diff options
Diffstat (limited to 'python/urllib3/contrib')
| -rw-r--r-- | python/urllib3/contrib/__init__.py | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | python/urllib3/contrib/_appengine_environ.py | 30 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | python/urllib3/contrib/_securetransport/__init__.py | 0 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | python/urllib3/contrib/_securetransport/bindings.py | 593 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | python/urllib3/contrib/_securetransport/low_level.py | 346 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | python/urllib3/contrib/appengine.py | 289 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | python/urllib3/contrib/ntlmpool.py | 111 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | python/urllib3/contrib/pyopenssl.py | 466 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | python/urllib3/contrib/securetransport.py | 804 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | python/urllib3/contrib/socks.py | 192 |
10 files changed, 2831 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/python/urllib3/contrib/__init__.py b/python/urllib3/contrib/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e69de29 --- /dev/null +++ b/python/urllib3/contrib/__init__.py diff --git a/python/urllib3/contrib/_appengine_environ.py b/python/urllib3/contrib/_appengine_environ.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f3e0094 --- /dev/null +++ b/python/urllib3/contrib/_appengine_environ.py @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +""" +This module provides means to detect the App Engine environment. +""" + +import os + + +def is_appengine(): + return (is_local_appengine() or + is_prod_appengine() or + is_prod_appengine_mvms()) + + +def is_appengine_sandbox(): + return is_appengine() and not is_prod_appengine_mvms() + + +def is_local_appengine(): + return ('APPENGINE_RUNTIME' in os.environ and + 'Development/' in os.environ['SERVER_SOFTWARE']) + + +def is_prod_appengine(): + return ('APPENGINE_RUNTIME' in os.environ and + 'Google App Engine/' in os.environ['SERVER_SOFTWARE'] and + not is_prod_appengine_mvms()) + + +def is_prod_appengine_mvms(): + return os.environ.get('GAE_VM', False) == 'true' diff --git a/python/urllib3/contrib/_securetransport/__init__.py b/python/urllib3/contrib/_securetransport/__init__.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e69de29 --- /dev/null +++ b/python/urllib3/contrib/_securetransport/__init__.py diff --git a/python/urllib3/contrib/_securetransport/bindings.py b/python/urllib3/contrib/_securetransport/bindings.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bcf41c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/python/urllib3/contrib/_securetransport/bindings.py @@ -0,0 +1,593 @@ +""" +This module uses ctypes to bind a whole bunch of functions and constants from +SecureTransport. The goal here is to provide the low-level API to +SecureTransport. These are essentially the C-level functions and constants, and +they're pretty gross to work with. + +This code is a bastardised version of the code found in Will Bond's oscrypto +library. An enormous debt is owed to him for blazing this trail for us. For +that reason, this code should be considered to be covered both by urllib3's +license and by oscrypto's: + + Copyright (c) 2015-2016 Will Bond <will@wbond.net> + + Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person obtaining a + copy of this software and associated documentation files (the "Software"), + to deal in the Software without restriction, including without limitation + the rights to use, copy, modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, + and/or sell copies of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the + Software is furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: + + The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be included in + all copies or substantial portions of the Software. + + THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS OR + IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, + FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE + AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER + LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING + FROM, OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER + DEALINGS IN THE SOFTWARE. +""" +from __future__ import absolute_import + +import platform +from ctypes.util import find_library +from ctypes import ( + c_void_p, c_int32, c_char_p, c_size_t, c_byte, c_uint32, c_ulong, c_long, + c_bool +) +from ctypes import CDLL, POINTER, CFUNCTYPE + + +security_path = find_library('Security') +if not security_path: + raise ImportError('The library Security could not be found') + + +core_foundation_path = find_library('CoreFoundation') +if not core_foundation_path: + raise ImportError('The library CoreFoundation could not be found') + + +version = platform.mac_ver()[0] +version_info = tuple(map(int, version.split('.'))) +if version_info < (10, 8): + raise OSError( + 'Only OS X 10.8 and newer are supported, not %s.%s' % ( + version_info[0], version_info[1] + ) + ) + +Security = CDLL(security_path, use_errno=True) +CoreFoundation = CDLL(core_foundation_path, use_errno=True) + +Boolean = c_bool +CFIndex = c_long +CFStringEncoding = c_uint32 +CFData = c_void_p +CFString = c_void_p +CFArray = c_void_p +CFMutableArray = c_void_p +CFDictionary = c_void_p +CFError = c_void_p +CFType = c_void_p +CFTypeID = c_ulong + +CFTypeRef = POINTER(CFType) +CFAllocatorRef = c_void_p + +OSStatus = c_int32 + +CFDataRef = POINTER(CFData) +CFStringRef = POINTER(CFString) +CFArrayRef = POINTER(CFArray) +CFMutableArrayRef = POINTER(CFMutableArray) +CFDictionaryRef = POINTER(CFDictionary) +CFArrayCallBacks = c_void_p +CFDictionaryKeyCallBacks = c_void_p +CFDictionaryValueCallBacks = c_void_p + +SecCertificateRef = POINTER(c_void_p) +SecExternalFormat = c_uint32 +SecExternalItemType = c_uint32 +SecIdentityRef = POINTER(c_void_p) +SecItemImportExportFlags = c_uint32 +SecItemImportExportKeyParameters = c_void_p +SecKeychainRef = POINTER(c_void_p) +SSLProtocol = c_uint32 +SSLCipherSuite = c_uint32 +SSLContextRef = POINTER(c_void_p) +SecTrustRef = POINTER(c_void_p) +SSLConnectionRef = c_uint32 +SecTrustResultType = c_uint32 +SecTrustOptionFlags = c_uint32 +SSLProtocolSide = c_uint32 +SSLConnectionType = c_uint32 +SSLSessionOption = c_uint32 + + +try: + Security.SecItemImport.argtypes = [ + CFDataRef, + CFStringRef, + POINTER(SecExternalFormat), + POINTER(SecExternalItemType), + SecItemImportExportFlags, + POINTER(SecItemImportExportKeyParameters), + SecKeychainRef, + POINTER(CFArrayRef), + ] + Security.SecItemImport.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SecCertificateGetTypeID.argtypes = [] + Security.SecCertificateGetTypeID.restype = CFTypeID + + Security.SecIdentityGetTypeID.argtypes = [] + Security.SecIdentityGetTypeID.restype = CFTypeID + + Security.SecKeyGetTypeID.argtypes = [] + Security.SecKeyGetTypeID.restype = CFTypeID + + Security.SecCertificateCreateWithData.argtypes = [ + CFAllocatorRef, + CFDataRef + ] + Security.SecCertificateCreateWithData.restype = SecCertificateRef + + Security.SecCertificateCopyData.argtypes = [ + SecCertificateRef + ] + Security.SecCertificateCopyData.restype = CFDataRef + + Security.SecCopyErrorMessageString.argtypes = [ + OSStatus, + c_void_p + ] + Security.SecCopyErrorMessageString.restype = CFStringRef + + Security.SecIdentityCreateWithCertificate.argtypes = [ + CFTypeRef, + SecCertificateRef, + POINTER(SecIdentityRef) + ] + Security.SecIdentityCreateWithCertificate.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SecKeychainCreate.argtypes = [ + c_char_p, + c_uint32, + c_void_p, + Boolean, + c_void_p, + POINTER(SecKeychainRef) + ] + Security.SecKeychainCreate.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SecKeychainDelete.argtypes = [ + SecKeychainRef + ] + Security.SecKeychainDelete.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SecPKCS12Import.argtypes = [ + CFDataRef, + CFDictionaryRef, + POINTER(CFArrayRef) + ] + Security.SecPKCS12Import.restype = OSStatus + + SSLReadFunc = CFUNCTYPE(OSStatus, SSLConnectionRef, c_void_p, POINTER(c_size_t)) + SSLWriteFunc = CFUNCTYPE(OSStatus, SSLConnectionRef, POINTER(c_byte), POINTER(c_size_t)) + + Security.SSLSetIOFuncs.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + SSLReadFunc, + SSLWriteFunc + ] + Security.SSLSetIOFuncs.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLSetPeerID.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + c_char_p, + c_size_t + ] + Security.SSLSetPeerID.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLSetCertificate.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + CFArrayRef + ] + Security.SSLSetCertificate.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLSetCertificateAuthorities.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + CFTypeRef, + Boolean + ] + Security.SSLSetCertificateAuthorities.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLSetConnection.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + SSLConnectionRef + ] + Security.SSLSetConnection.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLSetPeerDomainName.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + c_char_p, + c_size_t + ] + Security.SSLSetPeerDomainName.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLHandshake.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef + ] + Security.SSLHandshake.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLRead.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + c_char_p, + c_size_t, + POINTER(c_size_t) + ] + Security.SSLRead.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLWrite.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + c_char_p, + c_size_t, + POINTER(c_size_t) + ] + Security.SSLWrite.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLClose.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef + ] + Security.SSLClose.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLGetNumberSupportedCiphers.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + POINTER(c_size_t) + ] + Security.SSLGetNumberSupportedCiphers.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLGetSupportedCiphers.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + POINTER(SSLCipherSuite), + POINTER(c_size_t) + ] + Security.SSLGetSupportedCiphers.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLSetEnabledCiphers.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + POINTER(SSLCipherSuite), + c_size_t + ] + Security.SSLSetEnabledCiphers.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLGetNumberEnabledCiphers.argtype = [ + SSLContextRef, + POINTER(c_size_t) + ] + Security.SSLGetNumberEnabledCiphers.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLGetEnabledCiphers.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + POINTER(SSLCipherSuite), + POINTER(c_size_t) + ] + Security.SSLGetEnabledCiphers.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLGetNegotiatedCipher.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + POINTER(SSLCipherSuite) + ] + Security.SSLGetNegotiatedCipher.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLGetNegotiatedProtocolVersion.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + POINTER(SSLProtocol) + ] + Security.SSLGetNegotiatedProtocolVersion.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLCopyPeerTrust.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + POINTER(SecTrustRef) + ] + Security.SSLCopyPeerTrust.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SecTrustSetAnchorCertificates.argtypes = [ + SecTrustRef, + CFArrayRef + ] + Security.SecTrustSetAnchorCertificates.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SecTrustSetAnchorCertificatesOnly.argstypes = [ + SecTrustRef, + Boolean + ] + Security.SecTrustSetAnchorCertificatesOnly.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SecTrustEvaluate.argtypes = [ + SecTrustRef, + POINTER(SecTrustResultType) + ] + Security.SecTrustEvaluate.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SecTrustGetCertificateCount.argtypes = [ + SecTrustRef + ] + Security.SecTrustGetCertificateCount.restype = CFIndex + + Security.SecTrustGetCertificateAtIndex.argtypes = [ + SecTrustRef, + CFIndex + ] + Security.SecTrustGetCertificateAtIndex.restype = SecCertificateRef + + Security.SSLCreateContext.argtypes = [ + CFAllocatorRef, + SSLProtocolSide, + SSLConnectionType + ] + Security.SSLCreateContext.restype = SSLContextRef + + Security.SSLSetSessionOption.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + SSLSessionOption, + Boolean + ] + Security.SSLSetSessionOption.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLSetProtocolVersionMin.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + SSLProtocol + ] + Security.SSLSetProtocolVersionMin.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SSLSetProtocolVersionMax.argtypes = [ + SSLContextRef, + SSLProtocol + ] + Security.SSLSetProtocolVersionMax.restype = OSStatus + + Security.SecCopyErrorMessageString.argtypes = [ + OSStatus, + c_void_p + ] + Security.SecCopyErrorMessageString.restype = CFStringRef + + Security.SSLReadFunc = SSLReadFunc + Security.SSLWriteFunc = SSLWriteFunc + Security.SSLContextRef = SSLContextRef + Security.SSLProtocol = SSLProtocol + Security.SSLCipherSuite = SSLCipherSuite + Security.SecIdentityRef = SecIdentityRef + Security.SecKeychainRef = SecKeychainRef + Security.SecTrustRef = SecTrustRef + Security.SecTrustResultType = SecTrustResultType + Security.SecExternalFormat = SecExternalFormat + Security.OSStatus = OSStatus + + Security.kSecImportExportPassphrase = CFStringRef.in_dll( + Security, 'kSecImportExportPassphrase' + ) + Security.kSecImportItemIdentity = CFStringRef.in_dll( + Security, 'kSecImportItemIdentity' + ) + + # CoreFoundation time! + CoreFoundation.CFRetain.argtypes = [ + CFTypeRef + ] + CoreFoundation.CFRetain.restype = CFTypeRef + + CoreFoundation.CFRelease.argtypes = [ + CFTypeRef + ] + CoreFoundation.CFRelease.restype = None + + CoreFoundation.CFGetTypeID.argtypes = [ + CFTypeRef + ] + CoreFoundation.CFGetTypeID.restype = CFTypeID + + CoreFoundation.CFStringCreateWithCString.argtypes = [ + CFAllocatorRef, + c_char_p, + CFStringEncoding + ] + CoreFoundation.CFStringCreateWithCString.restype = CFStringRef + + CoreFoundation.CFStringGetCStringPtr.argtypes = [ + CFStringRef, + CFStringEncoding + ] + CoreFoundation.CFStringGetCStringPtr.restype = c_char_p + + CoreFoundation.CFStringGetCString.argtypes = [ + CFStringRef, + c_char_p, + CFIndex, + CFStringEncoding + ] + CoreFoundation.CFStringGetCString.restype = c_bool + + CoreFoundation.CFDataCreate.argtypes = [ + CFAllocatorRef, + c_char_p, + CFIndex + ] + CoreFoundation.CFDataCreate.restype = CFDataRef + + CoreFoundation.CFDataGetLength.argtypes = [ + CFDataRef + ] + CoreFoundation.CFDataGetLength.restype = CFIndex + + CoreFoundation.CFDataGetBytePtr.argtypes = [ + CFDataRef + ] + CoreFoundation.CFDataGetBytePtr.restype = c_void_p + + CoreFoundation.CFDictionaryCreate.argtypes = [ + CFAllocatorRef, + POINTER(CFTypeRef), + POINTER(CFTypeRef), + CFIndex, + CFDictionaryKeyCallBacks, + CFDictionaryValueCallBacks + ] + CoreFoundation.CFDictionaryCreate.restype = CFDictionaryRef + + CoreFoundation.CFDictionaryGetValue.argtypes = [ + CFDictionaryRef, + CFTypeRef + ] + CoreFoundation.CFDictionaryGetValue.restype = CFTypeRef + + CoreFoundation.CFArrayCreate.argtypes = [ + CFAllocatorRef, + POINTER(CFTypeRef), + CFIndex, + CFArrayCallBacks, + ] + CoreFoundation.CFArrayCreate.restype = CFArrayRef + + CoreFoundation.CFArrayCreateMutable.argtypes = [ + CFAllocatorRef, + CFIndex, + CFArrayCallBacks + ] + CoreFoundation.CFArrayCreateMutable.restype = CFMutableArrayRef + + CoreFoundation.CFArrayAppendValue.argtypes = [ + CFMutableArrayRef, + c_void_p + ] + CoreFoundation.CFArrayAppendValue.restype = None + + CoreFoundation.CFArrayGetCount.argtypes = [ + CFArrayRef + ] + CoreFoundation.CFArrayGetCount.restype = CFIndex + + CoreFoundation.CFArrayGetValueAtIndex.argtypes = [ + CFArrayRef, + CFIndex + ] + CoreFoundation.CFArrayGetValueAtIndex.restype = c_void_p + + CoreFoundation.kCFAllocatorDefault = CFAllocatorRef.in_dll( + CoreFoundation, 'kCFAllocatorDefault' + ) + CoreFoundation.kCFTypeArrayCallBacks = c_void_p.in_dll(CoreFoundation, 'kCFTypeArrayCallBacks') + CoreFoundation.kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks = c_void_p.in_dll( + CoreFoundation, 'kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks' + ) + CoreFoundation.kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks = c_void_p.in_dll( + CoreFoundation, 'kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks' + ) + + CoreFoundation.CFTypeRef = CFTypeRef + CoreFoundation.CFArrayRef = CFArrayRef + CoreFoundation.CFStringRef = CFStringRef + CoreFoundation.CFDictionaryRef = CFDictionaryRef + +except (AttributeError): + raise ImportError('Error initializing ctypes') + + +class CFConst(object): + """ + A class object that acts as essentially a namespace for CoreFoundation + constants. + """ + kCFStringEncodingUTF8 = CFStringEncoding(0x08000100) + + +class SecurityConst(object): + """ + A class object that acts as essentially a namespace for Security constants. + """ + kSSLSessionOptionBreakOnServerAuth = 0 + + kSSLProtocol2 = 1 + kSSLProtocol3 = 2 + kTLSProtocol1 = 4 + kTLSProtocol11 = 7 + kTLSProtocol12 = 8 + + kSSLClientSide = 1 + kSSLStreamType = 0 + + kSecFormatPEMSequence = 10 + + kSecTrustResultInvalid = 0 + kSecTrustResultProceed = 1 + # This gap is present on purpose: this was kSecTrustResultConfirm, which + # is deprecated. + kSecTrustResultDeny = 3 + kSecTrustResultUnspecified = 4 + kSecTrustResultRecoverableTrustFailure = 5 + kSecTrustResultFatalTrustFailure = 6 + kSecTrustResultOtherError = 7 + + errSSLProtocol = -9800 + errSSLWouldBlock = -9803 + errSSLClosedGraceful = -9805 + errSSLClosedNoNotify = -9816 + errSSLClosedAbort = -9806 + + errSSLXCertChainInvalid = -9807 + errSSLCrypto = -9809 + errSSLInternal = -9810 + errSSLCertExpired = -9814 + errSSLCertNotYetValid = -9815 + errSSLUnknownRootCert = -9812 + errSSLNoRootCert = -9813 + errSSLHostNameMismatch = -9843 + errSSLPeerHandshakeFail = -9824 + errSSLPeerUserCancelled = -9839 + errSSLWeakPeerEphemeralDHKey = -9850 + errSSLServerAuthCompleted = -9841 + errSSLRecordOverflow = -9847 + + errSecVerifyFailed = -67808 + errSecNoTrustSettings = -25263 + errSecItemNotFound = -25300 + errSecInvalidTrustSettings = -25262 + + # Cipher suites. We only pick the ones our default cipher string allows. + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = 0xC02C + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = 0xC030 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = 0xC02B + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = 0xC02F + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = 0x00A3 + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = 0x009F + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = 0x00A2 + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = 0x009E + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = 0xC024 + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384 = 0xC028 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0xC00A + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0xC014 + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 = 0x006B + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 = 0x006A + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0x0039 + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0x0038 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0xC023 + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0xC027 + TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0xC009 + TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0xC013 + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0x0067 + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0x0040 + TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0x0033 + TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0x0032 + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = 0x009D + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = 0x009C + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256 = 0x003D + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256 = 0x003C + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = 0x0035 + TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = 0x002F + TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 = 0x1301 + TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384 = 0x1302 + TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256 = 0x1303 diff --git a/python/urllib3/contrib/_securetransport/low_level.py b/python/urllib3/contrib/_securetransport/low_level.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b13cd9e --- /dev/null +++ b/python/urllib3/contrib/_securetransport/low_level.py @@ -0,0 +1,346 @@ +""" +Low-level helpers for the SecureTransport bindings. + +These are Python functions that are not directly related to the high-level APIs +but are necessary to get them to work. They include a whole bunch of low-level +CoreFoundation messing about and memory management. The concerns in this module +are almost entirely about trying to avoid memory leaks and providing +appropriate and useful assistance to the higher-level code. +""" +import base64 +import ctypes +import itertools +import re +import os +import ssl +import tempfile + +from .bindings import Security, CoreFoundation, CFConst + + +# This regular expression is used to grab PEM data out of a PEM bundle. +_PEM_CERTS_RE = re.compile( + b"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n(.*?)\n-----END CERTIFICATE-----", re.DOTALL +) + + +def _cf_data_from_bytes(bytestring): + """ + Given a bytestring, create a CFData object from it. This CFData object must + be CFReleased by the caller. + """ + return CoreFoundation.CFDataCreate( + CoreFoundation.kCFAllocatorDefault, bytestring, len(bytestring) + ) + + +def _cf_dictionary_from_tuples(tuples): + """ + Given a list of Python tuples, create an associated CFDictionary. + """ + dictionary_size = len(tuples) + + # We need to get the dictionary keys and values out in the same order. + keys = (t[0] for t in tuples) + values = (t[1] for t in tuples) + cf_keys = (CoreFoundation.CFTypeRef * dictionary_size)(*keys) + cf_values = (CoreFoundation.CFTypeRef * dictionary_size)(*values) + + return CoreFoundation.CFDictionaryCreate( + CoreFoundation.kCFAllocatorDefault, + cf_keys, + cf_values, + dictionary_size, + CoreFoundation.kCFTypeDictionaryKeyCallBacks, + CoreFoundation.kCFTypeDictionaryValueCallBacks, + ) + + +def _cf_string_to_unicode(value): + """ + Creates a Unicode string from a CFString object. Used entirely for error + reporting. + + Yes, it annoys me quite a lot that this function is this complex. + """ + value_as_void_p = ctypes.cast(value, ctypes.POINTER(ctypes.c_void_p)) + + string = CoreFoundation.CFStringGetCStringPtr( + value_as_void_p, + CFConst.kCFStringEncodingUTF8 + ) + if string is None: + buffer = ctypes.create_string_buffer(1024) + result = CoreFoundation.CFStringGetCString( + value_as_void_p, + buffer, + 1024, + CFConst.kCFStringEncodingUTF8 + ) + if not result: + raise OSError('Error copying C string from CFStringRef') + string = buffer.value + if string is not None: + string = string.decode('utf-8') + return string + + +def _assert_no_error(error, exception_class=None): + """ + Checks the return code and throws an exception if there is an error to + report + """ + if error == 0: + return + + cf_error_string = Security.SecCopyErrorMessageString(error, None) + output = _cf_string_to_unicode(cf_error_string) + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(cf_error_string) + + if output is None or output == u'': + output = u'OSStatus %s' % error + + if exception_class is None: + exception_class = ssl.SSLError + + raise exception_class(output) + + +def _cert_array_from_pem(pem_bundle): + """ + Given a bundle of certs in PEM format, turns them into a CFArray of certs + that can be used to validate a cert chain. + """ + # Normalize the PEM bundle's line endings. + pem_bundle = pem_bundle.replace(b"\r\n", b"\n") + + der_certs = [ + base64.b64decode(match.group(1)) + for match in _PEM_CERTS_RE.finditer(pem_bundle) + ] + if not der_certs: + raise ssl.SSLError("No root certificates specified") + + cert_array = CoreFoundation.CFArrayCreateMutable( + CoreFoundation.kCFAllocatorDefault, + 0, + ctypes.byref(CoreFoundation.kCFTypeArrayCallBacks) + ) + if not cert_array: + raise ssl.SSLError("Unable to allocate memory!") + + try: + for der_bytes in der_certs: + certdata = _cf_data_from_bytes(der_bytes) + if not certdata: + raise ssl.SSLError("Unable to allocate memory!") + cert = Security.SecCertificateCreateWithData( + CoreFoundation.kCFAllocatorDefault, certdata + ) + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(certdata) + if not cert: + raise ssl.SSLError("Unable to build cert object!") + + CoreFoundation.CFArrayAppendValue(cert_array, cert) + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(cert) + except Exception: + # We need to free the array before the exception bubbles further. + # We only want to do that if an error occurs: otherwise, the caller + # should free. + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(cert_array) + + return cert_array + + +def _is_cert(item): + """ + Returns True if a given CFTypeRef is a certificate. + """ + expected = Security.SecCertificateGetTypeID() + return CoreFoundation.CFGetTypeID(item) == expected + + +def _is_identity(item): + """ + Returns True if a given CFTypeRef is an identity. + """ + expected = Security.SecIdentityGetTypeID() + return CoreFoundation.CFGetTypeID(item) == expected + + +def _temporary_keychain(): + """ + This function creates a temporary Mac keychain that we can use to work with + credentials. This keychain uses a one-time password and a temporary file to + store the data. We expect to have one keychain per socket. The returned + SecKeychainRef must be freed by the caller, including calling + SecKeychainDelete. + + Returns a tuple of the SecKeychainRef and the path to the temporary + directory that contains it. + """ + # Unfortunately, SecKeychainCreate requires a path to a keychain. This + # means we cannot use mkstemp to use a generic temporary file. Instead, + # we're going to create a temporary directory and a filename to use there. + # This filename will be 8 random bytes expanded into base64. We also need + # some random bytes to password-protect the keychain we're creating, so we + # ask for 40 random bytes. + random_bytes = os.urandom(40) + filename = base64.b16encode(random_bytes[:8]).decode('utf-8') + password = base64.b16encode(random_bytes[8:]) # Must be valid UTF-8 + tempdirectory = tempfile.mkdtemp() + + keychain_path = os.path.join(tempdirectory, filename).encode('utf-8') + + # We now want to create the keychain itself. + keychain = Security.SecKeychainRef() + status = Security.SecKeychainCreate( + keychain_path, + len(password), + password, + False, + None, + ctypes.byref(keychain) + ) + _assert_no_error(status) + + # Having created the keychain, we want to pass it off to the caller. + return keychain, tempdirectory + + +def _load_items_from_file(keychain, path): + """ + Given a single file, loads all the trust objects from it into arrays and + the keychain. + Returns a tuple of lists: the first list is a list of identities, the + second a list of certs. + """ + certificates = [] + identities = [] + result_array = None + + with open(path, 'rb') as f: + raw_filedata = f.read() + + try: + filedata = CoreFoundation.CFDataCreate( + CoreFoundation.kCFAllocatorDefault, + raw_filedata, + len(raw_filedata) + ) + result_array = CoreFoundation.CFArrayRef() + result = Security.SecItemImport( + filedata, # cert data + None, # Filename, leaving it out for now + None, # What the type of the file is, we don't care + None, # what's in the file, we don't care + 0, # import flags + None, # key params, can include passphrase in the future + keychain, # The keychain to insert into + ctypes.byref(result_array) # Results + ) + _assert_no_error(result) + + # A CFArray is not very useful to us as an intermediary + # representation, so we are going to extract the objects we want + # and then free the array. We don't need to keep hold of keys: the + # keychain already has them! + result_count = CoreFoundation.CFArrayGetCount(result_array) + for index in range(result_count): + item = CoreFoundation.CFArrayGetValueAtIndex( + result_array, index + ) + item = ctypes.cast(item, CoreFoundation.CFTypeRef) + + if _is_cert(item): + CoreFoundation.CFRetain(item) + certificates.append(item) + elif _is_identity(item): + CoreFoundation.CFRetain(item) + identities.append(item) + finally: + if result_array: + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(result_array) + + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(filedata) + + return (identities, certificates) + + +def _load_client_cert_chain(keychain, *paths): + """ + Load certificates and maybe keys from a number of files. Has the end goal + of returning a CFArray containing one SecIdentityRef, and then zero or more + SecCertificateRef objects, suitable for use as a client certificate trust + chain. + """ + # Ok, the strategy. + # + # This relies on knowing that macOS will not give you a SecIdentityRef + # unless you have imported a key into a keychain. This is a somewhat + # artificial limitation of macOS (for example, it doesn't necessarily + # affect iOS), but there is nothing inside Security.framework that lets you + # get a SecIdentityRef without having a key in a keychain. + # + # So the policy here is we take all the files and iterate them in order. + # Each one will use SecItemImport to have one or more objects loaded from + # it. We will also point at a keychain that macOS can use to work with the + # private key. + # + # Once we have all the objects, we'll check what we actually have. If we + # already have a SecIdentityRef in hand, fab: we'll use that. Otherwise, + # we'll take the first certificate (which we assume to be our leaf) and + # ask the keychain to give us a SecIdentityRef with that cert's associated + # key. + # + # We'll then return a CFArray containing the trust chain: one + # SecIdentityRef and then zero-or-more SecCertificateRef objects. The + # responsibility for freeing this CFArray will be with the caller. This + # CFArray must remain alive for the entire connection, so in practice it + # will be stored with a single SSLSocket, along with the reference to the + # keychain. + certificates = [] + identities = [] + + # Filter out bad paths. + paths = (path for path in paths if path) + + try: + for file_path in paths: + new_identities, new_certs = _load_items_from_file( + keychain, file_path + ) + identities.extend(new_identities) + certificates.extend(new_certs) + + # Ok, we have everything. The question is: do we have an identity? If + # not, we want to grab one from the first cert we have. + if not identities: + new_identity = Security.SecIdentityRef() + status = Security.SecIdentityCreateWithCertificate( + keychain, + certificates[0], + ctypes.byref(new_identity) + ) + _assert_no_error(status) + identities.append(new_identity) + + # We now want to release the original certificate, as we no longer + # need it. + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(certificates.pop(0)) + + # We now need to build a new CFArray that holds the trust chain. + trust_chain = CoreFoundation.CFArrayCreateMutable( + CoreFoundation.kCFAllocatorDefault, + 0, + ctypes.byref(CoreFoundation.kCFTypeArrayCallBacks), + ) + for item in itertools.chain(identities, certificates): + # ArrayAppendValue does a CFRetain on the item. That's fine, + # because the finally block will release our other refs to them. + CoreFoundation.CFArrayAppendValue(trust_chain, item) + + return trust_chain + finally: + for obj in itertools.chain(identities, certificates): + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(obj) diff --git a/python/urllib3/contrib/appengine.py b/python/urllib3/contrib/appengine.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2952f11 --- /dev/null +++ b/python/urllib3/contrib/appengine.py @@ -0,0 +1,289 @@ +""" +This module provides a pool manager that uses Google App Engine's +`URLFetch Service <https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/python/urlfetch>`_. + +Example usage:: + + from urllib3 import PoolManager + from urllib3.contrib.appengine import AppEngineManager, is_appengine_sandbox + + if is_appengine_sandbox(): + # AppEngineManager uses AppEngine's URLFetch API behind the scenes + http = AppEngineManager() + else: + # PoolManager uses a socket-level API behind the scenes + http = PoolManager() + + r = http.request('GET', 'https://google.com/') + +There are `limitations <https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/python/\ +urlfetch/#Python_Quotas_and_limits>`_ to the URLFetch service and it may not be +the best choice for your application. There are three options for using +urllib3 on Google App Engine: + +1. You can use :class:`AppEngineManager` with URLFetch. URLFetch is + cost-effective in many circumstances as long as your usage is within the + limitations. +2. You can use a normal :class:`~urllib3.PoolManager` by enabling sockets. + Sockets also have `limitations and restrictions + <https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/python/sockets/\ + #limitations-and-restrictions>`_ and have a lower free quota than URLFetch. + To use sockets, be sure to specify the following in your ``app.yaml``:: + + env_variables: + GAE_USE_SOCKETS_HTTPLIB : 'true' + +3. If you are using `App Engine Flexible +<https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/flexible/>`_, you can use the standard +:class:`PoolManager` without any configuration or special environment variables. +""" + +from __future__ import absolute_import +import io +import logging +import warnings +from ..packages.six.moves.urllib.parse import urljoin + +from ..exceptions import ( + HTTPError, + HTTPWarning, + MaxRetryError, + ProtocolError, + TimeoutError, + SSLError +) + +from ..request import RequestMethods +from ..response import HTTPResponse +from ..util.timeout import Timeout +from ..util.retry import Retry +from . import _appengine_environ + +try: + from google.appengine.api import urlfetch +except ImportError: + urlfetch = None + + +log = logging.getLogger(__name__) + + +class AppEnginePlatformWarning(HTTPWarning): + pass + + +class AppEnginePlatformError(HTTPError): + pass + + +class AppEngineManager(RequestMethods): + """ + Connection manager for Google App Engine sandbox applications. + + This manager uses the URLFetch service directly instead of using the + emulated httplib, and is subject to URLFetch limitations as described in + the App Engine documentation `here + <https://cloud.google.com/appengine/docs/python/urlfetch>`_. + + Notably it will raise an :class:`AppEnginePlatformError` if: + * URLFetch is not available. + * If you attempt to use this on App Engine Flexible, as full socket + support is available. + * If a request size is more than 10 megabytes. + * If a response size is more than 32 megabtyes. + * If you use an unsupported request method such as OPTIONS. + + Beyond those cases, it will raise normal urllib3 errors. + """ + + def __init__(self, headers=None, retries=None, validate_certificate=True, + urlfetch_retries=True): + if not urlfetch: + raise AppEnginePlatformError( + "URLFetch is not available in this environment.") + + if is_prod_appengine_mvms(): + raise AppEnginePlatformError( + "Use normal urllib3.PoolManager instead of AppEngineManager" + "on Managed VMs, as using URLFetch is not necessary in " + "this environment.") + + warnings.warn( + "urllib3 is using URLFetch on Google App Engine sandbox instead " + "of sockets. To use sockets directly instead of URLFetch see " + "https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/latest/reference/urllib3.contrib.html.", + AppEnginePlatformWarning) + + RequestMethods.__init__(self, headers) + self.validate_certificate = validate_certificate + self.urlfetch_retries = urlfetch_retries + + self.retries = retries or Retry.DEFAULT + + def __enter__(self): + return self + + def __exit__(self, exc_type, exc_val, exc_tb): + # Return False to re-raise any potential exceptions + return False + + def urlopen(self, method, url, body=None, headers=None, + retries=None, redirect=True, timeout=Timeout.DEFAULT_TIMEOUT, + **response_kw): + + retries = self._get_retries(retries, redirect) + + try: + follow_redirects = ( + redirect and + retries.redirect != 0 and + retries.total) + response = urlfetch.fetch( + url, + payload=body, + method=method, + headers=headers or {}, + allow_truncated=False, + follow_redirects=self.urlfetch_retries and follow_redirects, + deadline=self._get_absolute_timeout(timeout), + validate_certificate=self.validate_certificate, + ) + except urlfetch.DeadlineExceededError as e: + raise TimeoutError(self, e) + + except urlfetch.InvalidURLError as e: + if 'too large' in str(e): + raise AppEnginePlatformError( + "URLFetch request too large, URLFetch only " + "supports requests up to 10mb in size.", e) + raise ProtocolError(e) + + except urlfetch.DownloadError as e: + if 'Too many redirects' in str(e): + raise MaxRetryError(self, url, reason=e) + raise ProtocolError(e) + + except urlfetch.ResponseTooLargeError as e: + raise AppEnginePlatformError( + "URLFetch response too large, URLFetch only supports" + "responses up to 32mb in size.", e) + + except urlfetch.SSLCertificateError as e: + raise SSLError(e) + + except urlfetch.InvalidMethodError as e: + raise AppEnginePlatformError( + "URLFetch does not support method: %s" % method, e) + + http_response = self._urlfetch_response_to_http_response( + response, retries=retries, **response_kw) + + # Handle redirect? + redirect_location = redirect and http_response.get_redirect_location() + if redirect_location: + # Check for redirect response + if (self.urlfetch_retries and retries.raise_on_redirect): + raise MaxRetryError(self, url, "too many redirects") + else: + if http_response.status == 303: + method = 'GET' + + try: + retries = retries.increment(method, url, response=http_response, _pool=self) + except MaxRetryError: + if retries.raise_on_redirect: + raise MaxRetryError(self, url, "too many redirects") + return http_response + + retries.sleep_for_retry(http_response) + log.debug("Redirecting %s -> %s", url, redirect_location) + redirect_url = urljoin(url, redirect_location) + return self.urlopen( + method, redirect_url, body, headers, + retries=retries, redirect=redirect, + timeout=timeout, **response_kw) + + # Check if we should retry the HTTP response. + has_retry_after = bool(http_response.getheader('Retry-After')) + if retries.is_retry(method, http_response.status, has_retry_after): + retries = retries.increment( + method, url, response=http_response, _pool=self) + log.debug("Retry: %s", url) + retries.sleep(http_response) + return self.urlopen( + method, url, + body=body, headers=headers, + retries=retries, redirect=redirect, + timeout=timeout, **response_kw) + + return http_response + + def _urlfetch_response_to_http_response(self, urlfetch_resp, **response_kw): + + if is_prod_appengine(): + # Production GAE handles deflate encoding automatically, but does + # not remove the encoding header. + content_encoding = urlfetch_resp.headers.get('content-encoding') + + if content_encoding == 'deflate': + del urlfetch_resp.headers['content-encoding'] + + transfer_encoding = urlfetch_resp.headers.get('transfer-encoding') + # We have a full response's content, + # so let's make sure we don't report ourselves as chunked data. + if transfer_encoding == 'chunked': + encodings = transfer_encoding.split(",") + encodings.remove('chunked') + urlfetch_resp.headers['transfer-encoding'] = ','.join(encodings) + + original_response = HTTPResponse( + # In order for decoding to work, we must present the content as + # a file-like object. + body=io.BytesIO(urlfetch_resp.content), + msg=urlfetch_resp.header_msg, + headers=urlfetch_resp.headers, + status=urlfetch_resp.status_code, + **response_kw + ) + + return HTTPResponse( + body=io.BytesIO(urlfetch_resp.content), + headers=urlfetch_resp.headers, + status=urlfetch_resp.status_code, + original_response=original_response, + **response_kw + ) + + def _get_absolute_timeout(self, timeout): + if timeout is Timeout.DEFAULT_TIMEOUT: + return None # Defer to URLFetch's default. + if isinstance(timeout, Timeout): + if timeout._read is not None or timeout._connect is not None: + warnings.warn( + "URLFetch does not support granular timeout settings, " + "reverting to total or default URLFetch timeout.", + AppEnginePlatformWarning) + return timeout.total + return timeout + + def _get_retries(self, retries, redirect): + if not isinstance(retries, Retry): + retries = Retry.from_int( + retries, redirect=redirect, default=self.retries) + + if retries.connect or retries.read or retries.redirect: + warnings.warn( + "URLFetch only supports total retries and does not " + "recognize connect, read, or redirect retry parameters.", + AppEnginePlatformWarning) + + return retries + + +# Alias methods from _appengine_environ to maintain public API interface. + +is_appengine = _appengine_environ.is_appengine +is_appengine_sandbox = _appengine_environ.is_appengine_sandbox +is_local_appengine = _appengine_environ.is_local_appengine +is_prod_appengine = _appengine_environ.is_prod_appengine +is_prod_appengine_mvms = _appengine_environ.is_prod_appengine_mvms diff --git a/python/urllib3/contrib/ntlmpool.py b/python/urllib3/contrib/ntlmpool.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ea127c --- /dev/null +++ b/python/urllib3/contrib/ntlmpool.py @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +""" +NTLM authenticating pool, contributed by erikcederstran + +Issue #10, see: http://code.google.com/p/urllib3/issues/detail?id=10 +""" +from __future__ import absolute_import + +from logging import getLogger +from ntlm import ntlm + +from .. import HTTPSConnectionPool +from ..packages.six.moves.http_client import HTTPSConnection + + +log = getLogger(__name__) + + +class NTLMConnectionPool(HTTPSConnectionPool): + """ + Implements an NTLM authentication version of an urllib3 connection pool + """ + + scheme = 'https' + + def __init__(self, user, pw, authurl, *args, **kwargs): + """ + authurl is a random URL on the server that is protected by NTLM. + user is the Windows user, probably in the DOMAIN\\username format. + pw is the password for the user. + """ + super(NTLMConnectionPool, self).__init__(*args, **kwargs) + self.authurl = authurl + self.rawuser = user + user_parts = user.split('\\', 1) + self.domain = user_parts[0].upper() + self.user = user_parts[1] + self.pw = pw + + def _new_conn(self): + # Performs the NTLM handshake that secures the connection. The socket + # must be kept open while requests are performed. + self.num_connections += 1 + log.debug('Starting NTLM HTTPS connection no. %d: https://%s%s', + self.num_connections, self.host, self.authurl) + + headers = {'Connection': 'Keep-Alive'} + req_header = 'Authorization' + resp_header = 'www-authenticate' + + conn = HTTPSConnection(host=self.host, port=self.port) + + # Send negotiation message + headers[req_header] = ( + 'NTLM %s' % ntlm.create_NTLM_NEGOTIATE_MESSAGE(self.rawuser)) + log.debug('Request headers: %s', headers) + conn.request('GET', self.authurl, None, headers) + res = conn.getresponse() + reshdr = dict(res.getheaders()) + log.debug('Response status: %s %s', res.status, res.reason) + log.debug('Response headers: %s', reshdr) + log.debug('Response data: %s [...]', res.read(100)) + + # Remove the reference to the socket, so that it can not be closed by + # the response object (we want to keep the socket open) + res.fp = None + + # Server should respond with a challenge message + auth_header_values = reshdr[resp_header].split(', ') + auth_header_value = None + for s in auth_header_values: + if s[:5] == 'NTLM ': + auth_header_value = s[5:] + if auth_header_value is None: + raise Exception('Unexpected %s response header: %s' % + (resp_header, reshdr[resp_header])) + + # Send authentication message + ServerChallenge, NegotiateFlags = \ + ntlm.parse_NTLM_CHALLENGE_MESSAGE(auth_header_value) + auth_msg = ntlm.create_NTLM_AUTHENTICATE_MESSAGE(ServerChallenge, + self.user, + self.domain, + self.pw, + NegotiateFlags) + headers[req_header] = 'NTLM %s' % auth_msg + log.debug('Request headers: %s', headers) + conn.request('GET', self.authurl, None, headers) + res = conn.getresponse() + log.debug('Response status: %s %s', res.status, res.reason) + log.debug('Response headers: %s', dict(res.getheaders())) + log.debug('Response data: %s [...]', res.read()[:100]) + if res.status != 200: + if res.status == 401: + raise Exception('Server rejected request: wrong ' + 'username or password') + raise Exception('Wrong server response: %s %s' % + (res.status, res.reason)) + + res.fp = None + log.debug('Connection established') + return conn + + def urlopen(self, method, url, body=None, headers=None, retries=3, + redirect=True, assert_same_host=True): + if headers is None: + headers = {} + headers['Connection'] = 'Keep-Alive' + return super(NTLMConnectionPool, self).urlopen(method, url, body, + headers, retries, + redirect, + assert_same_host) diff --git a/python/urllib3/contrib/pyopenssl.py b/python/urllib3/contrib/pyopenssl.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c0e946 --- /dev/null +++ b/python/urllib3/contrib/pyopenssl.py @@ -0,0 +1,466 @@ +""" +SSL with SNI_-support for Python 2. Follow these instructions if you would +like to verify SSL certificates in Python 2. Note, the default libraries do +*not* do certificate checking; you need to do additional work to validate +certificates yourself. + +This needs the following packages installed: + +* pyOpenSSL (tested with 16.0.0) +* cryptography (minimum 1.3.4, from pyopenssl) +* idna (minimum 2.0, from cryptography) + +However, pyopenssl depends on cryptography, which depends on idna, so while we +use all three directly here we end up having relatively few packages required. + +You can install them with the following command: + + pip install pyopenssl cryptography idna + +To activate certificate checking, call +:func:`~urllib3.contrib.pyopenssl.inject_into_urllib3` from your Python code +before you begin making HTTP requests. This can be done in a ``sitecustomize`` +module, or at any other time before your application begins using ``urllib3``, +like this:: + + try: + import urllib3.contrib.pyopenssl + urllib3.contrib.pyopenssl.inject_into_urllib3() + except ImportError: + pass + +Now you can use :mod:`urllib3` as you normally would, and it will support SNI +when the required modules are installed. + +Activating this module also has the positive side effect of disabling SSL/TLS +compression in Python 2 (see `CRIME attack`_). + +If you want to configure the default list of supported cipher suites, you can +set the ``urllib3.contrib.pyopenssl.DEFAULT_SSL_CIPHER_LIST`` variable. + +.. _sni: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Server_Name_Indication +.. _crime attack: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CRIME_(security_exploit) +""" +from __future__ import absolute_import + +import OpenSSL.SSL +from cryptography import x509 +from cryptography.hazmat.backends.openssl import backend as openssl_backend +from cryptography.hazmat.backends.openssl.x509 import _Certificate +try: + from cryptography.x509 import UnsupportedExtension +except ImportError: + # UnsupportedExtension is gone in cryptography >= 2.1.0 + class UnsupportedExtension(Exception): + pass + +from socket import timeout, error as SocketError +from io import BytesIO + +try: # Platform-specific: Python 2 + from socket import _fileobject +except ImportError: # Platform-specific: Python 3 + _fileobject = None + from ..packages.backports.makefile import backport_makefile + +import logging +import ssl +from ..packages import six +import sys + +from .. import util + +__all__ = ['inject_into_urllib3', 'extract_from_urllib3'] + +# SNI always works. +HAS_SNI = True + +# Map from urllib3 to PyOpenSSL compatible parameter-values. +_openssl_versions = { + ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23: OpenSSL.SSL.SSLv23_METHOD, + ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1: OpenSSL.SSL.TLSv1_METHOD, +} + +if hasattr(ssl, 'PROTOCOL_TLSv1_1') and hasattr(OpenSSL.SSL, 'TLSv1_1_METHOD'): + _openssl_versions[ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1_1] = OpenSSL.SSL.TLSv1_1_METHOD + +if hasattr(ssl, 'PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2') and hasattr(OpenSSL.SSL, 'TLSv1_2_METHOD'): + _openssl_versions[ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2] = OpenSSL.SSL.TLSv1_2_METHOD + +try: + _openssl_versions.update({ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv3: OpenSSL.SSL.SSLv3_METHOD}) +except AttributeError: + pass + +_stdlib_to_openssl_verify = { + ssl.CERT_NONE: OpenSSL.SSL.VERIFY_NONE, + ssl.CERT_OPTIONAL: OpenSSL.SSL.VERIFY_PEER, + ssl.CERT_REQUIRED: + OpenSSL.SSL.VERIFY_PEER + OpenSSL.SSL.VERIFY_FAIL_IF_NO_PEER_CERT, +} +_openssl_to_stdlib_verify = dict( + (v, k) for k, v in _stdlib_to_openssl_verify.items() +) + +# OpenSSL will only write 16K at a time +SSL_WRITE_BLOCKSIZE = 16384 + +orig_util_HAS_SNI = util.HAS_SNI +orig_util_SSLContext = util.ssl_.SSLContext + + +log = logging.getLogger(__name__) + + +def inject_into_urllib3(): + 'Monkey-patch urllib3 with PyOpenSSL-backed SSL-support.' + + _validate_dependencies_met() + + util.ssl_.SSLContext = PyOpenSSLContext + util.HAS_SNI = HAS_SNI + util.ssl_.HAS_SNI = HAS_SNI + util.IS_PYOPENSSL = True + util.ssl_.IS_PYOPENSSL = True + + +def extract_from_urllib3(): + 'Undo monkey-patching by :func:`inject_into_urllib3`.' + + util.ssl_.SSLContext = orig_util_SSLContext + util.HAS_SNI = orig_util_HAS_SNI + util.ssl_.HAS_SNI = orig_util_HAS_SNI + util.IS_PYOPENSSL = False + util.ssl_.IS_PYOPENSSL = False + + +def _validate_dependencies_met(): + """ + Verifies that PyOpenSSL's package-level dependencies have been met. + Throws `ImportError` if they are not met. + """ + # Method added in `cryptography==1.1`; not available in older versions + from cryptography.x509.extensions import Extensions + if getattr(Extensions, "get_extension_for_class", None) is None: + raise ImportError("'cryptography' module missing required functionality. " + "Try upgrading to v1.3.4 or newer.") + + # pyOpenSSL 0.14 and above use cryptography for OpenSSL bindings. The _x509 + # attribute is only present on those versions. + from OpenSSL.crypto import X509 + x509 = X509() + if getattr(x509, "_x509", None) is None: + raise ImportError("'pyOpenSSL' module missing required functionality. " + "Try upgrading to v0.14 or newer.") + + +def _dnsname_to_stdlib(name): + """ + Converts a dNSName SubjectAlternativeName field to the form used by the + standard library on the given Python version. + + Cryptography produces a dNSName as a unicode string that was idna-decoded + from ASCII bytes. We need to idna-encode that string to get it back, and + then on Python 3 we also need to convert to unicode via UTF-8 (the stdlib + uses PyUnicode_FromStringAndSize on it, which decodes via UTF-8). + + If the name cannot be idna-encoded then we return None signalling that + the name given should be skipped. + """ + def idna_encode(name): + """ + Borrowed wholesale from the Python Cryptography Project. It turns out + that we can't just safely call `idna.encode`: it can explode for + wildcard names. This avoids that problem. + """ + import idna + + try: + for prefix in [u'*.', u'.']: + if name.startswith(prefix): + name = name[len(prefix):] + return prefix.encode('ascii') + idna.encode(name) + return idna.encode(name) + except idna.core.IDNAError: + return None + + name = idna_encode(name) + if name is None: + return None + elif sys.version_info >= (3, 0): + name = name.decode('utf-8') + return name + + +def get_subj_alt_name(peer_cert): + """ + Given an PyOpenSSL certificate, provides all the subject alternative names. + """ + # Pass the cert to cryptography, which has much better APIs for this. + if hasattr(peer_cert, "to_cryptography"): + cert = peer_cert.to_cryptography() + else: + # This is technically using private APIs, but should work across all + # relevant versions before PyOpenSSL got a proper API for this. + cert = _Certificate(openssl_backend, peer_cert._x509) + + # We want to find the SAN extension. Ask Cryptography to locate it (it's + # faster than looping in Python) + try: + ext = cert.extensions.get_extension_for_class( + x509.SubjectAlternativeName + ).value + except x509.ExtensionNotFound: + # No such extension, return the empty list. + return [] + except (x509.DuplicateExtension, UnsupportedExtension, + x509.UnsupportedGeneralNameType, UnicodeError) as e: + # A problem has been found with the quality of the certificate. Assume + # no SAN field is present. + log.warning( + "A problem was encountered with the certificate that prevented " + "urllib3 from finding the SubjectAlternativeName field. This can " + "affect certificate validation. The error was %s", + e, + ) + return [] + + # We want to return dNSName and iPAddress fields. We need to cast the IPs + # back to strings because the match_hostname function wants them as + # strings. + # Sadly the DNS names need to be idna encoded and then, on Python 3, UTF-8 + # decoded. This is pretty frustrating, but that's what the standard library + # does with certificates, and so we need to attempt to do the same. + # We also want to skip over names which cannot be idna encoded. + names = [ + ('DNS', name) for name in map(_dnsname_to_stdlib, ext.get_values_for_type(x509.DNSName)) + if name is not None + ] + names.extend( + ('IP Address', str(name)) + for name in ext.get_values_for_type(x509.IPAddress) + ) + + return names + + +class WrappedSocket(object): + '''API-compatibility wrapper for Python OpenSSL's Connection-class. + + Note: _makefile_refs, _drop() and _reuse() are needed for the garbage + collector of pypy. + ''' + + def __init__(self, connection, socket, suppress_ragged_eofs=True): + self.connection = connection + self.socket = socket + self.suppress_ragged_eofs = suppress_ragged_eofs + self._makefile_refs = 0 + self._closed = False + + def fileno(self): + return self.socket.fileno() + + # Copy-pasted from Python 3.5 source code + def _decref_socketios(self): + if self._makefile_refs > 0: + self._makefile_refs -= 1 + if self._closed: + self.close() + + def recv(self, *args, **kwargs): + try: + data = self.connection.recv(*args, **kwargs) + except OpenSSL.SSL.SysCallError as e: + if self.suppress_ragged_eofs and e.args == (-1, 'Unexpected EOF'): + return b'' + else: + raise SocketError(str(e)) + except OpenSSL.SSL.ZeroReturnError as e: + if self.connection.get_shutdown() == OpenSSL.SSL.RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN: + return b'' + else: + raise + except OpenSSL.SSL.WantReadError: + if not util.wait_for_read(self.socket, self.socket.gettimeout()): + raise timeout('The read operation timed out') + else: + return self.recv(*args, **kwargs) + else: + return data + + def recv_into(self, *args, **kwargs): + try: + return self.connection.recv_into(*args, **kwargs) + except OpenSSL.SSL.SysCallError as e: + if self.suppress_ragged_eofs and e.args == (-1, 'Unexpected EOF'): + return 0 + else: + raise SocketError(str(e)) + except OpenSSL.SSL.ZeroReturnError as e: + if self.connection.get_shutdown() == OpenSSL.SSL.RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN: + return 0 + else: + raise + except OpenSSL.SSL.WantReadError: + if not util.wait_for_read(self.socket, self.socket.gettimeout()): + raise timeout('The read operation timed out') + else: + return self.recv_into(*args, **kwargs) + + def settimeout(self, timeout): + return self.socket.settimeout(timeout) + + def _send_until_done(self, data): + while True: + try: + return self.connection.send(data) + except OpenSSL.SSL.WantWriteError: + if not util.wait_for_write(self.socket, self.socket.gettimeout()): + raise timeout() + continue + except OpenSSL.SSL.SysCallError as e: + raise SocketError(str(e)) + + def sendall(self, data): + total_sent = 0 + while total_sent < len(data): + sent = self._send_until_done(data[total_sent:total_sent + SSL_WRITE_BLOCKSIZE]) + total_sent += sent + + def shutdown(self): + # FIXME rethrow compatible exceptions should we ever use this + self.connection.shutdown() + + def close(self): + if self._makefile_refs < 1: + try: + self._closed = True + return self.connection.close() + except OpenSSL.SSL.Error: + return + else: + self._makefile_refs -= 1 + + def getpeercert(self, binary_form=False): + x509 = self.connection.get_peer_certificate() + + if not x509: + return x509 + + if binary_form: + return OpenSSL.crypto.dump_certificate( + OpenSSL.crypto.FILETYPE_ASN1, + x509) + + return { + 'subject': ( + (('commonName', x509.get_subject().CN),), + ), + 'subjectAltName': get_subj_alt_name(x509) + } + + def _reuse(self): + self._makefile_refs += 1 + + def _drop(self): + if self._makefile_refs < 1: + self.close() + else: + self._makefile_refs -= 1 + + +if _fileobject: # Platform-specific: Python 2 + def makefile(self, mode, bufsize=-1): + self._makefile_refs += 1 + return _fileobject(self, mode, bufsize, close=True) +else: # Platform-specific: Python 3 + makefile = backport_makefile + +WrappedSocket.makefile = makefile + + +class PyOpenSSLContext(object): + """ + I am a wrapper class for the PyOpenSSL ``Context`` object. I am responsible + for translating the interface of the standard library ``SSLContext`` object + to calls into PyOpenSSL. + """ + def __init__(self, protocol): + self.protocol = _openssl_versions[protocol] + self._ctx = OpenSSL.SSL.Context(self.protocol) + self._options = 0 + self.check_hostname = False + + @property + def options(self): + return self._options + + @options.setter + def options(self, value): + self._options = value + self._ctx.set_options(value) + + @property + def verify_mode(self): + return _openssl_to_stdlib_verify[self._ctx.get_verify_mode()] + + @verify_mode.setter + def verify_mode(self, value): + self._ctx.set_verify( + _stdlib_to_openssl_verify[value], + _verify_callback + ) + + def set_default_verify_paths(self): + self._ctx.set_default_verify_paths() + + def set_ciphers(self, ciphers): + if isinstance(ciphers, six.text_type): + ciphers = ciphers.encode('utf-8') + self._ctx.set_cipher_list(ciphers) + + def load_verify_locations(self, cafile=None, capath=None, cadata=None): + if cafile is not None: + cafile = cafile.encode('utf-8') + if capath is not None: + capath = capath.encode('utf-8') + self._ctx.load_verify_locations(cafile, capath) + if cadata is not None: + self._ctx.load_verify_locations(BytesIO(cadata)) + + def load_cert_chain(self, certfile, keyfile=None, password=None): + self._ctx.use_certificate_chain_file(certfile) + if password is not None: + self._ctx.set_passwd_cb(lambda max_length, prompt_twice, userdata: password) + self._ctx.use_privatekey_file(keyfile or certfile) + + def wrap_socket(self, sock, server_side=False, + do_handshake_on_connect=True, suppress_ragged_eofs=True, + server_hostname=None): + cnx = OpenSSL.SSL.Connection(self._ctx, sock) + + if isinstance(server_hostname, six.text_type): # Platform-specific: Python 3 + server_hostname = server_hostname.encode('utf-8') + + if server_hostname is not None: + cnx.set_tlsext_host_name(server_hostname) + + cnx.set_connect_state() + + while True: + try: + cnx.do_handshake() + except OpenSSL.SSL.WantReadError: + if not util.wait_for_read(sock, sock.gettimeout()): + raise timeout('select timed out') + continue + except OpenSSL.SSL.Error as e: + raise ssl.SSLError('bad handshake: %r' % e) + break + + return WrappedSocket(cnx, sock) + + +def _verify_callback(cnx, x509, err_no, err_depth, return_code): + return err_no == 0 diff --git a/python/urllib3/contrib/securetransport.py b/python/urllib3/contrib/securetransport.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..77cb59e --- /dev/null +++ b/python/urllib3/contrib/securetransport.py @@ -0,0 +1,804 @@ +""" +SecureTranport support for urllib3 via ctypes. + +This makes platform-native TLS available to urllib3 users on macOS without the +use of a compiler. This is an important feature because the Python Package +Index is moving to become a TLSv1.2-or-higher server, and the default OpenSSL +that ships with macOS is not capable of doing TLSv1.2. The only way to resolve +this is to give macOS users an alternative solution to the problem, and that +solution is to use SecureTransport. + +We use ctypes here because this solution must not require a compiler. That's +because pip is not allowed to require a compiler either. + +This is not intended to be a seriously long-term solution to this problem. +The hope is that PEP 543 will eventually solve this issue for us, at which +point we can retire this contrib module. But in the short term, we need to +solve the impending tire fire that is Python on Mac without this kind of +contrib module. So...here we are. + +To use this module, simply import and inject it:: + + import urllib3.contrib.securetransport + urllib3.contrib.securetransport.inject_into_urllib3() + +Happy TLSing! +""" +from __future__ import absolute_import + +import contextlib +import ctypes +import errno +import os.path +import shutil +import socket +import ssl +import threading +import weakref + +from .. import util +from ._securetransport.bindings import ( + Security, SecurityConst, CoreFoundation +) +from ._securetransport.low_level import ( + _assert_no_error, _cert_array_from_pem, _temporary_keychain, + _load_client_cert_chain +) + +try: # Platform-specific: Python 2 + from socket import _fileobject +except ImportError: # Platform-specific: Python 3 + _fileobject = None + from ..packages.backports.makefile import backport_makefile + +__all__ = ['inject_into_urllib3', 'extract_from_urllib3'] + +# SNI always works +HAS_SNI = True + +orig_util_HAS_SNI = util.HAS_SNI +orig_util_SSLContext = util.ssl_.SSLContext + +# This dictionary is used by the read callback to obtain a handle to the +# calling wrapped socket. This is a pretty silly approach, but for now it'll +# do. I feel like I should be able to smuggle a handle to the wrapped socket +# directly in the SSLConnectionRef, but for now this approach will work I +# guess. +# +# We need to lock around this structure for inserts, but we don't do it for +# reads/writes in the callbacks. The reasoning here goes as follows: +# +# 1. It is not possible to call into the callbacks before the dictionary is +# populated, so once in the callback the id must be in the dictionary. +# 2. The callbacks don't mutate the dictionary, they only read from it, and +# so cannot conflict with any of the insertions. +# +# This is good: if we had to lock in the callbacks we'd drastically slow down +# the performance of this code. +_connection_refs = weakref.WeakValueDictionary() +_connection_ref_lock = threading.Lock() + +# Limit writes to 16kB. This is OpenSSL's limit, but we'll cargo-cult it over +# for no better reason than we need *a* limit, and this one is right there. +SSL_WRITE_BLOCKSIZE = 16384 + +# This is our equivalent of util.ssl_.DEFAULT_CIPHERS, but expanded out to +# individual cipher suites. We need to do this because this is how +# SecureTransport wants them. +CIPHER_SUITES = [ + SecurityConst.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + SecurityConst.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA384, + SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + SecurityConst.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + SecurityConst.TLS_DHE_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, + SecurityConst.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384, + SecurityConst.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA256, + SecurityConst.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA, + SecurityConst.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, +] + +# Basically this is simple: for PROTOCOL_SSLv23 we turn it into a low of +# TLSv1 and a high of TLSv1.2. For everything else, we pin to that version. +_protocol_to_min_max = { + ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23: (SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol1, SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol12), +} + +if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_SSLv2"): + _protocol_to_min_max[ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv2] = ( + SecurityConst.kSSLProtocol2, SecurityConst.kSSLProtocol2 + ) +if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_SSLv3"): + _protocol_to_min_max[ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv3] = ( + SecurityConst.kSSLProtocol3, SecurityConst.kSSLProtocol3 + ) +if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_TLSv1"): + _protocol_to_min_max[ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1] = ( + SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol1, SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol1 + ) +if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_TLSv1_1"): + _protocol_to_min_max[ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1_1] = ( + SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol11, SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol11 + ) +if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2"): + _protocol_to_min_max[ssl.PROTOCOL_TLSv1_2] = ( + SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol12, SecurityConst.kTLSProtocol12 + ) +if hasattr(ssl, "PROTOCOL_TLS"): + _protocol_to_min_max[ssl.PROTOCOL_TLS] = _protocol_to_min_max[ssl.PROTOCOL_SSLv23] + + +def inject_into_urllib3(): + """ + Monkey-patch urllib3 with SecureTransport-backed SSL-support. + """ + util.ssl_.SSLContext = SecureTransportContext + util.HAS_SNI = HAS_SNI + util.ssl_.HAS_SNI = HAS_SNI + util.IS_SECURETRANSPORT = True + util.ssl_.IS_SECURETRANSPORT = True + + +def extract_from_urllib3(): + """ + Undo monkey-patching by :func:`inject_into_urllib3`. + """ + util.ssl_.SSLContext = orig_util_SSLContext + util.HAS_SNI = orig_util_HAS_SNI + util.ssl_.HAS_SNI = orig_util_HAS_SNI + util.IS_SECURETRANSPORT = False + util.ssl_.IS_SECURETRANSPORT = False + + +def _read_callback(connection_id, data_buffer, data_length_pointer): + """ + SecureTransport read callback. This is called by ST to request that data + be returned from the socket. + """ + wrapped_socket = None + try: + wrapped_socket = _connection_refs.get(connection_id) + if wrapped_socket is None: + return SecurityConst.errSSLInternal + base_socket = wrapped_socket.socket + + requested_length = data_length_pointer[0] + + timeout = wrapped_socket.gettimeout() + error = None + read_count = 0 + + try: + while read_count < requested_length: + if timeout is None or timeout >= 0: + if not util.wait_for_read(base_socket, timeout): + raise socket.error(errno.EAGAIN, 'timed out') + + remaining = requested_length - read_count + buffer = (ctypes.c_char * remaining).from_address( + data_buffer + read_count + ) + chunk_size = base_socket.recv_into(buffer, remaining) + read_count += chunk_size + if not chunk_size: + if not read_count: + return SecurityConst.errSSLClosedGraceful + break + except (socket.error) as e: + error = e.errno + + if error is not None and error != errno.EAGAIN: + data_length_pointer[0] = read_count + if error == errno.ECONNRESET or error == errno.EPIPE: + return SecurityConst.errSSLClosedAbort + raise + + data_length_pointer[0] = read_count + + if read_count != requested_length: + return SecurityConst.errSSLWouldBlock + + return 0 + except Exception as e: + if wrapped_socket is not None: + wrapped_socket._exception = e + return SecurityConst.errSSLInternal + + +def _write_callback(connection_id, data_buffer, data_length_pointer): + """ + SecureTransport write callback. This is called by ST to request that data + actually be sent on the network. + """ + wrapped_socket = None + try: + wrapped_socket = _connection_refs.get(connection_id) + if wrapped_socket is None: + return SecurityConst.errSSLInternal + base_socket = wrapped_socket.socket + + bytes_to_write = data_length_pointer[0] + data = ctypes.string_at(data_buffer, bytes_to_write) + + timeout = wrapped_socket.gettimeout() + error = None + sent = 0 + + try: + while sent < bytes_to_write: + if timeout is None or timeout >= 0: + if not util.wait_for_write(base_socket, timeout): + raise socket.error(errno.EAGAIN, 'timed out') + chunk_sent = base_socket.send(data) + sent += chunk_sent + + # This has some needless copying here, but I'm not sure there's + # much value in optimising this data path. + data = data[chunk_sent:] + except (socket.error) as e: + error = e.errno + + if error is not None and error != errno.EAGAIN: + data_length_pointer[0] = sent + if error == errno.ECONNRESET or error == errno.EPIPE: + return SecurityConst.errSSLClosedAbort + raise + + data_length_pointer[0] = sent + + if sent != bytes_to_write: + return SecurityConst.errSSLWouldBlock + + return 0 + except Exception as e: + if wrapped_socket is not None: + wrapped_socket._exception = e + return SecurityConst.errSSLInternal + + +# We need to keep these two objects references alive: if they get GC'd while +# in use then SecureTransport could attempt to call a function that is in freed +# memory. That would be...uh...bad. Yeah, that's the word. Bad. +_read_callback_pointer = Security.SSLReadFunc(_read_callback) +_write_callback_pointer = Security.SSLWriteFunc(_write_callback) + + +class WrappedSocket(object): + """ + API-compatibility wrapper for Python's OpenSSL wrapped socket object. + + Note: _makefile_refs, _drop(), and _reuse() are needed for the garbage + collector of PyPy. + """ + def __init__(self, socket): + self.socket = socket + self.context = None + self._makefile_refs = 0 + self._closed = False + self._exception = None + self._keychain = None + self._keychain_dir = None + self._client_cert_chain = None + + # We save off the previously-configured timeout and then set it to + # zero. This is done because we use select and friends to handle the + # timeouts, but if we leave the timeout set on the lower socket then + # Python will "kindly" call select on that socket again for us. Avoid + # that by forcing the timeout to zero. + self._timeout = self.socket.gettimeout() + self.socket.settimeout(0) + + @contextlib.contextmanager + def _raise_on_error(self): + """ + A context manager that can be used to wrap calls that do I/O from + SecureTransport. If any of the I/O callbacks hit an exception, this + context manager will correctly propagate the exception after the fact. + This avoids silently swallowing those exceptions. + + It also correctly forces the socket closed. + """ + self._exception = None + + # We explicitly don't catch around this yield because in the unlikely + # event that an exception was hit in the block we don't want to swallow + # it. + yield + if self._exception is not None: + exception, self._exception = self._exception, None + self.close() + raise exception + + def _set_ciphers(self): + """ + Sets up the allowed ciphers. By default this matches the set in + util.ssl_.DEFAULT_CIPHERS, at least as supported by macOS. This is done + custom and doesn't allow changing at this time, mostly because parsing + OpenSSL cipher strings is going to be a freaking nightmare. + """ + ciphers = (Security.SSLCipherSuite * len(CIPHER_SUITES))(*CIPHER_SUITES) + result = Security.SSLSetEnabledCiphers( + self.context, ciphers, len(CIPHER_SUITES) + ) + _assert_no_error(result) + + def _custom_validate(self, verify, trust_bundle): + """ + Called when we have set custom validation. We do this in two cases: + first, when cert validation is entirely disabled; and second, when + using a custom trust DB. + """ + # If we disabled cert validation, just say: cool. + if not verify: + return + + # We want data in memory, so load it up. + if os.path.isfile(trust_bundle): + with open(trust_bundle, 'rb') as f: + trust_bundle = f.read() + + cert_array = None + trust = Security.SecTrustRef() + + try: + # Get a CFArray that contains the certs we want. + cert_array = _cert_array_from_pem(trust_bundle) + + # Ok, now the hard part. We want to get the SecTrustRef that ST has + # created for this connection, shove our CAs into it, tell ST to + # ignore everything else it knows, and then ask if it can build a + # chain. This is a buuuunch of code. + result = Security.SSLCopyPeerTrust( + self.context, ctypes.byref(trust) + ) + _assert_no_error(result) + if not trust: + raise ssl.SSLError("Failed to copy trust reference") + + result = Security.SecTrustSetAnchorCertificates(trust, cert_array) + _assert_no_error(result) + + result = Security.SecTrustSetAnchorCertificatesOnly(trust, True) + _assert_no_error(result) + + trust_result = Security.SecTrustResultType() + result = Security.SecTrustEvaluate( + trust, ctypes.byref(trust_result) + ) + _assert_no_error(result) + finally: + if trust: + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(trust) + + if cert_array is not None: + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(cert_array) + + # Ok, now we can look at what the result was. + successes = ( + SecurityConst.kSecTrustResultUnspecified, + SecurityConst.kSecTrustResultProceed + ) + if trust_result.value not in successes: + raise ssl.SSLError( + "certificate verify failed, error code: %d" % + trust_result.value + ) + + def handshake(self, + server_hostname, + verify, + trust_bundle, + min_version, + max_version, + client_cert, + client_key, + client_key_passphrase): + """ + Actually performs the TLS handshake. This is run automatically by + wrapped socket, and shouldn't be needed in user code. + """ + # First, we do the initial bits of connection setup. We need to create + # a context, set its I/O funcs, and set the connection reference. + self.context = Security.SSLCreateContext( + None, SecurityConst.kSSLClientSide, SecurityConst.kSSLStreamType + ) + result = Security.SSLSetIOFuncs( + self.context, _read_callback_pointer, _write_callback_pointer + ) + _assert_no_error(result) + + # Here we need to compute the handle to use. We do this by taking the + # id of self modulo 2**31 - 1. If this is already in the dictionary, we + # just keep incrementing by one until we find a free space. + with _connection_ref_lock: + handle = id(self) % 2147483647 + while handle in _connection_refs: + handle = (handle + 1) % 2147483647 + _connection_refs[handle] = self + + result = Security.SSLSetConnection(self.context, handle) + _assert_no_error(result) + + # If we have a server hostname, we should set that too. + if server_hostname: + if not isinstance(server_hostname, bytes): + server_hostname = server_hostname.encode('utf-8') + + result = Security.SSLSetPeerDomainName( + self.context, server_hostname, len(server_hostname) + ) + _assert_no_error(result) + + # Setup the ciphers. + self._set_ciphers() + + # Set the minimum and maximum TLS versions. + result = Security.SSLSetProtocolVersionMin(self.context, min_version) + _assert_no_error(result) + result = Security.SSLSetProtocolVersionMax(self.context, max_version) + _assert_no_error(result) + + # If there's a trust DB, we need to use it. We do that by telling + # SecureTransport to break on server auth. We also do that if we don't + # want to validate the certs at all: we just won't actually do any + # authing in that case. + if not verify or trust_bundle is not None: + result = Security.SSLSetSessionOption( + self.context, + SecurityConst.kSSLSessionOptionBreakOnServerAuth, + True + ) + _assert_no_error(result) + + # If there's a client cert, we need to use it. + if client_cert: + self._keychain, self._keychain_dir = _temporary_keychain() + self._client_cert_chain = _load_client_cert_chain( + self._keychain, client_cert, client_key + ) + result = Security.SSLSetCertificate( + self.context, self._client_cert_chain + ) + _assert_no_error(result) + + while True: + with self._raise_on_error(): + result = Security.SSLHandshake(self.context) + + if result == SecurityConst.errSSLWouldBlock: + raise socket.timeout("handshake timed out") + elif result == SecurityConst.errSSLServerAuthCompleted: + self._custom_validate(verify, trust_bundle) + continue + else: + _assert_no_error(result) + break + + def fileno(self): + return self.socket.fileno() + + # Copy-pasted from Python 3.5 source code + def _decref_socketios(self): + if self._makefile_refs > 0: + self._makefile_refs -= 1 + if self._closed: + self.close() + + def recv(self, bufsiz): + buffer = ctypes.create_string_buffer(bufsiz) + bytes_read = self.recv_into(buffer, bufsiz) + data = buffer[:bytes_read] + return data + + def recv_into(self, buffer, nbytes=None): + # Read short on EOF. + if self._closed: + return 0 + + if nbytes is None: + nbytes = len(buffer) + + buffer = (ctypes.c_char * nbytes).from_buffer(buffer) + processed_bytes = ctypes.c_size_t(0) + + with self._raise_on_error(): + result = Security.SSLRead( + self.context, buffer, nbytes, ctypes.byref(processed_bytes) + ) + + # There are some result codes that we want to treat as "not always + # errors". Specifically, those are errSSLWouldBlock, + # errSSLClosedGraceful, and errSSLClosedNoNotify. + if (result == SecurityConst.errSSLWouldBlock): + # If we didn't process any bytes, then this was just a time out. + # However, we can get errSSLWouldBlock in situations when we *did* + # read some data, and in those cases we should just read "short" + # and return. + if processed_bytes.value == 0: + # Timed out, no data read. + raise socket.timeout("recv timed out") + elif result in (SecurityConst.errSSLClosedGraceful, SecurityConst.errSSLClosedNoNotify): + # The remote peer has closed this connection. We should do so as + # well. Note that we don't actually return here because in + # principle this could actually be fired along with return data. + # It's unlikely though. + self.close() + else: + _assert_no_error(result) + + # Ok, we read and probably succeeded. We should return whatever data + # was actually read. + return processed_bytes.value + + def settimeout(self, timeout): + self._timeout = timeout + + def gettimeout(self): + return self._timeout + + def send(self, data): + processed_bytes = ctypes.c_size_t(0) + + with self._raise_on_error(): + result = Security.SSLWrite( + self.context, data, len(data), ctypes.byref(processed_bytes) + ) + + if result == SecurityConst.errSSLWouldBlock and processed_bytes.value == 0: + # Timed out + raise socket.timeout("send timed out") + else: + _assert_no_error(result) + + # We sent, and probably succeeded. Tell them how much we sent. + return processed_bytes.value + + def sendall(self, data): + total_sent = 0 + while total_sent < len(data): + sent = self.send(data[total_sent:total_sent + SSL_WRITE_BLOCKSIZE]) + total_sent += sent + + def shutdown(self): + with self._raise_on_error(): + Security.SSLClose(self.context) + + def close(self): + # TODO: should I do clean shutdown here? Do I have to? + if self._makefile_refs < 1: + self._closed = True + if self.context: + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(self.context) + self.context = None + if self._client_cert_chain: + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(self._client_cert_chain) + self._client_cert_chain = None + if self._keychain: + Security.SecKeychainDelete(self._keychain) + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(self._keychain) + shutil.rmtree(self._keychain_dir) + self._keychain = self._keychain_dir = None + return self.socket.close() + else: + self._makefile_refs -= 1 + + def getpeercert(self, binary_form=False): + # Urgh, annoying. + # + # Here's how we do this: + # + # 1. Call SSLCopyPeerTrust to get hold of the trust object for this + # connection. + # 2. Call SecTrustGetCertificateAtIndex for index 0 to get the leaf. + # 3. To get the CN, call SecCertificateCopyCommonName and process that + # string so that it's of the appropriate type. + # 4. To get the SAN, we need to do something a bit more complex: + # a. Call SecCertificateCopyValues to get the data, requesting + # kSecOIDSubjectAltName. + # b. Mess about with this dictionary to try to get the SANs out. + # + # This is gross. Really gross. It's going to be a few hundred LoC extra + # just to repeat something that SecureTransport can *already do*. So my + # operating assumption at this time is that what we want to do is + # instead to just flag to urllib3 that it shouldn't do its own hostname + # validation when using SecureTransport. + if not binary_form: + raise ValueError( + "SecureTransport only supports dumping binary certs" + ) + trust = Security.SecTrustRef() + certdata = None + der_bytes = None + + try: + # Grab the trust store. + result = Security.SSLCopyPeerTrust( + self.context, ctypes.byref(trust) + ) + _assert_no_error(result) + if not trust: + # Probably we haven't done the handshake yet. No biggie. + return None + + cert_count = Security.SecTrustGetCertificateCount(trust) + if not cert_count: + # Also a case that might happen if we haven't handshaked. + # Handshook? Handshaken? + return None + + leaf = Security.SecTrustGetCertificateAtIndex(trust, 0) + assert leaf + + # Ok, now we want the DER bytes. + certdata = Security.SecCertificateCopyData(leaf) + assert certdata + + data_length = CoreFoundation.CFDataGetLength(certdata) + data_buffer = CoreFoundation.CFDataGetBytePtr(certdata) + der_bytes = ctypes.string_at(data_buffer, data_length) + finally: + if certdata: + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(certdata) + if trust: + CoreFoundation.CFRelease(trust) + + return der_bytes + + def _reuse(self): + self._makefile_refs += 1 + + def _drop(self): + if self._makefile_refs < 1: + self.close() + else: + self._makefile_refs -= 1 + + +if _fileobject: # Platform-specific: Python 2 + def makefile(self, mode, bufsize=-1): + self._makefile_refs += 1 + return _fileobject(self, mode, bufsize, close=True) +else: # Platform-specific: Python 3 + def makefile(self, mode="r", buffering=None, *args, **kwargs): + # We disable buffering with SecureTransport because it conflicts with + # the buffering that ST does internally (see issue #1153 for more). + buffering = 0 + return backport_makefile(self, mode, buffering, *args, **kwargs) + +WrappedSocket.makefile = makefile + + +class SecureTransportContext(object): + """ + I am a wrapper class for the SecureTransport library, to translate the + interface of the standard library ``SSLContext`` object to calls into + SecureTransport. + """ + def __init__(self, protocol): + self._min_version, self._max_version = _protocol_to_min_max[protocol] + self._options = 0 + self._verify = False + self._trust_bundle = None + self._client_cert = None + self._client_key = None + self._client_key_passphrase = None + + @property + def check_hostname(self): + """ + SecureTransport cannot have its hostname checking disabled. For more, + see the comment on getpeercert() in this file. + """ + return True + + @check_hostname.setter + def check_hostname(self, value): + """ + SecureTransport cannot have its hostname checking disabled. For more, + see the comment on getpeercert() in this file. + """ + pass + + @property + def options(self): + # TODO: Well, crap. + # + # So this is the bit of the code that is the most likely to cause us + # trouble. Essentially we need to enumerate all of the SSL options that + # users might want to use and try to see if we can sensibly translate + # them, or whether we should just ignore them. + return self._options + + @options.setter + def options(self, value): + # TODO: Update in line with above. + self._options = value + + @property + def verify_mode(self): + return ssl.CERT_REQUIRED if self._verify else ssl.CERT_NONE + + @verify_mode.setter + def verify_mode(self, value): + self._verify = True if value == ssl.CERT_REQUIRED else False + + def set_default_verify_paths(self): + # So, this has to do something a bit weird. Specifically, what it does + # is nothing. + # + # This means that, if we had previously had load_verify_locations + # called, this does not undo that. We need to do that because it turns + # out that the rest of the urllib3 code will attempt to load the + # default verify paths if it hasn't been told about any paths, even if + # the context itself was sometime earlier. We resolve that by just + # ignoring it. + pass + + def load_default_certs(self): + return self.set_default_verify_paths() + + def set_ciphers(self, ciphers): + # For now, we just require the default cipher string. + if ciphers != util.ssl_.DEFAULT_CIPHERS: + raise ValueError( + "SecureTransport doesn't support custom cipher strings" + ) + + def load_verify_locations(self, cafile=None, capath=None, cadata=None): + # OK, we only really support cadata and cafile. + if capath is not None: + raise ValueError( + "SecureTransport does not support cert directories" + ) + + self._trust_bundle = cafile or cadata + + def load_cert_chain(self, certfile, keyfile=None, password=None): + self._client_cert = certfile + self._client_key = keyfile + self._client_cert_passphrase = password + + def wrap_socket(self, sock, server_side=False, + do_handshake_on_connect=True, suppress_ragged_eofs=True, + server_hostname=None): + # So, what do we do here? Firstly, we assert some properties. This is a + # stripped down shim, so there is some functionality we don't support. + # See PEP 543 for the real deal. + assert not server_side + assert do_handshake_on_connect + assert suppress_ragged_eofs + + # Ok, we're good to go. Now we want to create the wrapped socket object + # and store it in the appropriate place. + wrapped_socket = WrappedSocket(sock) + + # Now we can handshake + wrapped_socket.handshake( + server_hostname, self._verify, self._trust_bundle, + self._min_version, self._max_version, self._client_cert, + self._client_key, self._client_key_passphrase + ) + return wrapped_socket diff --git a/python/urllib3/contrib/socks.py b/python/urllib3/contrib/socks.py new file mode 100644 index 0000000..811e312 --- /dev/null +++ b/python/urllib3/contrib/socks.py @@ -0,0 +1,192 @@ +# -*- coding: utf-8 -*- +""" +This module contains provisional support for SOCKS proxies from within +urllib3. This module supports SOCKS4 (specifically the SOCKS4A variant) and +SOCKS5. To enable its functionality, either install PySocks or install this +module with the ``socks`` extra. + +The SOCKS implementation supports the full range of urllib3 features. It also +supports the following SOCKS features: + +- SOCKS4 +- SOCKS4a +- SOCKS5 +- Usernames and passwords for the SOCKS proxy + +Known Limitations: + +- Currently PySocks does not support contacting remote websites via literal + IPv6 addresses. Any such connection attempt will fail. You must use a domain + name. +- Currently PySocks does not support IPv6 connections to the SOCKS proxy. Any + such connection attempt will fail. +""" +from __future__ import absolute_import + +try: + import socks +except ImportError: + import warnings + from ..exceptions import DependencyWarning + + warnings.warn(( + 'SOCKS support in urllib3 requires the installation of optional ' + 'dependencies: specifically, PySocks. For more information, see ' + 'https://urllib3.readthedocs.io/en/latest/contrib.html#socks-proxies' + ), + DependencyWarning + ) + raise + +from socket import error as SocketError, timeout as SocketTimeout + +from ..connection import ( + HTTPConnection, HTTPSConnection +) +from ..connectionpool import ( + HTTPConnectionPool, HTTPSConnectionPool +) +from ..exceptions import ConnectTimeoutError, NewConnectionError +from ..poolmanager import PoolManager +from ..util.url import parse_url + +try: + import ssl +except ImportError: + ssl = None + + +class SOCKSConnection(HTTPConnection): + """ + A plain-text HTTP connection that connects via a SOCKS proxy. + """ + def __init__(self, *args, **kwargs): + self._socks_options = kwargs.pop('_socks_options') + super(SOCKSConnection, self).__init__(*args, **kwargs) + + def _new_conn(self): + """ + Establish a new connection via the SOCKS proxy. + """ + extra_kw = {} + if self.source_address: + extra_kw['source_address'] = self.source_address + + if self.socket_options: + extra_kw['socket_options'] = self.socket_options + + try: + conn = socks.create_connection( + (self.host, self.port), + proxy_type=self._socks_options['socks_version'], + proxy_addr=self._socks_options['proxy_host'], + proxy_port=self._socks_options['proxy_port'], + proxy_username=self._socks_options['username'], + proxy_password=self._socks_options['password'], + proxy_rdns=self._socks_options['rdns'], + timeout=self.timeout, + **extra_kw + ) + + except SocketTimeout as e: + raise ConnectTimeoutError( + self, "Connection to %s timed out. (connect timeout=%s)" % + (self.host, self.timeout)) + + except socks.ProxyError as e: + # This is fragile as hell, but it seems to be the only way to raise + # useful errors here. + if e.socket_err: + error = e.socket_err + if isinstance(error, SocketTimeout): + raise ConnectTimeoutError( + self, + "Connection to %s timed out. (connect timeout=%s)" % + (self.host, self.timeout) + ) + else: + raise NewConnectionError( + self, + "Failed to establish a new connection: %s" % error + ) + else: + raise NewConnectionError( + self, + "Failed to establish a new connection: %s" % e + ) + + except SocketError as e: # Defensive: PySocks should catch all these. + raise NewConnectionError( + self, "Failed to establish a new connection: %s" % e) + + return conn + + +# We don't need to duplicate the Verified/Unverified distinction from +# urllib3/connection.py here because the HTTPSConnection will already have been +# correctly set to either the Verified or Unverified form by that module. This +# means the SOCKSHTTPSConnection will automatically be the correct type. +class SOCKSHTTPSConnection(SOCKSConnection, HTTPSConnection): + pass + + +class SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool(HTTPConnectionPool): + ConnectionCls = SOCKSConnection + + +class SOCKSHTTPSConnectionPool(HTTPSConnectionPool): + ConnectionCls = SOCKSHTTPSConnection + + +class SOCKSProxyManager(PoolManager): + """ + A version of the urllib3 ProxyManager that routes connections via the + defined SOCKS proxy. + """ + pool_classes_by_scheme = { + 'http': SOCKSHTTPConnectionPool, + 'https': SOCKSHTTPSConnectionPool, + } + + def __init__(self, proxy_url, username=None, password=None, + num_pools=10, headers=None, **connection_pool_kw): + parsed = parse_url(proxy_url) + + if username is None and password is None and parsed.auth is not None: + split = parsed.auth.split(':') + if len(split) == 2: + username, password = split + if parsed.scheme == 'socks5': + socks_version = socks.PROXY_TYPE_SOCKS5 + rdns = False + elif parsed.scheme == 'socks5h': + socks_version = socks.PROXY_TYPE_SOCKS5 + rdns = True + elif parsed.scheme == 'socks4': + socks_version = socks.PROXY_TYPE_SOCKS4 + rdns = False + elif parsed.scheme == 'socks4a': + socks_version = socks.PROXY_TYPE_SOCKS4 + rdns = True + else: + raise ValueError( + "Unable to determine SOCKS version from %s" % proxy_url + ) + + self.proxy_url = proxy_url + + socks_options = { + 'socks_version': socks_version, + 'proxy_host': parsed.host, + 'proxy_port': parsed.port, + 'username': username, + 'password': password, + 'rdns': rdns + } + connection_pool_kw['_socks_options'] = socks_options + + super(SOCKSProxyManager, self).__init__( + num_pools, headers, **connection_pool_kw + ) + + self.pool_classes_by_scheme = SOCKSProxyManager.pool_classes_by_scheme |