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| author | Stéphane Lesimple <speed47_github@speed47.net> | 2018-01-22 11:00:54 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Stéphane Lesimple <speed47_github@speed47.net> | 2018-01-24 09:04:25 +0100 |
| commit | d55bafde19a42d8d11ec803128b5b74f1ccc34b8 (patch) | |
| tree | ff9193cfe6b2fc73af6f25f4ac4d15b69f75cb59 | |
| parent | 147462c0ab5100833774a8913079760c344dab67 (diff) | |
| download | spectre-meltdown-checker-d55bafde19a42d8d11ec803128b5b74f1ccc34b8.tar.lz spectre-meltdown-checker-d55bafde19a42d8d11ec803128b5b74f1ccc34b8.tar.xz spectre-meltdown-checker-d55bafde19a42d8d11ec803128b5b74f1ccc34b8.zip | |
fix(cpu): trust is_cpu_vulnerable even w/ debugfs
For variant3 under AMD, the debugfs vulnerabilities hierarchy
flags the system as Vulnerable, which is wrong. Trust our own
is_cpu_vulnerable() func in that case
| -rwxr-xr-x | spectre-meltdown-checker.sh | 15 |
1 files changed, 6 insertions, 9 deletions
diff --git a/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh b/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh index 6a92a49..92917b0 100755 --- a/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh +++ b/spectre-meltdown-checker.sh @@ -851,8 +851,7 @@ check_variant1() status=UNK fi - # if we have the /sys interface, don't even check is_cpu_vulnerable ourselves, the kernel already does it - if [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ] && ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then + if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 1; then # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all msg="your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" status=OK @@ -1104,7 +1103,7 @@ check_variant2() unload_cpuid _info "* Mitigation 2" - _info_nol "* Kernel compiled with retpoline option: " + _info_nol " * Kernel compiled with retpoline option: " # We check the RETPOLINE kernel options if [ -r "$opt_config" ]; then if grep -q '^CONFIG_RETPOLINE=y' "$opt_config"; then @@ -1118,7 +1117,7 @@ check_variant2() pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't read your kernel configuration" fi - _info_nol "* Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: " + _info_nol " * Kernel compiled with a retpoline-aware compiler: " # Now check if the compiler used to compile the kernel knows how to insert retpolines in generated asm # For gcc, this is -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern (detected by the kernel makefiles) # See gcc commit https://github.com/hjl-tools/gcc/commit/23b517d4a67c02d3ef80b6109218f2aadad7bd79 @@ -1163,7 +1162,7 @@ check_variant2() [ "$retpoline" = 1 ] && pstatus yellow UNKNOWN "couldn't find your kernel image or System.map" || pstatus red NO fi - _info_nol "* Retpoline enabled: " + _info_nol " * Retpoline enabled: " if [ "$opt_live" = 1 ]; then # kernel adds this flag when retpoline is supported and enabled, # regardless of the fact that it's minimal / full and generic / amd @@ -1183,8 +1182,7 @@ check_variant2() fi cve='CVE-2017-5715' - # if we have the /sys interface, don't even check is_cpu_vulnerable ourselves, the kernel already does it - if [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ] && ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then + if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 2; then # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then @@ -1359,9 +1357,8 @@ check_variant3() status=UNK fi - # if we have the /sys interface, don't even check is_cpu_vulnerable ourselves, the kernel already does it cve='CVE-2017-5754' - if [ "$sys_interface_available" = 0 ] && ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then + if ! is_cpu_vulnerable 3; then # override status & msg in case CPU is not vulnerable after all pvulnstatus $cve OK "your CPU vendor reported your CPU model as not vulnerable" elif [ -z "$msg" ]; then |