diff options
| -rwxr-xr-x | spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | 547 |
1 files changed, 302 insertions, 245 deletions
diff --git a/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh b/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh index c0a5eba..72cbfef 100755 --- a/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh +++ b/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ # # Stephane Lesimple # -VERSION=0.21 +VERSION=0.22 # Script configuration show_usage() @@ -34,8 +34,10 @@ show_usage() Options: --no-color Don't use color codes -v, --verbose Increase verbosity level - --batch Produce machine readable output + --batch text Produce machine readable output, this is the default if --batch is specified alone --batch nrpe Produce machine readable output formatted for NRPE + --variant [1,2,3] Specify which variant you'd like to check, by default all variants are checked + Can be specified multiple times (e.g. --variant 2 --variant 3) IMPORTANT: A false sense of security is worse than no security at all. @@ -79,6 +81,10 @@ opt_no_color=0 opt_batch=0 opt_batch_format="text" opt_verbose=1 +opt_variant1=0 +opt_variant2=0 +opt_variant3=0 +opt_allvariants=1 nrpe_critical=0 nrpe_unknown=0 @@ -255,6 +261,20 @@ while [ -n "$1" ]; do elif [ "$1" = "-v" -o "$1" = "--verbose" ]; then opt_verbose=$(expr $opt_verbose + 1) shift + elif [ "$1" = "--variant" ]; then + if [ -z "$2" ]; then + echo "$0: error: option --variant expects a parameter (1, 2 or 3)" >&2 + exit 1 + fi + case "$2" in + 1) opt_variant1=1; opt_allvariants=0;; + 2) opt_variant2=1; opt_allvariants=0;; + 3) opt_variant3=1; opt_allvariants=0;; + *) + echo "$0: error: invalid parameter '$2' for --variant, expected either 1, 2 or 3" >&2; + exit 1;; + esac + shift 2 elif [ "$1" = "-h" -o "$1" = "--help" ]; then show_header show_usage @@ -467,293 +487,330 @@ fi _info -########### -# SPECTRE 1 -_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m" -_info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: " +# end of header stuff -status=0 -if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$vmlinux_err" -else - if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package" +# now we define some util functions and the check_*() funcs, as +# the user can choose to execute only some of those + +mount_debugfs() +{ + if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then + # try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards + mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1 + fi +} + +umount_debugfs() +{ + if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then + # umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves + umount /sys/kernel/debug + fi +} + +################### +# SPECTRE VARIANT 1 +check_variant1() +{ + _info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5753 [bounds check bypass] aka 'Spectre Variant 1'\033[0m" + _info_nol "* Checking count of LFENCE opcodes in kernel: " + + status=0 + if [ -n "$vmlinux_err" ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "$vmlinux_err" else - # here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode - # in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50 - # in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+) - # v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches, - # so let's push the threshold to 70. - # TODO LKML patch is starting to dump LFENCE in favor of the PAUSE opcode, we might need to check that (patch not stabilized yet) - nb_lfence=$(objdump -D "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence) - if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 70 ]; then - pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70" - status=1 + if ! which objdump >/dev/null 2>&1; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'objdump' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package" else - pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70" - status=2 + # here we disassemble the kernel and count the number of occurences of the LFENCE opcode + # in non-patched kernels, this has been empirically determined as being around 40-50 + # in patched kernels, this is more around 70-80, sometimes way higher (100+) + # v0.13: 68 found in a 3.10.23-xxxx-std-ipv6-64 (with lots of modules compiled-in directly), which doesn't have the LFENCE patches, + # so let's push the threshold to 70. + # TODO LKML patch is starting to dump LFENCE in favor of the PAUSE opcode, we might need to check that (patch not stabilized yet) + nb_lfence=$(objdump -D "$vmlinux" | grep -wc lfence) + if [ "$nb_lfence" -lt 70 ]; then + pstatus red NO "only $nb_lfence opcodes found, should be >= 70" + status=1 + else + pstatus green YES "$nb_lfence opcodes found, which is >= 70" + status=2 + fi fi fi -fi -if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then - pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" -else - case "$status" in - 0) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 UNK "impossible to check ${vmlinux}";; - 1) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 VULN 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';; - 2) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';; - esac -fi - -########### -# VARIANT 2 -_info -_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m" -_info "* Mitigation 1" -_info_nol "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: " -if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then - # try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards) - modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1 -fi -if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?" -else - # the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48 - # here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool - # if we get a read error, the MSR is not there - dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip=9 2>/dev/null - if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then - pstatus green YES + if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then + pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" else - pstatus red NO + case "$status" in + 0) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 UNK "impossible to check ${vmlinux}";; + 1) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 VULN 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';; + 2) pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5753 OK 'heuristic to be improved when official patches become available';; + esac fi -fi +} -if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then - # if we used modprobe ourselves, rmmod the module - rmmod msr 2>/dev/null -fi +################### +# SPECTRE VARIANT 2 +check_variant2() +{ + _info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5715 [branch target injection] aka 'Spectre Variant 2'\033[0m" + _info "* Mitigation 1" + _info_nol "* Hardware (CPU microcode) support for mitigation: " + if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then + # try to load the module ourselves (and remember it so we can rmmod it afterwards) + modprobe msr 2>/dev/null && insmod_msr=1 + fi + if [ ! -e /dev/cpu/0/msr ]; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read /dev/cpu/0/msr, is msr support enabled in your kernel?" + else + # the new MSR 'SPEC_CTRL' is at offset 0x48 + # here we use dd, it's the same as using 'rdmsr 0x48' but without needing the rdmsr tool + # if we get a read error, the MSR is not there + dd if=/dev/cpu/0/msr of=/dev/null bs=8 count=1 skip=9 2>/dev/null + if [ $? -eq 0 ]; then + pstatus green YES + else + pstatus red NO + fi + fi -_info_nol "* Kernel support for IBRS: " -if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - if [ ! -e /sys/kernel/debug/sched_features ]; then - # try to mount the debugfs hierarchy ourselves and remember it to umount afterwards - mount -t debugfs debugfs /sys/kernel/debug 2>/dev/null && mounted_debugfs=1 + if [ "$insmod_msr" = 1 ]; then + # if we used modprobe ourselves, rmmod the module + rmmod msr 2>/dev/null + fi + + _info_nol "* Kernel support for IBRS: " + if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + mount_debugfs + if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then + # if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in + pstatus green YES + ibrs_supported=1 + ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null) + elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then + # RedHat uses a different path (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301) + pstatus green YES + ibrs_supported=1 + ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null) + fi fi - if [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled ]; then - # if the file is there, we have IBRS compiled-in - pstatus green YES - ibrs_supported=1 - ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null) - elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled ]; then - # RedHat uses a different path (see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301) - pstatus green YES - ibrs_supported=1 - ibrs_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/ibrs_enabled 2>/dev/null) + if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then + if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then + pstatus green YES + ibrs_supported=1 + fi fi -fi -if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then - if grep -q spec_ctrl "$opt_map"; then - pstatus green YES - ibrs_supported=1 + if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then + pstatus red NO fi -fi -if [ "$ibrs_supported" != 1 ]; then - pstatus red NO -fi - -_info_nol "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: " -if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - # 0 means disabled - # 1 is enabled only for kernel space - # 2 is enabled for kernel and user space - case "$ibrs_enabled" in - "") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;; - 0) pstatus red NO;; - 1 | 2) pstatus green YES;; - *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; - esac -else - pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" -fi - -_info_nol "* IBRS enabled for User space: " -if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - case "$ibrs_enabled" in - "") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;; - 0 | 1) pstatus red NO;; - 2) pstatus green YES;; - *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; - esac -else - pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" -fi -_info "* Mitigation 2" -_info_nol "* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: " -# We check the RETPOLINE kernel options -if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then - if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then - pstatus green YES - retpoline=1 + _info_nol "* IBRS enabled for Kernel space: " + if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + # 0 means disabled + # 1 is enabled only for kernel space + # 2 is enabled for kernel and user space + case "$ibrs_enabled" in + "") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;; + 0) pstatus red NO;; + 1 | 2) pstatus green YES;; + *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; + esac else - pstatus red NO + pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" fi -else - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration" -fi -_info_nol "* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: " -# Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm -# For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles) -# See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79 -# In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set -# *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol -if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then - # look for the symbol - if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then - retpoline_compiler=1 - pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map" + _info_nol "* IBRS enabled for User space: " + if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + case "$ibrs_enabled" in + "") [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN || pstatus red NO;; + 0 | 1) pstatus red NO;; + 2) pstatus green YES;; + *) pstatus yellow UNKNOWN;; + esac else - pstatus red NO + pstatus blue N/A "not testable in offline mode" fi -elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then - # look for the symbol - if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then - # the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol - if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then + + _info "* Mitigation 2" + _info_nol "* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: " + # We check the RETPOLINE kernel options + if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then + if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then + pstatus green YES + retpoline=1 + else + pstatus red NO + fi + else + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration" + fi + + _info_nol "* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: " + # Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm + # For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles) + # See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79 + # In latest retpoline LKML patches, the noretpoline_setup symbol exists only if CONFIG_RETPOLINE is set + # *AND* if the compiler is retpoline-compliant, so look for that symbol + if [ -n "$opt_map" ]; then + # look for the symbol + if grep -qw noretpoline_setup "$opt_map"; then + retpoline_compiler=1 + pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup symbol found in System.map" + else + pstatus red NO + fi + elif [ -n "$vmlinux" ]; then + # look for the symbol + if which nm >/dev/null 2>&1; then + # the proper way: use nm and look for the symbol + if nm "$vmlinux" 2>/dev/null | grep -qw 'noretpoline_setup'; then + retpoline_compiler=1 + pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols" + else + pstatus red NO + fi + elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then + # if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have + # any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary retpoline_compiler=1 - pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux symbols" + pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux" else pstatus red NO fi - elif grep -q noretpoline_setup "$vmlinux"; then - # if we don't have nm, nevermind, the symbol name is long enough to not have - # any false positive using good old grep directly on the binary - retpoline_compiler=1 - pstatus green YES "noretpoline_setup found in vmlinux" else - pstatus red NO + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map" fi -else - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map" -fi -if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then - pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" -elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability" -elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then - pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability" - else - pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" - fi -else - if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime" + if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then + pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" + elif [ "$retpoline" = 1 -a "$retpoline_compiler" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "retpoline mitigate the vulnerability" + elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + if [ "$ibrs_enabled" = 1 -o "$ibrs_enabled" = 2 ]; then + pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "IBRS mitigates the vulnerability" + else + pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" + fi else - pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" + if [ "$ibrs_supported" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 OK "offline mode: IBRS will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime" + else + pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5715 VULN "IBRS hardware + kernel support OR kernel with retpoline are needed to mitigate the vulnerability" + fi fi -fi +} -########## -# MELTDOWN -_info -_info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m" -_info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): " -kpti_support=0 -kpti_can_tell=0 -if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then - kpti_can_tell=1 - if grep -Eq '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config"; then - kpti_support=1 - fi -fi -if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then - # it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch - # so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map - kpti_can_tell=1 - if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then - kpti_support=1 +######################## +# MELTDOWN aka VARIANT 3 +check_variant3() +{ + _info "\033[1;34mCVE-2017-5754 [rogue data cache load] aka 'Meltdown' aka 'Variant 3'\033[0m" + _info_nol "* Kernel supports Page Table Isolation (PTI): " + kpti_support=0 + kpti_can_tell=0 + if [ -n "$opt_config" ]; then + kpti_can_tell=1 + if grep -Eq '^(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION|CONFIG_KAISER)=y' "$opt_config"; then + kpti_support=1 + fi fi -fi -if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$vmlinux" ]; then - # same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the - # nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option) - kpti_can_tell=1 - if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package" - else - if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then + if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$opt_map" ]; then + # it's not an elif: some backports don't have the PTI config but still include the patch + # so we try to find an exported symbol that is part of the PTI patch in System.map + kpti_can_tell=1 + if grep -qw kpti_force_enabled "$opt_map"; then kpti_support=1 fi fi -fi - -if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then - pstatus green YES -elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then - pstatus red NO -else - pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file" -fi - -_info_nol "* PTI enabled and active: " -if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then - # vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo - kpti_enabled=1 - elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then - # kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo - kpti_enabled=1 - elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then - # RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301 - kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null) - elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then - # if we can't find the flag, grep dmesg output - kpti_enabled=1 - elif [ -r /var/log/dmesg ] && grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled' /var/log/dmesg; then - # if we can't find the flag in dmesg output, grep in /var/log/dmesg when readable - kpti_enabled=1 - else - kpti_enabled=0 + if [ "$kpti_support" = 0 -a -n "$vmlinux" ]; then + # same as above but in case we don't have System.map and only vmlinux, look for the + # nopti option that is part of the patch (kernel command line option) + kpti_can_tell=1 + if ! which strings >/dev/null 2>&1; then + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "missing 'strings' tool, please install it, usually it's in the binutils package" + else + if strings "$vmlinux" | grep -qw nopti; then + kpti_support=1 + fi + fi fi - if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then + + if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then pstatus green YES - else + elif [ "$kpti_can_tell" = 1 ]; then pstatus red NO - fi -else - pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode" -fi - -if [ "$mounted_debugfs" = 1 ]; then - # umount debugfs if we did mount it ourselves - umount /sys/kernel/debug -fi - -if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then - pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" -elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then - if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability" else - pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" + pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration nor System.map file" + fi + + mount_debugfs + _info_nol "* PTI enabled and active: " + if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + if grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw pti; then + # vanilla PTI patch sets the 'pti' flag in cpuinfo + kpti_enabled=1 + elif grep ^flags /proc/cpuinfo | grep -qw kaiser; then + # kernel line 4.9 sets the 'kaiser' flag in cpuinfo + kpti_enabled=1 + elif [ -e /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled ]; then + # RedHat Backport creates a dedicated file, see https://access.redhat.com/articles/3311301 + kpti_enabled=$(cat /sys/kernel/debug/x86/pti_enabled 2>/dev/null) + elif dmesg | grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled'; then + # if we can't find the flag, grep dmesg output + kpti_enabled=1 + elif [ -r /var/log/dmesg ] && grep -Eq 'Kernel/User page tables isolation: enabled|Kernel page table isolation enabled' /var/log/dmesg; then + # if we can't find the flag in dmesg output, grep in /var/log/dmesg when readable + kpti_enabled=1 + else + kpti_enabled=0 + fi + if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then + pstatus green YES + else + pstatus red NO + fi + else + pstatus blue N/A "can't verify if PTI is enabled in offline mode" fi -else - if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then - pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime" + + if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then + pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" + elif [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then + if [ "$kpti_enabled" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "PTI mitigates the vulnerability" + else + pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" + fi else - pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" + if [ "$kpti_support" = 1 ]; then + pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 OK "offline mode: PTI will mitigate the vulnerability if enabled at runtime" + else + pvulnstatus CVE-2017-5754 VULN "PTI is needed to mitigate the vulnerability" + fi fi -fi +} -_info +# now run the checks the user asked for +if [ "$opt_variant1" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then + check_variant1 + _info +fi +if [ "$opt_variant2" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then + check_variant2 + _info +fi +if [ "$opt_variant3" = 1 -o "$opt_allvariants" = 1 ]; then + check_variant3 + _info +fi _info "A false sense of security is worse than no security at all, see --disclaimer" +# this'll umount only if we mounted debugfs ourselves +umount_debugfs + +# cleanup the temp decompressed config [ -n "$dumped_config" ] && rm -f "$dumped_config" if [ "$opt_batch" = 1 -a "$opt_batch_format" = "nrpe" ]; then |