoid - # too big a performance impact with PTI - # refs: - # https://marc.info/?t=151532047900001&r=1&w=2 - # https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/mechanical-sympathy/L9mHTbeQLNU - if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then - _info "* Performance impact if PTI is enabled" - _info_nol " * CPU supports PCID: " - if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pcid; then - pstatus green YES 'performance degradation with PTI will be limited' - else - pstatus blue NO 'no security impact but performance will be degraded with PTI' - fi - _info_nol " * CPU supports INVPCID: " - if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw invpcid; then - pstatus green YES 'performance degradation with PTI will be limited' - else - pstatus blue NO 'no security impact but performance will be degraded with PTI' - fi - fi - elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then - # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only! - msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!" - status=UNK - fi - - - # Test if the current host is a Xen PV Dom0 / DomU - if [ -d "/proc/xen" ]; then - # XXX do we have a better way that relying on dmesg? - dmesg_grep 'Booting paravirtualized kernel on Xen$'; ret=$? - if [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then - _warn "dmesg truncated, Xen detection will be unreliable. Please reboot and relaunch this script" - elif [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then - if [ -e /proc/xen/capabilities ] && grep -q "control_d" /proc/xen/capabilities; then - xen_pv_domo=1 - else - xen_pv_domu=1 - fi - fi - fi - - if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - # checking whether we're running under Xen PV 64 bits. If yes, we are affected by variant3 - # (unless we are a Dom0) - _info_nol "* Running as a Xen PV DomU: " - if [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then - pstatus red YES - else - pstatus green NO - fi - fi - - cve='CVE-2017-5754' - if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then - # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all - pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" - elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then - # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test - if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability" - elif [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve OK "Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI" - elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode" - else - pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" - fi - else - if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime" - elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" - else - pvulnstatus $cve UNK "offline mode: not enough information" - fi - fi - else - if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then - msg="Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI" - status="OK" - elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then - msg="Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode" - status="VULN" - elif [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ]; then - msg="PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" - fi - pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg" - fi - - # Warn the user about XSA-254 recommended mitigations - if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then - _warn - _warn "This host is a Xen Dom0. Please make sure that you are running your DomUs" - _warn "in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode to prevent any guest-to-host / host-to-guest attacks." - _warn - _warn "See https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ and XSA-254 for details." - fi + _info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m" + + status=UNK + sys_interface_available=0 + msg='' + if sys_interface_check "/sys/devices/system/cpu/vulnerabilities/meltdown"; then + # this kernel has the /sys interface, trust it over everything + sys_interface_available=1 + fi + if [ "$opt_sysfs_only" != 1 ]; then + _info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): " + kpti_support=0 + kpti_can_tell=0 + if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then + kpti_can_tell=1 + if grep -Eq '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config"; then + # shellcheck disable=SC2046 + _debug 'kpti_support: found option '$(grep -E '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config")" in $opt_config" + kpti_support=1 + fi + fi + if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 ] && [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then + # it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch + # so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map + kpti_can_tell=1 + if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then + _debug "kpti_support: found kpti_force_enabled in $opt_map" + kpti_support=1 + fi + fi + if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 ] && [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then + # same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the + # nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option) + kpti_can_tell=1 + if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package" + else + if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then + _debug "kpti_support: found nopti string in $vmlinux" + kpti_support=1 + fi + fi + fi + + if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then + pstatus green YES + elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then + pstatus red NO + else + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file" + fi + + mount_debugfs + _info_nol "* PTI enabled and active: " + if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + dmesg_grep="Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled" + dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|Kernel page table isolation enabled" + dmesg_grep="$dmesg_grep|x86/pti: Unmapping kernel while in userspace" + if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then + # vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo + _debug "kpti_enabled: found 'pti' flag in /proc/cpuinfo" + kpti_enabled=1 + elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then + # kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo + _debug "kpti_enabled: found 'kaiser' flag in /proc/cpuinfo" + kpti_enabled=1 + elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then + # RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301 + kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null) + _debug "kpti_enabled: file /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled exists and says: $kpti_enabled" + fi + if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then + dmesg_grep "$dmesg_grep"; ret=$? + if [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then + _debug "kpti_enabled: found hint in dmesg: $dmesg_grepped" + kpti_enabled=1 + elif [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then + _debug "kpti_enabled: dmesg truncated" + kpti_enabled=-1 + fi + fi + if [ -z "$kpti_enabled" ]; then + _debug "kpti_enabled: couldn't find any hint that PTI is enabled" + kpti_enabled=0 + fi + if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then + pstatus green YES + elif [ "$kpti_enabled" = -1 ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "dmesg truncated, please reboot and relaunch this script" + else + pstatus red NO + fi + else + pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode" + fi + + # no security impact but give a hint to the user in verbose mode + # about PCID/INVPCID cpuid features that must be present to avoid + # too big a performance impact with PTI + # refs: + # https://marc.info/?t=151532047900001&r=1&w=2 + # https://groups.google.com/forum/m/#!topic/mechanical-sympathy/L9mHTbeQLNU + if [ "$opt_verbose" -ge 2 ]; then + _info "* Performance impact if PTI is enabled" + _info_nol " * CPU supports PCID: " + if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pcid; then + pstatus green YES 'performance degradation with PTI will be limited' + else + pstatus blue NO 'no security impact but performance will be degraded with PTI' + fi + _info_nol " * CPU supports INVPCID: " + if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw invpcid; then + pstatus green YES 'performance degradation with PTI will be limited' + else + pstatus blue NO 'no security impact but performance will be degraded with PTI' + fi + fi + elif [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ]; then + # we have no sysfs but were asked to use it only! + msg="/sys vulnerability interface use forced, but it's not available!" + status=UNK + fi + + # Test if the current host is a Xen PV Dom0 / DomU + if [ -d "/proc/xen" ]; then + # XXX do we have a better way that relying on dmesg? + dmesg_grep 'Booting paravirtualized kernel on Xen$'; ret=$? + if [ $ret -eq 2 ]; then + _warn "dmesg truncated, Xen detection will be unreliable. Please reboot and relaunch this script" + elif [ $ret -eq 0 ]; then + if [ -e /proc/xen/capabilities ] && grep -q "control_d" /proc/xen/capabilities; then + xen_pv_domo=1 + else + xen_pv_domu=1 + fi + fi + fi + + if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + # checking whether we're running under Xen PV 64 bits. If yes, we are affected by variant3 + # (unless we are a Dom0) + _info_nol "* Running as a Xen PV DomU: " + if [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then + pstatus red YES + else + pstatus green NO + fi + fi + + cve='CVE-2017-5754' + if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then + # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all + pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" + elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then + # if msg is empty, sysfs check didn't fill it, rely on our own test + if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability" + elif [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve OK "Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI" + elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve VULN "Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode" + else + pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" + fi + else + if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime" + elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus $cve VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" + else + pvulnstatus $cve UNK "offline mode: not enough information" + fi + fi + else + if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then + msg="Xen Dom0s are safe and do not require PTI" + status="OK" + elif [ "$xen_pv_domu" = 1 ]; then + msg="Xen PV DomUs are vulnerable and need to be run in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode" + status="VULN" + elif [ "$msg" = "Vulnerable" ]; then + msg="PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" + fi + pvulnstatus $cve "$status" "$msg" + fi + + # Warn the user about XSA-254 recommended mitigations + if [ "$xen_pv_domo" = 1 ]; then + _warn + _warn "This host is a Xen Dom0. Please make sure that you are running your DomUs" + _warn "in HVM, PVHVM or PVH mode to prevent any guest-to-host / host-to-guest attacks." + _warn + _warn "See https://blog.xenproject.org/2018/01/22/xen-project-spectre-meltdown-faq-jan-22-update/ and XSA-254 for details." + fi } check_cpu # now run the checks the user asked for if [ "$opt_variant1" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then - check_variant1 - _info + check_variant1 + _info fi if [ "$opt_variant2" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then - check_variant2 - _info + check_variant2 + _info fi if [ "$opt_variant3" = 1 ] || [ "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then - check_variant3 - _info + check_variant3 + _info fi _info "A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer" if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "nrpe" ]; then - if [ ! -z "$nrpe_vuln" ]; then - echo "Vulnerable:$nrpe_vuln" - else - echo "OK" - fi + if [ ! -z "$nrpe_vuln" ]; then + echo "Vulnerable:$nrpe_vuln" + else + echo "OK" + fi fi if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 ] && [ "$opt_batch_format" = "json" ]; then - _echo 0 "${json_output%?}]" + _echo 0 "${json_output%?}]" fi # exit with the proper exit code |